

KALTENBORN
EDITS
THE NEWS


From the collection of the



San Francisco, California
2006

SO LIKEWISE YE EXCEPT YE UTTER BY
THE TONGUE WORDS EASY TO BE
UNDERSTOOD, HOW SHALL IT BE KNOWN
WHAT IS SPOKEN?

FOR YE WILL BE SPEAKING INTO THE AIR!
CORINTHIANS I-14-9



DEAR HANS — SINCE YOU, BY WAY OF
SPEAKING, ARE THE GRANDFATHER OF US ALL
A SORT OF AMIABLE MOBEY DICK OF THE AIR —
I AM SURE THAT ST. PAUL HAD YOU IN MIND
WHEN HE WROTE THIS TO THE GOOD PEOPLE OF
CORINTH. — HENDRIK WILLEM VAN DOORN 2 June 1937.

KALTENBORN EDITS THE NEWS

EUROPE - ASIA - AMERICA

by H. V. Kaltenborn



MODERN AGE BOOKS, INC., NEW YORK

COPYRIGHT BY H. V. KALTENBORN, 1937

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.

*Composed and printed in the United States of America by Union Labor
AT THE RUMFORD PRESS, CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE*

Typography by Robert Josephy

TO MY UNSEEN AUDIENCE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author's thanks are due to Roger Paul Craig and Mary McCarthy for valuable editorial assistance, to the Columbia Broadcasting System for permission to reproduce from *Talks*, material broadcast from Spain and to *The Commentator* for permission to use source material and excerpts from my recent articles.

CONTENTS

<i>Introduction: RADIO AND THE NEWS</i>	iii
1. SPAIN	3
Revolution	11
Intervention	32
2. DUCE — KING — EMPEROR	42
3. IS HITLER GERMANY?	52
4. RUSSIA: TWENTY YEARS AFTER	66
5. THE ORIENT ASTIR	82
6. OTHER DANGER SPOTS	94
Austria	96
Hungary	97
Czechoslovakia	98
Palestine	99
Belgium	100
Poland	101
Danzig	104
7. BRITANNIA, THE BALANCE WHEEL	107
8. A NEW DEAL IN FRANCE	125
9. STRIKE!	139
10. ROOSEVELT: MAN OF ACTION	154
<i>Epilogue: WAR OR PEACE?</i>	177

KALTENBORN
EDITS THE NEWS

INTRODUCTION: RADIO AND THE NEWS

One fine spring morning I sat down to open my morning mail, and though accustomed to expect almost anything from radio listeners, I was struck by the first letter.

It consisted of only a few lines. Somewhat hastily, but with a firm hand, a high school girl in the suburbs had written, *Our English teacher has asked us to write an essay. I chose "World Politics Today." Please send me the material on this subject.*

Whenever I stop to take stock of radio's progress or to answer a query as to its still problematical future, I am reminded of this girl's letter; of the thousand and one different aspects of radio; of the many ways in which it has changed our lives. I can't forget that letter because it indicates graphically the good and ill radio has brought. What a gap it has created between those, like this girl, for whom it has simplified everything, and myself, for whom radio presents a greater complexity every day.

The marriage of radio and the news has been responsible for many significant changes. The technical facility behind ethereal communication has done much more than bring the peoples of the world together. World politics, to use the young lady's comprehensive title, has become everyone's concern. Today, the significant elements of world politics can be assembled from one thousand or ten thousand miles away with the speed of light, related, condensed, interpreted in a few minutes, finally to be broadcast to the tiniest little red schoolhouse, the brightest kitchen, the darkest sick room, the largest mass meeting. The air and the world are literally full of politics, politicians, political incidents and portents. The world awaits them, hour by hour, in home and office and shop and general store, anxious with a new found personal relationship to all these events and personalities, listening, waiting, wondering — sometimes skeptical,

sometimes all too credulous, but always stimulated by the intimacy of personal contact with the voice which brings them word — the familiar voice they have come to know from hearing it regularly, which will tell them what lies behind the words, what it all really means.

Immediately we have stumbled across the opposite poles of radio. The wonder of it — and the utterly commonplace thing it has become. The responsibility that weighs upon whoever uses it, the matter of fact way it is taken for granted by those born and bred to it. As a radio commentator whose regular broadcast is heard by millions, accepted by some and challenged by others, I am never able to forget the intricacy and ingenuity behind radio, the backbreaking toil, the mental anguish, the unnerving precision which was mobilized to make it possible.

Radio is a blessing no one can deny or begrudge to those in need, to the invalid, to the family with few opportunities for enlightenment or entertainment. It has become a boon to mankind which makes all that has gone into it well worth while. But we are beginning to realize that its values must be appraised wisely. We can afford to rely on its mechanical efficiency, but we must also see that such an invention finds its best purposes and uses. It is by no means automatically beneficial. Once we have familiarized ourselves with all its possibilities, for good and evil, we will be better equipped to find its true value, to find in it the means to worthier ends, to ensure the great hopes and promises mankind has set for it. We must always be mindful of the difference between promise and achievement in the moving picture. We know today that wrongly exploited it is capable of undoing much of the good the world has accomplished since long before Marconi exhibited his wireless telegraph.

The pitfalls are everywhere, and perhaps they are shown nowhere more clearly than in the interesting relationship between radio and the news. With "news" as the sole weapon, all the forces and advantages of radio could be mobilized to produce confusion, discontent, ignorance, incompatibility, intemperance, and moral and social disintegration — just as easily as they might be concentrated on public enlightenment, intellectual stimulus, social awareness, diplomatic cooperation, greater understanding and economic recovery.

How? Why? As an introduction to this book in which I endeavor to show, by editing recent news, how complicated an interlocking there is among the health, wealth and destiny of the nations, let us explore a few potential factors in this realm of news by radio.

The first essential is, of course, to realize the technical growth of the industry. When I inaugurated my radio editorship in 1923, it was news in itself that I could address a hundred thousand people at once. It was news in any sense, for any one individual to be heard by that many other individuals, regardless of the means by which they were brought together. The invention that made possible the mass audience was bound to make history. Today mere numbers and miles mean nothing. The significance of this personal, instantly audible message is not that it may be heard by millions, but that it can and does *influence* millions. It was this discovery, radio's personal appeal as opposed to the anonymous and unfelt impression received by the reader of "cold type," that opened up channels of radio more incisive and influential than any previous media had ever known, wider and deeper than the ether waves themselves. Here indeed was a weapon, the scope of which is still, in all probability, beyond the range of present indications. In half a decade the world discovered that here was a weapon, singularly and gigantically adaptable to *use* or *abuse*.

Most Americans have no conception of the misuse of radio abroad. The larger and more progressive groups are beginning to realize that its use even in this country is something more than either the words "commercial" or "utilitarian" imply. If most of our voting population does not seem quite aware of the subtle distinction between news as information and news as propaganda, at least all regular radio listeners are increasingly conscious of the fact that their local station selects the material it uses in keeping with a pre-determined policy, a sometimes indefinable classification most precise in its inclusion or exclusion of certain controversial material.

Apart from the constitutional rights and limitations of freedom of speech, any given broadcasting station's "editorial" viewpoint is supposed to be its own business. Most stations would deny that they have an editorial viewpoint, which merely proves that they don't know what these two words mean. In that sense radio in the United States is "commercial." It is operated for profit, and its policies are

determined by the station management, with no fixed obligation to minority voices except during a political campaign. The fact that it is strictly "utilitarian" is the general contention of broadcasters in the same sense that it is asserted by newspaper publishers. Both talk a lot about public service but admit they are in business to make money. Only the endowed stations operated by colleges, churches, societies or political units would deny that their programs are devised solely to give the public what it wants, in so far as possible.

While the average radio listener is aware that all broadcasting stations in the United States are operating under licenses, awarded (and revocable) by the Federal Communications Commission, many of them would hesitate to regard this as a form of government censorship. Yet there are groups which maintain that the entire broadcasting facilities of the nation are an outlet for government propaganda, that there is no true freedom of speech, that unfair censorship is constantly applied. Different American groups insist variously that our government is Capitalist, Socialist, Fascist and Counter-revolutionary! On the face of it, such attitudes are ridiculous. There is radio censorship of course. Minorities are not on a par with the majorities. But to ask radio to wipe out these distinctions is like asking government to wipe out all distinctions between rich and poor. Minorities and majorities have equal opportunities on the air in much the same sense and with the same limitations in which rich and poor are equal before the law.

Most critics of the American system fail to consider the saving grace of having three powerful rival broadcasting systems, Columbia, Mutual and National. This is extremely healthy in itself, and though it does not rid the air channels of evils or errors of administration, it does provide for a balance of views, a variety of policy and a stimulus of competition which is in every way superior to a monopoly, whether commercial or governmental. This suggests a logical comparison with the British system, where the British Broadcasting System is a government monopoly, operated under the jurisdiction of the Postmaster General, with plenty of discreet attention from the Government. But since both countries have a democratic tradition, and since considerable freedom of speech prevails except on controversial political topics, the difference between the two which receives most attention, is that in Great Britain broadcasting is supported by direct

taxation of receiving set owners whereas in the United States it is supported by advertisers who pay for the time their commercial programs occupy. The British are always grousing against the B. B. C. for one reason or another. Its chief defect from the American point of view is its ultra-conservatism on program material and the almost complete exclusion of real political debate. Both countries have considerable free air as compared with other nations although the United States has infinitely more than England.

From any standpoint, the collection and dissemination of news — I assume that political speeches are news — are the most important functions of radio today. In our own country, except for a few star performers, the news programs are by far the most popular broadcasts. The actual weight of news in radio's balance cannot be measured, however, simply by the headline summaries broadcast over your local station at stated and fixed hours during the day. Though this particular part played by radio in informative news service was sufficient to cause an open break between the industry and the newspapers themselves, it by no means represents the entire field of news to which the radio networks are largely and faithfully devoted. News is, in its broader sense, far more than a timely recording of the world's events. There are as many, if not more, steps in the process of maintaining outstanding radio news service as there are in the course of newspaper publication. Sound coverage, verification from authoritative sources, reliable reporting, spot broadcasting of important events as they occur, comprehensive wire and wireless connections, careful editing, intelligent interpretation, and — above all — the time element, are only the barest essentials in the smooth functioning of such an elaborate mechanism.

This complexity is but one of the reasons for my description of radio as *The Fifth Estate*. Its unique position in relation to the other four, and to the public, had been impressed upon me as a result of my earliest experience with a microphone. It was not entirely in jest that I described the draped factory studio out in Newark where I made my first broadcast as the torture chamber. More than anything else I can remember, I was conscious of the gap I was bridging between my position as a veteran newspaper writer and editor and my debut in this new, somewhat fantastic medium as a radio commentator. I mention this aspect of the ordeal now, rather than any

or all of the accompanying sensations which we early broadcasters experienced when the microphone was an imperfect instrument, because from that very first broadcast I received a complete surprise in my discovery of the actual, or at least potential, relationship between these two allegedly opposite media. I realized then and I am more convinced than ever today, that they are by no means rivals and as I had occasion to insist many times during the press-radio controversy, they can and must complement each other to their reciprocal advantage.

I found, specifically, that the spoken editorial supplemented the written editorial in every respect. With interpretive aims running in parallel grooves, each enables the other to perform its task that much more efficiently. The editor, whether he is a writer or speaker, will find his objective more speedily obtained by the approach of the listener-reader, the man and woman who are his public. If his aim is honestly to enlighten his audience through analysis and emphasis on the interpretation of facts, he is dealing with much more fertile ground. He is assured of an additional response, and a more understanding reaction, as a result of the very cooperation of these two methods in making a given point. Where the first relies upon the color of language and style employed in making a visible and lasting impression upon the reader's mind, the other provides that other "color" peculiar to the audible warmth and dramatic impact of a "person-to-person" conversation.

I do not address myself exclusively to men or to women in my radio audience for the particular reason that among radio's undisputed benefits its mechanical facility has enabled every news writer, editor and commentator to count, for the first time, as many women as men in every audience. The way radio has brought news literally into the home, even the busiest, where the domestic routine is so arduous that newspapers would go unread, has meant a doubling in the numerical strength of the news public and in the importance of reaching it.

With both men and women I have always felt, and I have never known it to be disproved, that to talk news, interests people in reading news. Both the interest in and dependence on news today receive vitality from the cumulative effect it has on people. News, then, is inescapably educational as well as informative. The more we know

the more we want to know. The rise of the radio commentator — fifteen years ago I was the first and practically the only one — has derived from the growing realization that the more one knows, the more one realizes how little of it one understands, and how important it is to understand.

Another circumstance that has widened the radio commentator's sphere of influence is his valued independence. He, as an acknowledged individual, neither speaking for nor representing the interests of other individuals, has achieved an independence and an opportunity for courageous singlemindedness that no organization can ever afford. This should give him a peculiar sort of integrity which none can challenge, over which his own conscience and personal reputation are the only censors, and which his public will come to respect, bringing to his forthright rostrum a greater degree of confidence.

The commentator naturally pays for this admittedly estimable position. Not only are his responsibilities greater but his work is harder. I have found, since I left the somewhat sedentary editorial desk — which never kept me completely chained — for the highly stimulating job of chasing (and many times carrying!) a microphone around, that as a radio editor I had to be my own reporter. I have returned again and again, not only because it was imperative, but with a new excitement in the thorough-going mechanism of which I was a part, to do my own "leg work," as the reporters on the city desk call it. To keep abreast of the news and to keep a public decently and fairly informed, I have had to go where the news was breaking, sometimes thousands of miles away, to find out what was what, report on it, and finally, explain its significance in relation to other current events.

My own attitude toward this exacting procedure has been neither altruistic nor over-conscientious. It is all part of a great adventure, which began with my early conviction that America could well afford to take a greater interest in world affairs. I deplored at the outset, and I am still deeply concerned over the undeniable, unimpressionable provincialism of a great part of our continental nation. I came from the mid-West and I have seen this indifference to horizons beyond our own immediate political interests far too clearly to pretend that it is anything but a dangerous provincialism. It is

dangerous because in such soil the political and social backwardness that underlies most of our national and international enmity thrives best. The large, unwieldy, unsocial ambitions that can develop in small minds are legion. This determination to try to open up some of these narrower corners of our social and worldly consciousness, has given direction and motive to my newspaper, radio and platform career. With radio I have had a new weapon with which to drive home my belief in world integration and world understanding.

And yet radio, which has served me so well in this endeavor, has also been revealed to me as a weapon used just as efficiently by the common enemies of that ideal.

From the thought of radio as a personal weapon of influence, we have watched it grow inescapably into a social weapon — again, to be used or abused. It has taken its place among those means by which great social movements, mass movements in their most graphic sense, have been contrived. This may well be the era of radio, and a more complete history of our day may see radio playing the decisive *rôle* in the social upheaval which is the stuff of today's chapters. Hamilton Fish Armstrong has reduced it to the simplest of all terms in his recent pamphlet titled "We Or They." Anyone who has looked to the horizon has seen the words written there. Although we are in the middle of it, few of us are blind today to the real consequence of this elemental struggle between nations of free individuals working together in the communal enterprise we call society and those which are ruled by the manifold stamp of a single, adventurous, aggressive, dictatorial personality. "Between the two doctrines," he said, "there is no compromise. Our society or theirs. We or they."

That is the issue. That is consistently the news of today. Where, then, does radio stand? We do not need to wait for television to show us any more candidly and more realistically how wide the divergence is between these two irrepressible programs. Radio is in the thick of it right now, and radio's part is already clearly defined.

The uses and misuses of radio over the face of the earth are pretty evenly divided. Although radio has been accorded considerable liberalism in the United States, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, France, and in a different way and under direct government supervision in Great Britain, such use is certainly counterbalanced by its provocative abuse in Russia, Germany and Italy. In most European

countries radio is government controlled, of course, but in those three countries the entire national radio facilities are used frankly for propaganda purposes. We hardly need dwell on the fact that their word for it is "political education." This particular kind of education is obviously the best available means to organize and direct mass opinion. This term, and such others as "public enlightenment" have little significance until we examine them in actual practice. An important part of Soviet Russia's government owned and operated broadcasting is devoted to highpowered transmission by short wave of special foreign language programs aimed at and adapted to special groups of foreign listeners. Propaganda by radio is rarely confined to "domestic culture." That, from any dictator's standpoint, would be uneconomic, for he must constantly spread his gospel to all groups of potential nationals, foreign sympathizers and agents, and all manner of susceptible minorities within range of his transmitter. This development of propaganda broadcasting across frontiers has produced odd ramifications, and has caused the dictators real worry. German broadcasts into Austria, Russian broadcasts into Germany, Italian broadcasts to the Arab lands have all caused international incidents. Soviet broadcasts in German were so effective that Hitler ordered his subjects not to hear Russian stations. *Verboten* proclamations were not effective and now the secret police has a special division devoted to radio snooping which makes frequent arrests.

The virulent radio competition and reprisals between these dictatored countries are significant in that the administrators fully appreciate the weapon they have in radio. They use it carefully and efficiently as a highly prized organ of government (or, better, an organ of persuasion) and it receives appropriate attention from the highest authorities. Radio, they know, is too valuable to be toyed with. Every propaganda department has a well organized radio section. Their acute awareness of radio's potentialities should be a positive lesson to democratic countries. Every uncolored presentation of American news and American events that is made accessible to radio listeners in other lands diminishes by just so much the effectiveness of the unending flood of Fascist propaganda.

The fact that American radio facilities are used in concert with the given administration and the democratic tradition is no guarantee that the ether waves, here and elsewhere, will not become charged,

as time goes along, with an increasing preponderance of Fascist or Nazi or Soviet programs. It is going to be too late if we simply maintain an academic interest in the improprieties of European radio perversion. It is all right to admire their professional and technical competence, to stand aghast at the insolence of their political pretensions, and to condemn the intimidation of the system's victims, but none of these reactions is positive. It is the duty of democracy to stand forth as its own champion. If, as we all hope, a free administration of the ether waves, national and international, is an ideal, then all the democratic forces of both government *and* radio must be marshalled behind the technical, political and cultural tenets of our society.

Our participation in this crisis should include a positive program. I think one of the most effective ways of making our stand felt, and of setting forth the ideals to which we are irrevocably committed, would be consciously and frequently to stimulate the European air channels with our news. That is the most varied and the liveliest aspect of America we can exhibit to the rest of the world. Since there must be choice I should eliminate material that might give offense abroad and include material that speaks well for our civilization.

Our present broadcasting organizations are admirably equipped for such short wave broadcasts. I only suggest that the most judicious use of such equipment would include more international broadcasts intended for foreign countries and in foreign languages. We must give steadily increasing attention to overseas audiences in general and special groups in particular. Such programs invite no new revenues, it is true, but they certainly represent one of the most tangible responsibilities incumbent upon an industry which is, by its very nature, a public service enterprise. They are already an enormous factor in so far as they reflect good will or bad will. In South America last winter I was greatly disappointed to learn that radio listeners in many countries, even Americans, relied on European short wave programs for news and entertainment. Partly as a result of the contacts established by American radio executives during the Pan-American Conference at Buenos Aires new efforts are being made to reach Latin America. The Columbia Broadcasting System is now using its short wave transmitter, with newly increased power, and a directional antenna to send programs from local studios to Europe

and South America for a total of approximately fifteen hours daily. But as yet only a very small part of this material is in any way adapted to foreign tastes or needs.

Of course we cannot dismiss the challenging concept of radio and the news without a pause, even at this date, for due consideration of those literally breathtaking possibilities inherent in television. One need no longer toy with predictions. It was used successfully to bring George the Sixth's coronation procession to 50,000 lookers-in. Television is so near it is high time to give it a little thought in connection with news.

Our imagination is not running away with us for once. It will soon be possible to broadcast something even more startling than the sound of shells and machine gunfire such as played around me as I sat huddled in a haystack midway between Rebel and Loyalist armies during the Battle of Irún in the north of Spain. I found it extremely disconcerting to try to convey a word picture of that desperately bloody battle between brothers and cousins which tore gaping holes into the farmlands of their common soil, all because they could not agree on a satisfactory form of government. As I hugged my portable microphone tighter and kicked at the spent bullets lying about my feet, I did not have time to think of television. Yet in only a few years my successors in battle broadcasting will carry a television camera, and you will see and hear the bullets fly and the shells burst as you sit at home quietly waiting for *news*.

1. SPAIN

FOCAL POINT: *Spain* is the Anglo-Saxon name of the Iberian peninsula, the rugged bridge between Southwestern Europe and Northwestern Africa. It has been both a geographical curiosity and the scene of Europe's bloodiest conflicts. More akin to Africa than Europe, Spain is separated from France by the high Pyrenees. The permanent impasse between its various political, cultural and religious entities dates from its earliest exploitation by foreign vandals, when Hamilcar of Carthage conscripted the population to attack Rome. Almost every power in Europe has fought in Spain, but not one has ruled there successfully. Through the Gothic Middle Ages, Spain was under the spell of Moorish culture. When the Renaissance was already budding in Italy, and humanism colored French and English thought, Spain finally cast out Moslem civilization and entered upon her own feudal period, from which she is only now emerging. Modern, like ancient, Spain is divided against herself by mountain ranges as by differences in language and tradition. Three different Romance languages are spoken in Spain: Castilian, Catalan, and Portuguese-Galician, while the Basques have a language of their own. The coal miner of Oviedo can barely communicate with the grape grower of Jerez. Spain is a country of contrasts and savage paradoxes. The graceful Alhambra of Granada matches oddly with King Philip's gloomy Alcazar of Toledo. The chaotic spirit of anarchy which has risen from the ashes of her history is peculiarly Spanish. She has never survived the ignominy of the contrast between Imperial Spain and "invertebrate" Spain. The same far-flung colonies which were once her greatness were also her undoing. The despotic patriotism stemming from ancient glories has never been sufficiently integrated to unify this country that is neither particularly fertile nor well endowed with natural resources.

Dominant over Spain is the Catholic Church with its emphasis on the transitory nature of the present and the reality of life after death. With its monuments of dead civilization and its preoccupation with

eternity, Spain strikes a solemn, half-barbaric note in present day Europe. The airplanes, bombs and machine guns, which are crumbling her ancient buildings, seem out of place in legendary Spain, but they may decide all Europe's future.

BACKGROUND: *If Spain is reborn a monarchy, she will be insignificant; if reborn a republic, she will be great.* — Victor Hugo, 1868.

In 1868 revolution had flared up in Spain. Liberals, republicans, progressives and generals, supported by the mass of the Spanish people, had risen to oust a feudal and sanguinary queen. The revolution was successful. Yet in 1871 the monarchy was restored, though a prince of a different house sat on the throne. In 1873 a Republic was proclaimed; but in 1875 the House of Bourbon was once more in power, and King Alfonso XII wielded the scepter.

From 1812, when the Spanish people wrote their first constitution, until the present, Spain has been in ferment. Time and again, by revolution, by military coups, by general strikes, Spain has attempted to shake off the incubus of a medieval monarchy. Up to now, the kings have always returned, bringing with them terror and reaction. Finally, in 1931, Alfonso XIII ran away, and Spain for a time believed herself free. It was not long, however, before a Rightist government, made up of Royalists, Fascists, and Conservatives of all shades, took over power from the Socialists and Republicans who had created the Republic.

In 1933 the parties of the Right outpolled the parties of the Moderate Left, and began to undo the reforms which the parties of the Left had already voted. As usual the Left, unused to power and responsibility, had gone too far and too fast. Then in October 1934, there were uprisings in Catalonia, in Biscay, in Leon, in Madrid, in the Asturias — uprisings which were put down with vindictive savagery. Five to six thousand persons were killed; sixty thousand were arrested; and thirty thousand condemned to terms of imprisonment varying from one year to life. And again, in February 1936, the parties of the Left and the Moderate Left were swept back into office by the decisive electoral victory of the Popular Front.

In July 1936 the forces of the Right once more swung on the Re-

public. General Francisco Franco flew from the Canary Islands to Morocco; the garrison rose at Ceuta; and the Civil War had begun.

If General Franco wins this war, which is now one year old, the old feudal order will probably be restored, whether or not Alfonso or his son, the Count of Cavadonga, are actually placed on the throne. After more than a hundred years of struggle, of fitful and Pyrrhic victories, it has at last become clear that if the Spanish people are to achieve the liberation for which they have paid so dearly in blood, they must scrap not only their kings, but also the institutions which have kept the kings alive.

The monarch is not the real enemy of Spanish freedom. The monarch is merely the symbol of the real forces of repression, the army, the Church hierarchy, and the land owning aristocracy. Spanish Republicans have been perpetually shortsighted and ineffectual. On the few occasions when they have attained power, they have believed that, by lopping off the king, they solved the problems of Spain. More thorough-going surgery was needed. In every case, the Spanish Republicans, too timid or too myopic to attack the basic evils of the Spanish system, have themselves been wiped out by the forces that feed on those evils.

Three institutions are the curse of Spain: a selfish, parasitic, royalistically minded army; a politically-minded Church; and an entrenched land owning aristocracy. These three institutions, deeply rooted in Spain's tradition, once contributed largely to Spain's greatness. They are now outmoded, unresponsive, unwilling to make concessions which would give them a normal and healthy stake in the life of Spain, fanatically reluctant to relinquish those privileges which, however hallowed by tradition, have no proper place today. These institutions, with their inflexible, adamant greed, bear a good share of the moral responsibility for the lives of the three hundred thousand men who have already died in the Civil War, for the lives of the other countless thousands who have died fighting during more than a century of Spanish social unrest. Of course the Left extremists are as blind as those of the Right and if the Conservatives deserve the most blame it is because of the rule that "from him to whom much hath been given much shall be asked."

The vicious nature of Spain's superannuated but active institutions has long been noted by the most conservative foreign observers. In

the last edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, which is certainly not a radical publication, there is the following analysis of the rôle of the army in Spanish life:

The fact is that the Government [Primo de Rivera's] has not tackled the chief problem of the Spanish state — the reorganization of the army on an objective basis and its insertion within the framework of a civil society. The army is still a nest of posts for the sons of the middle classes and an instrument of political bullying.

In 1870, to go back a little, John Hay, Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of the State, made this comment on the Spanish Army:

The Spanish army, from general to corporal, is penetrated with the poison of conspiracy. . . . Every successive minister has used it for the purposes of his own personal ambition, and has left in it a swarm of superfluous officers who owe their grades to personal or political services, more or less illegal. . . . There is scarcely a general in Spain but owes his successive grades to successive treasons.

In 1930 this description was still accurate. There were 21,000 officers for an army of 130,000 men, that is, one officer for every six men, and one general for every one hundred and fifty. The army had never won a foreign war; but it consumed thirty percent of the national budget. For every three dollars spent on equipment, war materials, and salaries for troops, ten dollars was spent on officers' pay. An enormous, unwieldy officer caste dominated a fantastically large army, battenning on the collective resources of the state. Such an army, feudal in its make-up, a comfortable catch-all which provided soft livings for the sons of the middle and upper classes, was naturally committed to a feudal and reactionary form of government. The parasitic officer class, interested only in self-perpetuation, was overwhelmingly Monarchist, Rightist, Anti-Republican.

With the advent of the Republic in 1931, the active officers' list was reduced by 15,000, the dismissed officers being put in the reserve. Very shortly, in 1932, there was an army revolt, headed by General Sanjurjo. As soon as the Rightists came into power in 1933, they began to restore officers to their posts. So it is not surprising that when

plots were to be hatched against the democratic Popular Front Government in 1936, the army proved the ideal incubator. The army had been reduced, but it had not been changed in character.

Wealthier and more powerful than the Spanish army is the Catholic Church in Spain. Out of more than twenty-seven million people in Spain, only about thirty-five thousand are non-Catholics. Just as a huge officer caste makes the Spanish army topheavy, so a huge clerical caste loads down the Spanish Church. There is one priest for every nine hundred persons in Spain; and altogether in the clergy and religious orders there are 106,734 persons. The Catholic Church holds about thirty percent of the wealth of Spain. The Church is Spain's chief *entrepreneur*. It is the principal banker, factory owner, mine operator, land owner, educator, and moneylender for the Spanish people. Until 1931, when the Republic finally separated Church and State, the State itself was contributing ten million dollars a year to the support of the Church. Up to the time of the 1931 Republic, the Church was a flourishing business. Its investments extended to every corner of the nation; it was Spain's largest industrialist.

The Republican-Socialist combination which established the Spanish Republic in 1931 attempted to curb the business activities of the Catholic Church. Its subsidies were cut by one-third in October 1932, and were to be abolished altogether in November 1933. Church property beyond what was needed for living and for the practice of religion was confiscated. The clergy was forbidden to participate in industry, commerce, and education. However, just as was the case with the army, the Church reforms were not very energetically prosecuted by the moderate Socialist-Republican Government. Before much of the Government's Church program could be put into effect, the Government itself was swept out of office by the Rightist victory of 1933. Most of the anti-Church laws were repealed or winked at by the Rightist Government; and it was left for the Popular Front Government of 1936 to resume the work of the 1931 Republic.

It is difficult for Americans in 1937 to conceive of the *rôle* that the Church has been playing in the Spanish social scheme. We must really go back to the Middle Ages to find a parallel for it. Long ago, in most European states, the Church was liquidated as a temporal power. If we remember that the Reformation roughly coincided with

the end of feudal economy, the rise of the middle class, and the beginnings of what we call capitalism, we will understand that the problem was not truly religious but economic. Henry VIII broke away from the Catholic Church because he wanted to marry Anne Boleyn, but he undoubtedly found the fat lands of the monasteries quite as attractive as Anne's black eyes. It was the expropriation of the Church lands which contributed to England's great economic expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Land and capital which for hundreds of years had remained frozen in the grasp of the Church were released to play their part in the commerce and enterprise of a new society. But in Spain the hands of the clock stayed fixed in feudal time.

When we once understand the economic stake that the Church has in the life of Spain, the events of today become clearer. The Church represents, in fact, it *is* the "economic royalist" of Spain. As the largest property holder and *entrepreneur* in Spain, the Church is necessarily politically-minded. It has for generations constituted a vast and powerful lobby exerting continuous and, almost always, repressive pressure on the Spanish Government. It has naturally directed all its energies to preserving the *status quo*. It has combined with other forces to keep Spain economically the most backward country in Europe. Modern capitalism, as we know it, hardly exists in Spain; and industrialism is rudimentary there. Until 1931 the whole educational system was in the hands of the Church; yet fifty percent of the Spanish population is illiterate.

Since the Catholic Church has assumed a preponderant part in the secular life of Spain, it is legitimate to expect a secular opposition to it. Such an opposition indeed exists. It would be a mistake, though, to think that it is anti-religious in character. It is not; it is anti-clerical. More than ninety-nine percent of the Spanish people profess the Catholic faith; but a good part of this percentage find their economic interests opposed by the economic interests of the Church. Masses of the people have now and then set themselves against the Church, not as minister of God, but as banker or industrialist. Spanish workers remember the savagery with which strikes in the mines of Oviedo were repressed. The Catholic Church was a principal stockholder in these mines. A Left Socialist deputy in the Cortes put it this way: "In other countries the crowd, in a moment of na-

tional uprising, attacks banks and palaces, while here it burns convents and churches." Such behavior must be condemned but its origins should be understood, for the Church, when it participates in business and politics is, in those departments, no more holy or sacrosanct than any other business or political interest.

In the present Spanish struggle, the Church has lined itself up, on the whole, with the forces of Fascism and reaction. In the Basque country, however, it has taken a different stand. There the masses of the people are fighting on the side of the Government not because they want a social revolution, but because they want self-government. The clergy in the Basque country is sympathetic to this desire for autonomy, and has accordingly sided with the Government. So while in the rest of Spain priests are now and then being shot by Loyalists, in the Basque country they are being shot by Rebels.

The other great repressive force in Spain is the landowning aristocracy. The greater part of the country is still divided up into huge feudal estates, where the peasant tills the land but does not own it. In more than half of the provinces of Spain two percent of the people, up to the time of the Republic, owned sixty-seven percent of the land. In some provinces the great landlords owned half the land; in some, two-thirds. Many of these property owners were absentee landlords, who took no interest whatsoever in the management of their estates. Great stretches of the land were allowed to lie uncultivated.

Indeed, in Spain today, only sixty percent of the land is under cultivation. Land reform was one of the most pressing problems to face the Socialist-Republican Government of 1931, and the Popular Front Government of 1936. The Socialist-Republican Government had a program of expropriation, by which the landlords were to be compensated for the property which was to be taken from them and divided up among the landless peasants. But, as Church reform and reform of the army were rendered ineffectual by the Rightist Government which succeeded the Socialist-Republican regime, so land reform also was blocked. The Popular Front Government took up the task again, as soon as it came into power. By the time General Franco started his rebellion, it had already settled one hundred thousand families on the land. The grandees of Spain have, almost without exception, resisted any kind of expropriation, just as the Church has refused to give up one jot of its privileges and the army, one tittle of

its power. Therefore, it is natural to find the grandees of Spain, collaborating with Church and army to bring about the overthrow of a regime which menaced them.

That these institutions were acting in defiance of the expressed wishes of the majority of the Spanish people, the election returns of February 1936, leave no doubt. The Left-Republican parties won one hundred and fifty-eight seats in the Cortes, the Spanish parliament; the workers' parties, with whom they were allied, won one hundred and ten. The Popular Front held altogether two hundred and sixty-eight seats, and the Center and Right parties combined got only two hundred and five. Of four hundred and seventy-three members only sixteen were Communists, as opposed to ninety-eight Socialists and eighty-one Republicans; and in Spain, just as in France, the Socialists are a reformist not a revolutionary party. If votes, by the way, are any index, France is much more Communistic than Spain, since there seventy-two out of six hundred and fifteen members of the Chamber of Deputies are Communists. Rebel sympathizers have tried to make the world believe that the Spanish Government is Communistic. This is not true. The Government's professed program, on which it rode into office, was to maintain the Republic, to continue to subordinate Church and army to the state, and to carry forward a program of land reform and social service in the interest of tenant farmers and industrial workers.

To an American this seems like a moderate program especially when the alternative offered by the Rebels is by the late General Mola's own statement a military dictatorship. General Mola who was killed in an airplane crash in June 1937 hated politicians. He felt that they were to blame for many of Spain's difficulties. "Whatever else happens," he said to me early in the Revolution when I interviewed him at Burgos, "the politicians will never again get back into power."

Yet as soon as the new Cortes had chosen Manuel Azaña, President in place of Alcalá Zamora, as soon as it had released thirty thousand political prisoners and launched a large number of democratic reforms, the rich men of Spain began to export their capital and the generals began to organize their Revolution. Assassinations and reprisals of which extremists among both Fascists and anti-Fascists were the victims, became common. The Fascist groups organized

military units and the Government forces organized a workers' defense militia. Church authorities, Monarchists, Carlists, and young Primo de Rivera's Fascists made common cause against the Government. Riots, strikes, bombings, church burnings, and killings were an almost daily occurrence from February to July. In May there was an unsuccessful military mutiny in the barracks outside of Madrid. The Spanish Phalanx, the Fascist organization with headquarters in the strongly conservative Province of Navarre, made rapid progress in the development of its semi-military units. In June, Calvo Sotelo, able Catholic leader, warned the Government in the Cortes that its policy was creating revolution. "The army," he said, "is becoming impatient and the Government will be responsible if something happens." On July 12, the murder of Calvo Sotelo precipitated the Revolution.

REVOLUTION

It had been long and carefully planned by army leaders in all parts of Spain. General Franco was to come up from the Canary Islands to take charge of the revolt in Morocco. General Queipo de Llano was to seize Seville. General Mola was established at Burgos in the north and General Caanellas was nearby at Saragossa. The drive toward Madrid was to begin simultaneously from north and south. Everything functioned as planned, except the advance on the capital. In both Madrid and Barcelona the army lacked competent leadership and their military units were overpowered by a spontaneous rising of the industrial workers. For the first time the Spanish people had developed a sufficient sense of unity and organization to defeat city garrisons by the sheer weight of numbers.

From the beginning, almost all the officers and three-fourths of the enlisted soldiers were on the side of the Rebels. They controlled the larger part of Spain's limited war material. But in Barcelona, San Sebastian, Bilbao, Santander, Malaga, Valencia — all important sea-coast towns — popular sympathy with the Madrid Government was strong enough to quell incipient military rebellions. Crews on the most important naval units revolted against their officers and placed their chiefs, such as they were, on the Loyalist side.

This left Spain divided against itself. A week after the revolution began, the Government still held two-thirds of the territory and dominated three-fourths of the population. But for outside help, the

Rebels would probably have been defeated two months after their Revolution began.

It was in those early weeks of the Civil War before intervention had become the chief factor in the situation that I returned to Spain. I was broadcasting to the United States from Paris on the night of Sunday, July 19, when events in Spain flared forth in front page headlines. On that day the Paris press was much more anxious about Danzig, where Hitler was Nazifying a so-called Free State. International complications appeared imminent there. Spain's revolt looked like a brief local flare-up. So I went to Danzig to interview Dr. Greiser, the belligerent President of the Danzig Senate. But the serious implications of events in Spain soon became apparent. I moved my headquarters to the Spanish frontier at Hendaye, France, near Irun and San Sebastian, a point from which both Rebel and Loyalist territory could easily be reached. My first task was to decide from what city I could best broadcast to America. In Madrid the Government censor was in complete charge of the one powerful Spanish short wave station. He would pass favorable propaganda, but he would not be interested in serving American listeners with impartial news analyses. From Hendaye I could reach both Rebel headquarters and the Government forces defending the northern coast. I arranged for lines and transmission facilities and left for Rebel headquarters.

It was not easy to get into Spain. My lecture circular, featuring a photograph of myself with Adolf Hitler, proved my best passport to Rebel favor. However, that same Hitler picture nearly proved my undoing a week later when I sought to join the Spanish Government forces. The military commander at Irun took one look at the picture, sputtered a stream of angry Spanish and summoned an immediate conference of his staff. It looked dark for my chance of getting a pass, when I remembered that the same circular also contained a picture of myself taken with a Soviet commissar. I pointed this out to the commander, who happened to be a member of the Socialist Party, and explained that an American radio commentator had to interview anyone and everyone. I explained that I paid frequent visits to the Soviet Union to report on its progress. This saved the day, and I became one of the few correspondents accredited to the military forces on both sides in the Spanish Civil War.

At Burgos, headquarters of the northern Rebel army, I found an efficient, well-established organization. Here the regular army of Spain, which had engineered and led the Revolution, was in complete control. The staff had already organized a press office, which gave me my first opportunity to visit the Guadarrama front, where the Rebels faced the Government forces forty miles north of Madrid. After a few hours' motor ride, I found myself in the midst of the bloodiest civil war in modern history.

The Spaniard seems to be completely indifferent to danger and death. I have never seen such nonchalance. The soldiers on both sides often disdain cover, even when it is available. Every time I heard a shell shriek or a bullet whistle I wanted to duck, but because the Spanish soldiers didn't, I felt ashamed to.

In returning to Hendaye from the front I had the advantage over those correspondents who wrote their stories while they were still in Spain. They were obliged to submit them to a Rebel censor. Having nothing to write, I had nothing that could be censored. The best the Rebel censor could do was to suggest that I ought to bring a portable short wave set into Spain.

Back in neutral France, my most difficult task was to make sure that the various pick-up points for my broadcast would function efficiently. We tried routing the talks by way of Paris and London to Rugby, as well as through Bordeaux to Geneva. The League of Nations short wave station, which is operated commercially by Radio-Suisse in Geneva, proved to be the most efficient. My first broadcasts were carried over that route.

One night I interviewed a Spanish marquis, who outlined his reasons for favoring the Rebels. He said, in substance, that they represented law, order and tradition, while the Government forces were fighting for Anarchy and Communism. The Columbia Broadcasting System had just carried a broadcast from Madrid, favoring the Government, so we felt that the Rebel interview provided proper balance.

But the League of Nations did not like this broadcast. They demanded the submission of all material in written form to Geneva forty-eight hours before the broadcast. For a war reporter extemporizing news reports on a quickly changing Revolution, this was hardly feasible. So it became necessary for me to work by telephone

to Paris, London and Rugby, and thence by short wave to New York.

The highlight of my broadcasting experience came in the closing week of my service, while the battle for Irun was at its height. This Spanish harbor town adjoins French territory. Just east of the city a triangular piece of French territory, dominated by a hill, juts directly into Spain, at a point where the little Bidassoa River, which separates France from Spain, makes a sharp bend. As the battle lines approached Irun, this bit of French soil separated the contending armies and provided a marvelous vantage point for a radio broadcast.

For a week I struggled with the French authorities before I obtained permission for a radio technician to accompany me into this area. He had located a telephone in Hendaye sufficiently close to the scene of action so that a long wire from this telephone would reach to the battlefield.

On the day set for the battle broadcast, my lines were led from a farmhouse telephone into the fighting area, where I found shelter for myself and the microphone between a haystack and a cornfield. My French technician, who was a good sport and thoroughly willing to take chances for the sake of a successful broadcast, set up his amplifier in the shelter of one of the outbuildings of the farm. Our broadcasts were booked for 4 P.M. and 11 P.M. French time. The battle began at 2 P.M., shortly after we were installed. It was at its height at 4 P.M.

The broadcast did not go through because of a misunderstanding in Paris. I telephoned a succession of urgent cables: "BATTLE CONTINUES" "STANDING BY" "GIVE ME LINES." Twice between 4 and 5 o'clock the network tried to get through to me. Twice our lines were shot to pieces and had to be repaired under fire.

Finally, after darkness had fallen, at 11 o'clock, when the artillery was already out of action, but with rifle and machine guns still sputtering, we got through to New York and completed the first actual battlefield broadcast in radio history.

The capture of Irun by the Rebels was the first decisive battle of the Spanish Civil War. Today I have in my possession my own extemporized account of that battle itself and the events that preceded, as it was recorded on a phonograph disc in the Columbia Broadcasting System's New York studios thirty-five hundred miles away. It

constitutes a kind of spoken diary of the early part of the Spanish Civil War. I reproduce some parts of it here to give readers a sense of the Revolution as seen by a mobile radio correspondent.

Hendaye, July 30, 1936

I am speaking to you from the French town of Hendaye, in the foothills of the Pyrenees within one mile of the Spanish border. Within the last two days I have made two trips into Spain, one covering territory occupied by Government forces and one into that part of the country which is controlled by the Rebels. But the fact that a neutral can shift from one side to the other does not mean that this is a comic opera revolution. It is on the contrary very bitter and very bloody.

A curious fact is that the Rebels have better discipline, better organization and better equipment than those men who are fighting for the established Government. Why? Because the Rebels are led and controlled by the army officers and the aristocrats, aided by the position and discipline of the Catholic Church. The uniformed Rebels sling their excellent guns from straps and know how to handle them. The nondescript Government forces — at least those around San Sebastian — sling their nondescript guns from improvised ropes and when they point them at you, you have the definite feeling that they may go off accidentally.

At the Rebel frontier, the guards were all in uniform, the motor cars were marked in red and gold Carlist-Monarchist flags, and as you saw the troops you sensed that they were led by competent authoritative officers.

At the Government frontier, the few uniformed guards had nothing to say. Admission was controlled by a civilian committee from the Communist and labor unions. Their only identification was a bit of red rag pinned to their arms. The Government motor car that carried me into Spain through Irún and Fuenterrabia was smeared on all four sides with the Communist hammer and sickle emblem and the initials of the radical Syndicalist and labor unions.

"Are you all Communists?" I asked the man who served both as my guard and guide. I pointed to the Soviet hammer and sickle emblem on the windshield.

"No," he replied. "In Spain that sign only means anti-Fascist."

In these two border towns still under Government control shops were closed and shuttered. The people expected an artillery bombardment from the advancing Rebels at any moment. We passed a hospital where an ambulance marked with a hammer and sickle was unloading wounded. Catholic nuns, wearing the garb of their order, received the wounded men who were fighting to prevent the re-establishment of the Catholic Church in Spain. A nearby courtyard was filled with prisoners. In many places they are not taking any prisoners during this Revolution. Feeling between the two sides is too bitter.

In an open square, volunteers or conscripts were being organized to help defend the town. A road ran along the shore, where a beautiful bay was fringed by the tranquil green hills of the Pyrenees. For the third time the car was stopped by a group of rifle-bearing youngsters who examined the chauffeur's credentials. In response to a question as to how long the Revolution would last, my guide answered, "About another week."

Then noticing that I looked incredulous, he added, "Maybe longer."

The Rebels are in complete control of whole districts in the north, west, and south of Spain. They have the best regiments of the army on their side. They have been preparing for this Revolution for a long time. I visited a Spanish duke who is one of the intellectual and spiritual leaders of the Carlist movement in Spain. "Remember," he said, "this Revolution is not sudden or unexpected — we have been preparing for it day and night for the past five years. We cannot permit Spain to remain in the hands of the godless, anarchistic rabble which controls Madrid."

His handsome face burned with indignation as he spoke, and you felt something of the passionate hatred that dominates this struggle.

But what about the forces of the Madrid Government? It has the labor unions, the Syndicalists, the Socialists, the Communists, the believers in a republic, the navy and the air force on its side. In Spain, army and navy have been opposed to one another in most revolutions. Most important of all, the Government forces have the interior lines. They may be unable to retake Burgos, or Seville, or Spanish Morocco, but neither does it look as though the Rebels could take Barcelona or Madrid.

So there may be a stalemate. And what then? Unhappy Spain — it does seem as though some kind, friendly intervention from the outside world would soon be justified. Failing intervention on behalf of peace, we may soon hear of it for war. France and Russia want the Spanish Government to win, Germany and Italy want the Spanish Rebels to win. In present day Europe, it would be only too easy for a Revolution to end in a world war.

August 1

In the harbor, just within a few thousand feet from where I am speaking, are three Spanish warships flying red flags. They have come to participate in the defense of two towns which are on the way to San Sebastian and over which there's going to be a bitter struggle here, probably within the next few days.

Those of us who have studied the situation feel that the struggle for San Sebastian must precede the struggle for Madrid. For two days we've had a desultory artillery battle, going back and forth between the Government and Rebel forces, within a mile and a half from where we are; the Rebel forces a few miles farther back are slowing down their advance in this direction.

We know the Rebels are short of aircraft. We know that they have ordered aircraft from the British and from the Italians. We know that both the British and the Italians tried to deliver them. We know also that we have reached the beginning of serious international difficulties, difficulties which are quite likely to be enhanced as time goes on.

At present it is clearly evident that in this Revolution there is more cruelty, more atrocities than there have been in civil revolutions for some time. The Rebels have not made rapid progress. They say themselves that the reasons are strategic. They're waiting for this and waiting for that. But the fact is that they have threatened definitely to seize certain towns, and then weeks have passed without their being able to take them.

It is evident that this Revolution is not for a day, but is to continue for some time — and, alas, that it is going to wreck Spain's economic, political and social life.

August 5

Yesterday I visited San Sebastian. I was the first correspondent, so far as I know, who spent a day in San Sebastian since the Revolution

began. It took me at least five different visits to the city of Irun before I accomplished the purpose of securing a permit to go to San Sebastian — because the Government forces do not like reporters. The Rebels do. But the Government forces seem to feel that the press and the radio, too, are capitalistic institutions, and that they will necessarily be opposed to their point of view.

To get to San Sebastian was the first problem. It would have been a twelve mile walk. I finally hitch-hiked on a car that was going for hospital supplies. We took a detour. I was informed that the main road was under gunfire. All the way along we were stopped by gun squads — some had rifles, some had shotguns, some had revolvers. I found that I liked the revolvers least, especially when shiny. The rifles next. The shotguns seemed to be such a peace-time weapon that one didn't mind them. Everywhere were barricades.

And the great variety of material that was used for those barricades! Within a distance of about five miles I saw barricades made up of newspaper bundles, of heavy park benches, of heavy zinc oil containers, bags of salt, bags of sand, paving blocks. And the most popular barricade of all was one made up of well filled wine hogsheads. Now those barricades were built up on both sides of the road, leaving only a narrow lane in the center, so that in case the Rebels should advance toward San Sebastian the barricades could be closed.

At San Sebastian itself the barricades were more numerous. Many more shops were open than shut. The hotels are mostly occupied as hospitals. At the International Hotel I was offered the Bridal Suite and three meals for fifteen pesetas a day, which is about \$1.50, indicating to you how anxious they were for business. The shopkeepers, and I spoke to a dozen, are unanimous in their desire that the war should end and they didn't express any preference for either side. They were less concerned about how the war should end, than when it should end. And I should imagine that that represents the real feeling of the people of Spain.

It was interesting to watch the population in the streets. Everything seemed to be quite normal. The beach, streets and squares were full of children, indicating an indifference to the danger of bombardment. Everywhere youngsters were scratching the sand out of the bags used for barricades and building their little sand hills and houses out of them just as children do in countries that are at peace.

The churches were closed. They remain closed except for Mass in the morning. I was the first correspondent actually to enter and go through the Hotel Maria Christina, which was the center of the bloody fighting in San Sebastian. It was two and a half days before the Rebel troops occupying it were forced to surrender. Every window was barricaded. Cane chairs were used in one and bullets had chipped their way practically through a dozen. Overstuffed chairs, which were at another window, offered much better resistance. Bullets penetrated one or two before being stopped.

Even the curtains were rolled up and used as barricades — not very successfully. The most effective barricade I saw was a wash basin torn loose from its fastenings and stood up straight against the window. Bullets had chipped away little parts of it, but there it stood still solid and evidently offering protection to whatever men had fought behind it. Capture of this hotel finished Rebel resistance in San Sebastian.

As a matter of fact, life is going on there quietly and apparently comfortably. There were lines waiting for milk; lines waiting for free distribution of bread; and lines waiting for the issue of certificates which would enable people to withdraw money from the savings bank. They are allowed only five hundred pesetas a month, consequently there is a great demand for the privilege of drawing out this money.

The Popular Front is much better organized than it was a week ago. I noticed how much more efficient it was; I noticed there are fewer hammer and sickle signs; that the more conservative labor unions have taken control. As I visited the municipal offices in Irún and San Sebastian I found that things were speeded up. The committees seemed to know their work better, and altogether there has been tremendous progress in the efficiency of organization on the Governmental side. On the Rebel side they began with efficiency, because they had the regular army, but that efficiency has not been improved.

August 7

The first thing they ask us when we approach the Spanish frontier and want to get in on either side is, "Are you representing a paper that belongs to the Left or that belongs to the Right?"

When we try to tell them that our papers represent neither the Left nor the Right, but are just trying to tell the truth, they simply won't believe it.

Yesterday, after five days of steady effort, I got permission to go out to the front, up into the mountains. I rode up in an ammunition wagon. When we were about halfway up, a Rebel plane appeared overhead and dropped three bombs.

It's a very curious experience to see bombs dropping from an airplane when you know they're meant for you. And yet I realized the moment they left the plane how little chance there was of their striking an object so small as a single artillery motor car — that is, a motor car carrying munitions, for which they had been watching.

As a matter of fact, not one of the three bombs struck anywhere near our car. We went up and reached the first artillery station. This was on top of a higher peak and its purpose was to throw shells over an intervening mountain and to the Rebel forces that were gathered behind it. But the point is that the lackadaisical way in which that bombardment was carried on would certainly have amused any artillery officer.

"Now," as they told me, "we have no trained officers. We know nothing about artillery. The members of the regular army with the artillery are on the side of the Rebels, and we're only learning."

And this was true. It was interesting to see how they were learning. They had established a wig-wag station on the hill over which they were shooting, and from that station a man would wig-wag "Shoot to the right" or "Shoot to the left," after each shell. Then they would readjust their guns.

But not with precision. You could see that the whole thing was a case of hit-and-miss, and mostly miss. And they laughed and joked while they were doing it.

The line is now established on the border of Navarre, the actual frontier between the two provinces. And in Spain one must never forget that these provinces have a certain autonomy. They have generally been opposed to one another in a variety of civil wars through the ages, and so these mountaineers who now hold these exposed positions are actually defending their homes, as they feel, against an enemy.

They are thoroughly well established. They command the leading

points of the frontier. It's going to be an almost impossible task to wrest all these peaks from them, one after the other.

August 17

Today the attacks came by sea as well as by land. For hours this afternoon, newspaper and camera men crowded the roof of the Hendaye Hotel from which I am speaking tonight, watching two Rebel warships throw shells into the environs of both San Sebastian and Irun. We could see the flash of six inch guns on the two Rebel cruisers, then just twenty-five seconds later, the sound of the explosion would reverberate across the narrow inlet which separates France from Spain.

Huge clouds of dust and smoke rising into the air showed where the shells exploded. Many were duds — most of them were poorly aimed. The Rebel gunners are trying to hit a munition dump in Fort Guadalupe on the hill just back of Irun. Out of fifty shells I saw dropped today, the nearest was a good quarter mile away from the Fort. But tomorrow the gunners may do better.

Yesterday and today, Hendaye has been filled with people who have come to see the war. They are running special picnic excursions from Biarritz and other nearby places, advertising the bombardment. Today no one was disappointed. As an added human interest feature, unending boatloads of women and children refugees from the bombardment across the inlet have been rowing back here to France in order to seek shelter in this peaceful country.

Two hours ago I walked to the police station with a refugee and her five children. This afternoon her husband, a civil guard, faced the firing squad. A bag of clothes and 50 francs are her total possessions. Such stories are commonplace.

Tonight an Ambassador staying at the Escalduno Hotel left his dinner to tell me another story. He had just received a message from one of a hundred Spanish aristocrats imprisoned in Guadalupe Fort, just a couple of miles from where I am speaking, which has been under bombardment today and will undoubtedly be under bombardment again tomorrow.

The Ambassador was asked to notify the Rebel warships that if the fort was blown up a hundred aristocrats would be blown up with it. Also, that for every shell that landed in Irun and killed an inhabitant, one aristocrat would be shot.

Having had first hand experience of the spirit with which this Revolution is being fought on both sides, I assume that the threat will be carried out. Yet, two Englishmen had tea served on the roof while watching the bombardment this afternoon.

Since my last broadcast I have visited Burgos and half a dozen places on the Guadarrama front. That's the front facing Madrid where the northern army is driving down. As opportunity develops, I will give you my impression of the Rebel campaign toward Madrid in this area.

For the moment the Government has the most planes. General Mola refused to tell me whether he expected to rival the Government in the air. But I do know this: he has been receiving excellent fighting planes from Italy, Germany, England and Poland. I saw some of them myself at the Burgos airport. When they arrive they are civilian transport planes. Inside of a week they are equipped with bomb racks and are dropping explosives on Government territory, usually with such poor aim that they are apt to fall anywhere. Last night one such shell hit France instead of Spain.

But this matter of using civilian airplanes for military purposes is something that will have to be carefully considered when any nation hereafter discusses the question of neutrality.

August 21

The Rebels hold more territory; the Government forces control more population. The Rebels have the army; the Loyalists have the navy. The Revolutionists control all that part of Spain facing Portugal; the Government controls most of the Spanish people. The province of Navarre in the north, through which I have traveled, where the Catholic Carlists are heart and soul for the Revolution, would have to be conquered village by village, before it accepted an anti-church Government.

The Catalonian provinces, in northeastern Spain, of which Barcelona is the center, will never surrender their hard-won autonomy. The Basque mountaineers of San Sebastian which has been under bitter attack all this week are devoutly Catholic. Yet they are fighting on the side of the Popular Front Government because they have been promised autonomy.

Yet every Rebel from General Mola down tells me that a united

Spain must emerge from the Revolution. I don't believe it. I venture to predict that the end of the Revolution will find Spain more thoroughly divided than when the fighting began. Unless one has lived with both armies, it is impossible to imagine the passions that divide them. The men on each side will tell you proudly about the unutterably cruel and inhuman things which they have done — and yet they try to insist in the same breath that only the enemy commits atrocities.

I gave a handsome Rebel soldier a lift in my car. He had just served as the member of a firing squad which had executed a captured Government officer. Both sides shoot prisoners in this Revolution. He had cut the bullet from the dead man's body and displayed it to me proudly. But he took more pleasure in telling how the condemned man asked for a priest and seemed much more ready for death after receiving absolution. To him, that meant that a wicked God-hating Communist had been won to the faith. To me, it showed again that good Catholics are fighting on both sides of this destructive Civil War.

You can't help liking and respecting the fighting men on both sides. I have never seen such bravery — time and again I have felt ashamed because of my fear when I saw that these men were willing to face anything without the slightest consideration of their own danger.

The Rebels announced yesterday that any correspondent that would hereafter refer to them as Rebels in his dispatches would be barred. They say, "We're not Rebels; we're patriots." And there you are.

August 27

We're at the end of the second day of the Battle of Irun. From dawn to dark there was no quarter hour today without rifle fire, air bombs, machine gunfire and artillery fire. There was much more shooting than killing. The French village of Biriatou is exactly opposite the center of the battle. A little piece of French territory juts right into Spain at that point — and there, too, is the crucial point of this battle.

We who report the battle sit in plain view of both forces on the terrace of a little village café some 100 yards across the valley from the combatants. It is so real and so fantastic that it seems like a battle set up for the moving pictures.

The French authorities have barred the public from the frontier to prevent casualties. Reporters can obtain special permission to circulate at what the French call "their own risks and perils." Shells, bombs and bullets landed on French soil with fair regularity today.

One soon gets to be an expert in distinguishing between the high shriek of an air bomb, the skyrocket-like whizz of a shell and the sharp whistle of rifle and machine gun bullets.

The most comfortable rule ever devised in battle reporting is the one that says, "What you hear can't hurt you." It may not be true but it's delightfully reassuring.

Two days ago, traveling alone without benefit of guide or censorship I reached the Rebel front facing San Sebastian and Irún. From Hendaye, France, from where I'm talking tonight, in a straight line the distance is six miles. Yet to get there I had to travel 150 miles by taxi, bus, truck, tramway, muleback and foot. It was necessary to go to Pamplona to get one permit and then to Tolosa, which the Rebels captured two weeks ago, to get a second.

From there I traveled with soldiers or alone, and after six hours of constant climbing on a hot summer day, I blundered my way to an artillery position overlooking San Sebastian. The Rebel commander treated me to coffee and cognac but said that he didn't like reporters.

Tonight, in accordance with the summertime program prepared six months ago, a band is playing in the public square of Hendaye and the young people are dancing. At the same time terror-stricken Spanish women and children are crossing the frontier to ask the French Government for charity and safety.

In the course of my recent trip to the Rebel headquarters in Burgos, I secured an interview with the man who is most likely to be the president of Spain if the Rebels win. His name is Cabanellas. He is an army general on active service. In so far as northern Spain has a Government, he's at the head of it. His official title is President of the Junta of National Defense of Spain. He is both an older and a more handsome man than General Mola with whom he shares the supreme authority in Rebel Spain. His silvery beard gives him a dignity which is also reflected in his speech and bearing.

"What are the ideals of this national movement?" I inquired. "To give Spain an era of peace," he replied. "For years we have had no peace, because of Marxian propaganda. It is this that has so greatly

hampered any development of our moral strength — of our material wealth."

"What is it that you chiefly object to in the conduct of the Republican Government in Madrid?" I asked.

"There are many things. In the first place they are destroying the best part of our artistic patrimony. The Marxists are burning, sacking churches, museums, and artistic monuments. These are the finest mementos of our glorious past. Beyond it, Marxists are undermining our political economy by a process of systematic destruction of business conditions. And, after all, that is tremendously important. Mining, industry and business are at a standstill. Confiscation reaches into private homes, by a mass assassination of defenseless individuals."

General Cabanellas could have continued for a long time in this strain but what I have just quoted summarizes the content of a thousand passionate speeches by Rebel leaders that can be heard on all sides at all hours.

September 3

In a moment or two, when the machine gun, which has been barking intermittently all evening, sounds again, I will stop talking for a moment in order that you may get something of the sound of this Civil War as it continues even through the night. This farm is the one most near to the actual fighting scene. As a matter of fact, it is located some 300 yards from the lines where both Rebels and Government soldiers are fighting it out tonight.

(*Sound of machine guns*) Those are the isolated shots which are being exchanged by the front line sentinels on both sides of this Civil War. It is part of the battle of Irun.

(*Sound of dog barking*)

Directly in front of me as I look through the dark of this midsummer night is a bright line of fire rising from the most important single factory in the city of Irun. Late this afternoon, we watched a Rebel airplane circling overhead and dropping bombs. One struck directly into the center of the match factory which began to burn and which has since been blazing brightly so that the evening sky is lit up for a great distance all around. To the left, along the road that leads away from the city of Irun, the road over which the Government forces have been maintaining their communications, I see two flaming automo-

biles, both struck by some sort of fire that set them alight. They have been taken off to one side of the road where they are now blazing away.

The fight for the taking of Irun has been a desperate one. It has been desperate because the Government forces have felt that this is perhaps the criterion of the success or failure of the Revolution. And the same feeling has been held on the Rebel side. And as a result, we have had the bitterest kind of struggle for the possession of this city.

Yesterday, shortly after I finished speaking, the Rebels succeeded in taking the last hill between them and the city of Irun. Early this morning, the Government forces succeeded in moving in a number of troops into positions which are important since they are manned with machine guns. And up to the present the Rebel forces have not been able to bring up their artillery sufficiently close so that they could dislodge the Government troops from these machine gun nests. This isolated firing that you hear tonight is an attempt on the part of the Rebels to find out just where these machine guns are located in order that, as the sun rises tomorrow, their artillery — which I presume they have now brought up — can begin to shell the foe into submission.

Down on the road which marks the communication between the towns of Behobie and Irun, there has been a constant passage of cars back and forth and those cars have carried the wounded back from the front lines and have brought up fresh supplies of ammunition. A little farther down the road I was able to watch a battle between a number of Rebel tanks and the armored train which is in the control of the Government troops. That armored train has not succeeded in measuring up to the tanks. The tanks are more mobile — they seem to have been better handled and bit by bit the armored train has been driven back to Irun and the tanks have controlled one piece of the road after another.

We happen to be straight in the line of fire. Fortunately for us, the bullets are all going high. Twice this afternoon while we were waiting for an opportunity to link up with New York, our wires were cut. And now finally we have put the radio machinery, the modulating devices and so on, inside of a house and I'm standing around one corner of the house with the microphone in the open but with a good thick mortar wall between me and the bullets that are constantly whizzing past. We can't understand why it is that the Rebels have

arranged their fire in such a way that most of their bullets seem to go wild and pass over this farm and reach as far as the city and the streets of Hendaye. We have been cut off all day. While I have been talking we have just had word that perhaps if the fire continues to be quieted down, someone can come and call for us after this talk is done; but our endeavor to get away from here in the course of the day has been entirely vain, because the Hendaye police declared that no one would be permitted to go out on the streets on account of this hail of bullets. They cleared all the streets of people, after several were killed and a number of others injured.

(Sound of firing)

This afternoon there was a heavy airplane raid on the city of Fuenterrabia and we could see a good part of the population of the town going out on the sands between Hendaye and Fuenterrabia in order to escape the effect of these raids. I saw across with my glasses a group of Carlist soldiers who were taking their place in the front line — some fifty of them were massed in front of the priest and he blessed them before they started out to shoulder their rifles and assume their positions. Every one of these Carlist soldiers is wearing religious medals and — much to my surprise — I noted that in spite of the bloody fighting of the last few days, when these men who have been in the front lines should have had steel helmets, most of them continued to wear their red berets. These make them very conspicuous; make it very easy for the opposing riflemen to pick them off. But that is one of the strange things about this war — the religious fervor with which these Carlists on the Rebel side have gone in on behalf of their religion. As a matter of fact, they call it a Crusade. When I asked their leader in Pamplona the other day, "Why do your men take these chances by wearing these red berets even at a time when they are in the front lines?" he said, "For a century a red beret has been our traditional headdress."

This afternoon, early in the afternoon, on my way down to this place I stopped at a place where fifty Government soldiers were kept in a kind of little concentration camp because they had crossed over from the Government lines a few hours before, as a result of the heavy fighting and their being driven back yesterday, when the Rebels took possession of the dominating hills. "Why did you leave?" I asked them. "We left because we had no more ammunition."

"What are you going to do?" I asked. "We are going to try to

get the French Government to give us permission to join our forces again in Barcelona." When I saw these harum-scarum individuals, looking rather pitiable in their present plight, and, embroidered in red letters on their caps the French words *Diables Rouges* (Red Devils), well, it seemed a bit satirical.

Several men this afternoon were shot, swimming the river, because they were endeavoring to escape from their lines. Their own men without the slightest hesitation shot them down. And refugees have been pouring into Hendaye all day.

September 4

Today there is being played the last chapter in the tragic story of the city of Irún. At this very moment, as I speak to you, Irún is ablaze and aflame in a hundred places and is rapidly being destroyed.

The only sounds that you are likely to hear in the course of this broadcast this afternoon may possibly be an occasional burst of artillery fire which the Rebel guns are playing against the forts of Guadalupe, just opposite and in front of me, across the Bay. I see the French plane that is guarding the French frontier approaching — it may be that you will hear the purr of its motors.

I know that the last rattle of machine gunfire which I just heard down at the International Bridge is a desperate effort made by the Government forces to retain a last hold on the city of Irún against the advance of the Rebels. I doubt that that machine gunfire will penetrate to you as clearly as did the rifle and machine gunfire broadcast for you last evening.

Irún has been aflame since early morning. The Rebel forces penetrated the outskirts of the city early in the day. Now I'll stop for just a moment and you'll hear the whirr of the motor of the French plane which is guarding the frontier against airplane raids.

(Plane motor)

That plane has been going up and down the French coast here in order to prevent the Rebel planes and the Government planes from trespassing upon French territory. The Rebel and Government planes have been fighting one another and have been dropping shells on the city of Irún. But in spite of all that the French plane was able to do, it has happened again and again that bombs have fallen on the French side. I, myself, on two occasions, have been within 300 feet of such bombs when they fell in French territory.

But now, much to the relief of the people of this border region, that particular part of the struggle is nearing its end. As I said to you a moment ago, there is only a handful of men who are still fighting off the complete capture of Irun by the Rebel army.

Off to the left is the little town of Behobia on the outskirts of Irun, which was completely occupied this morning. And there in the early morning hours the Rebels signified their victory by a ceremony of changing the guard to the music of a band. That was the only band that played in old Irun today.

It has been a tragic day for the people of that city. They have been sent out from their homes, and early this morning when I was here at this hotel, there were literally thousands of them, lining the beach across the harbor on a little bit of sandy soil in the center, waiting to be rescued and brought to France. For even though the tide was rising they preferred to be there rather than remain in their shell-torn, blazing city.

The little town of Hendaye is today a Spanish city. It was prepared to receive hundreds. Today — thousands of refugees have come from everywhere. Once again the French plane is overhead and you hear the buzz and purr of its motor.

(Plane motor)

In Irun, these fires were set, no one knows just how. The Rebels say the Anarchists in their determination to destroy the city they could no longer hold, threw incendiary bombs and dynamite shells into houses as they were obliged to give them up, in response to the Rebel advance. The soldiers of the Government told me, on the other hand, that in order to dislodge Government forces from these various business buildings and houses, the Rebel forces threw incendiary bombs which lit these buildings, and the fire communicated itself quickly from one to the other.

One by one these fires are spreading to neighboring buildings and it looks at the moment, with the whole sky covered with a pall of smoke — with the flames rising higher and higher in certain points, as though the entire town were doomed. It was a tragic and yet a gallant story that I saw developing itself a few minutes ago when I paid my last visit to the International Bridge.

Over on the opposite side, a couple of hundred feet away, rifles were still crackling, machine guns were sputtering, and a handful —

perhaps fifteen or twenty — Government militiamen were holding this last point of vantage against the steady advance of the Rebels.

Every now and then one of them would come running across the bridge. One came, he told me, to say goodbye to his mother before he went back and fought on. Another came running over carrying in his arms a little dog wounded by a bullet. He was more concerned with placing that dog in safety than he was with his own life, which he risked in running across the bridge.

Every half hour or so a group of refugees would again gather at the Spanish end of the bridge, and an improvised armored car — armored with nothing but mattresses — would back its way across the bridge from France, pick up these last few refugees and bring them to a place of safety. So it has been all day — one tragic episode after another. Down in the green hillocks to the left of Irun I see companies of Rebel soldiers waiting the word to advance. Evidently they were not quite sure how many soldiers they would encounter in the streets of the city, and so they had reserves.

Practically, the struggle for Irun is over. The city is almost completely in the hands of the Rebels now. Here and there, there is a house well placed where a few scattered militiamen are still holding out, still fighting to the bitter end. The end, for them, will be bitter, since the Rebels have indicated that every man caught with arms in his hands will be shot, summarily, without trial.

Many militiamen working with the Government forces, have come across the International Bridge, and it was interesting to see the way in which the French authorities handled the difficult situation. They immediately organized special trains. Those Spanish militiamen who desired to return to Spain were put into these trains and transported to the French frontier nearest Barcelona.

It was curious to watch the goings and comings at the French end of the International Bridge. For a good part of the day, even on the French side, a commander of the Spanish Government militia was in charge. He told the men when they could cross and obliged them to leave their arms at the French end of the bridge. It was strange to see them coming over to get a brief rest from war, to get a bit of refreshment at the bar at the station, and then to go back again to continue their desperate fight.

Newsreel photographers struggled desperately to keep out of the

way of the bullets, and yet get some of the many interesting camera shots available at the French end of the bridge. I stumbled against a stack of dynamite and other bombs brought over by the Spanish militiamen. They have a *penchant*, as the French say, for hand grenades and dynamite bombs. I don't know whether you heard that shot of artillery — it was another shell landing against the side of Fort Guadalupe sent by a Rebel battery just outside of Irun. But even that is a vain gesture. The Guadalupe fort is practically evacuated, and I have been told that the men who were guarding it are already on their way to San Sebastian to join in the defense of that city. Also, the big artillery pieces which until today have been shelling the Rebel positions are silent, and we are told that they too have been mounted on trucks and taken over to San Sebastian.

The French Government has a great problem on its hands here today. It has had to take care of thousands of refugees who have streamed over from Irun without any means of self-support. Just in front of me here on the main street of the city of Hendaye is what is known as the *Élégante Bazaar* — and that elegant bazaar is this afternoon turned into a hospital. As I look into the windows I can see half a dozen of the Government militiamen who were severely wounded, lying on their cots and being treated by the Red Cross nurses who brought them across the bridge, for the hospital was evacuated as was every other public institution in the city of Irun.

Hendaye opinion is sharply divided as to the action of the French Government. Some feel that they should have taken stern measures to prevent these militiamen either from coming across the frontier or from going on again to Barcelona to continue fighting. Those are the individuals whose sympathies lie with the Rebels. On the other hand, those who believe in the cause of the Spanish Government say that since it is a recognized Government, the French Government had no other choice than to permit them to seek the hospitality of French soil. It is perfectly natural that in a war such as this where there are such issues as Fascism on the one hand, and Communism on the other, public opinion should be sharply divided. The French gendarmes here in Hendaye have been suspected of being in favor of the Government side. That is natural enough since France also has a Popular Front Government. So I noticed that this afternoon it was not the gendarmes but the French army that took charge at the

International Bridge, controlled traffic, looked after the militiamen who were coming over and saw that they gave up their arms.

So many things about this particular war are distressing. It has been a whole series of tragic episodes. Now and then, when one finds something that strikes a slightly different note, one likes to remember it. At the front Rebel lines this week, I found a poorhouse with thirty inmates, conducted by Catholic sisters, who carried on under a continued fusillade of rifle fire from a nearby hill. A few days ago the town was held by the Government, now it is held by the Rebels. And yet the Mother Superior who was in control there was giving the benefit of her help equally to the wounded of both sides. And there, with that last *boom boom!* of another Rebel gun against Fort Guadalupe, I bid you good afternoon.

INTERVENTION

The conflagration of Irún has been forgotten in the flames of Guernica and Bilbao. Yet since the Revolution has gone on, since I left Hendaye through nine months of attacks and counter-attacks, of cities lost and won again, and cities destroyed, of intervention and so called Non-Intervention, still the forces that were operating around Irún and San Sebastian continue to dominate the Spanish war scene. Already in August and September, foreign men and munitions were finding their way into the Spanish conflict. Although a neutrality agreement was formally in existence, I saw war materials being carried across the International Bridge from Hendaye to Irún destined for Loyalists. I myself crossed the frontier from France into Spain in a car with a Rebel courier whose loaded car was not even examined. War materials were seeping in from Germany and Italy to the Rebel side through Fascist Portugal and into every Rebel-controlled Spanish port. The Italians and Germans had not yet had the arrogance to send whole regiments of "volunteers" to the Rebel cause. Neither had the Soviet Union been finally moved by the Fascist intervention to shipping planes, arms and technicians to the Loyalist armies. France and Great Britain had not yet been sufficiently angered by violations of the neutrality agreement to propose the new Non-Intervention Pact which was openly ignored as soon as it was framed. These events, however, were foreshadowed at Irún. The international line-up was already clear.

In Spain itself at that time the issues were not always so distinct. There was on both sides a great deal of sincerity, and for an American who was in daily contact with the men and leaders of both sides, who was continually being impressed with acts of heroism, of devotion and patriotism, on the parts of both factions, it was sometimes difficult to say which side was right.

I spent a night with a small Anarchist detachment, trying to get at the meat of Anarchist philosophy. "We want to live our own lives," was the closest they could come to telling me what they wanted from the perfect state. When I was at the front with them they had no commander. I said: "How do you get on?" They said: "Oh, we elect someone each morning who has the right to give the orders." A new one is chosen every morning because Anarchists don't recognize officers. Anarchism responds to the Spaniard's strange fatalistic individualistic streak. The Anarchists in Catalonia have since rebelled against the Loyalist Government there, because the Government refused to allow them to collectivize the peasantry. Always these intransigent and foolhardy idealists refused to make common cause with the other Left parties. They would fight Fascism and General Franco, but they would fight him in their own way. They rejected incorporation with other army units; yet at the same time, they gladly accepted the most dangerous assignments and threw their lives away with utter recklessness. Nearly every Anarchist detachment had several women members who dressed, fought, worked, talked and swore like men.

At the opposite pole from the Anarchists in the Spanish political spectrum are the Carlists. They are a Right wing, intensely Catholic group, who occupy the same position as the Jacobists, the adherents of the Stuart pretenders in England. I talked to Ignacio Baleztena, their venerable chief, in his stronghold in Navarre.

"Why," I asked him, "do you support the army against the Madrid Government?"

"For us," he replied, "the religious question is dominant. Our movement had its inception a little more than a century ago in the Carlist opposition to the ideas of political and religious freedom which grew out of the French Revolution. We want the Catholic Church recognized as the State Church of Spain. Catholicism must be our official religion. Spain is Catholic or it is nothing. The Repub-

lic removed the crucifix from the schools of Spain. It must be restored. We seek to defend Spain against Communism, the Church against violation. This is the crucial issue. All else can wait."

In Pamplona, the capital city of Navarre province, where this interview took place, Church and State have joined forces since the Rebels seized control during the first week of the Civil War. On Sunday, August 21, this reconciliation was celebrated with a great military-religious procession. For the first time since the Spanish Republic was proclaimed in 1931, the Army took part officially in a Catholic ceremony. For the first time under the Republic, the sacred image of the Virgin Mary, patron saint of Pamplona, was carried through the streets in solemn procession. The omnipresent Rebel cries of *Viva España, Arriba España*, were silenced that night in response to the request of Marcelino, Bishop of Pamplona, who declared the day sacred to the Virgin. "Place in my hands," he cried, "for the Committee of National Defense, all you can spare of your own funds, of the funds of the corporations you control, or in which you have any influence. This is not a war. It is a Holy Crusade."

The Navarre volunteers, whose red berets are a picturesque note of color at the Rebel front, offered their own petition to the Virgin that night. "Don't let us fall into the hands of the enemy, for this means we will be killed. We have pledged our honor in this war against barbarism. Help us to defend it. We ask for a Spain that is strong, great, just, dignified, in order that we may offer it as the achievement of this hellish war to the sacred heart of thy Son in order that He may purify it with His fire, redeem it with His love and make it eternal with His truth."

It is impossible to witness such a manifestation of religious faith without sensing what the Catholic Church means to the Spanish faithful. One wonders why Spanish Catholics cannot go on worshipping in their own way under a Republic?

I put that question to the Commander of a Government detachment holding an outpost on a mountain top before Irun. "Do you know anything about the questions asked and answered by the Church?" he replied. He then quoted the New Catechism which declares it to be a mortal sin for Spanish Catholics to approve liberal policies. It is the rigid attitude of the Church and the corresponding bitterness of the liberals, plus the fearful memory of the Inquisition

and the persecutions that followed which combine to produce church burnings, vandalism, and atrocities.

During my stay in Spain I learned to know the men and leaders on both sides. The Spaniards are an attractive self-respecting people but a strange one. They have a fanatic streak and to put it bluntly, a lust for blood. I have never known any other civilized people to take such diabolic joy in the commission of cruel deeds. They glory in them and present them to you as things a man can point to with pride provided only that he does these things for what to him appears a holy cause.

Spaniards are indifferent to death. I never saw a braver nor a more fatalistic people. The men often refused to take the most elementary precautions in the most exposed positions. At the front in the villages, open streets were often in the direct line of fire. Yet men would walk across these streets in leisurely fashion, careless of the fact that snipers were a few hundred yards away waiting to pick them off. It was a matter of Spanish pride or Spanish indifference but they wouldn't even duck.

I talked with Miguel Unamuno, the late great Spanish philosopher. During this conversation, perhaps the most interesting I had in Spain, I asked him to explain Spanish fatalism. "The Spaniard's spirit of desperation represents something of the fundamental tragedy of man. The truth is that we Spaniards are sick people," was his answer.

Our conversation continued as follows:

Q. But why should Spaniards be different from other people?

A. It is a question of geography, and race. Remember we have a strong inheritance of Moorish blood, of gypsy blood, and of Jewish blood. This is more important than people believe.

Q. But is this general spirit of pessimism confined to Spain?

A. No, it is a general malady in post-war Europe, but it is most evident here.

Q. But how is it that you, a leading Spanish Republican and liberal, are on the side of the Rebels?

A. Fundamentally I believe that the Rebels are fighting on the side of civilization.

Q. Does that mean you want to see a Fascist Government in Spain?

A. Certainly not. I will be against whichever side wins the war.

Q. Why?

A. Because the victorious side will need restraint.

Q. How do you account for the presence of so much Anarchism?

A. It is a serious mental malady. Our people have been poisoned by the belief that they can live at the expense of others.

Q. But why has Anarchism developed so rapidly?

A. It represents a general lowering of mentality in this generation.

Q. And to what is that due?

A. It is the result of the World War. The people of this generation are a little queer.

Q. How does that manifest itself?

A. It is evident in our young people. Many of the young men of Spain have gone to the front without caring on which side they fought. Their aim seems to be to have a good time, to enjoy life.

Q. How do the students at this great University of Salamanca feel about the Revolution?

A. Until recently the great mass had no interest in it. The intelligent minority studied. One part of them are Communists and believe in Russia. Another part are Fascists and believe in Italy. I noticed that just before the Civil War the Fascist idea seemed to be taking a greater hold.

Q. Is that also true of the Spanish masses generally?

A. No. I have thought for a long time that the Spanish mass was leaning towards Anarchism. You must remember that there is something fundamental in the Spanish character that takes to Anarchism. When Trotsky came to Spain and tried to interest Spaniards in Communism, he asked them, "What do you want of the state?" Their answer was, "We want no state."

Q. Does that spirit of Anarchism account for some of the atrocities and church burnings in this Revolution?

A. Yes, it does. Spaniards burn churches because they are unable to believe. We have had no liberal Republican government in Spain because we have persecuted religion.

Yet, wise, perceptive, and humane as Unamuno was, I believe he was wrong to choose the Rebel side to die on. He was taken in, it seems to me, by the Rebel propaganda. Had he lived longer he might have seen that the Rebels alone did not stand for civilization,

nor the Loyalists alone for anarchy. It was the Rebels, after all, who bombed Madrid, the Rebels who massacred the Basque holy city, non-combatant Guernica. It is the Loyalists, on the other hand, who have just suppressed Anarchist rebellions and reorganized the Valencia cabinet to eliminate Anarchists from the government.

The Rebel propaganda machine, the Fascist propaganda machines in Germany, Italy, and even in America, are doing their utmost to distort the meaning of the Spanish conflict. Of course the Loyalist propagandists are also at work but their radicalism often makes them suspect. Not long before the outbreak of the war, Mussolini, the creator of Fascism, predicted: "We stand on the eve of a decisive conflict. It will be a war of religion in which humanity and civil progress will be arrayed against anarchy." The Spanish Revolution is surely a decisive conflict, but I cannot accept Il Duce's characterization of the two forces in this struggle.

The Spanish Revolution has marked the definite division of Europe into a Fascist and an anti-Fascist camp. Spain has become a battle-ground which may determine the issue between democracy and dictatorship in Europe, and no amount of mudslinging, no catcalls of "Bolshevik" can now obscure this fact. That there are revolutionists on the Loyalist side and a few rare liberals like Unamuno on the Rebel side, cannot change the political complexion of the struggle. Any important political or economic conflict has always been attended by such contradictions, yet its true character has eventually emerged.

In the Spanish Revolution today the nations of Europe are pitting their armaments against each other. Spain has become a kind of enormous test tube in which modern war materials and methods are being tried out. German Junker planes are being matched against the new Soviet snubnosed planes which appeared on the Madrid front to help drive back the Italians at Guadalajara. German tanks have been tested and found ineffectual. Airplanes have been found more dangerous to warships than was supposed.

In the same way, two systems of government, Fascism and Democracy, are contending against each other. Spain is, as it were, a rehearsal stage for the next World War. The peculiar individual problems of Spain have been engulfed by the problems of the world. In Spain itself, as we have seen, the struggle is really between feudal-

ism and modern bourgeois democracy. This is a war which has been fought in Spain over and over again for more than a hundred years, with the forces of feudalism so far always triumphant. But the intervention of the Fascist nations has given the battle a different character. Feudalism has become identified, for the moment, with Fascism. An ancient social form has made an alliance with the new corporate states in order to defeat a kind of government which has long prevailed in England, France and America.

The Fascist propaganda machines have been describing the struggle as one between Marxism and Fascism. The Communist propaganda from Moscow insisted that the nations and workers of the world would have to choose between Fascism and Communism. Neither side would admit Democracy as an alternative. The Communists, however, have, as we shall see, lately changed their tune. They have not been able to achieve Communism in Russia, and they have made overtures to the democratic nations to form defensive alliances with them against Fascism. Such an alliance was tacitly in existence with the Popular Front Government of Spain. The Communists who participated in the Loyalist Government gave their honest support to the democratic idea.

The Soviet Union supported the neutrality agreement, together with France and Britain, until the open Fascist intervention made it absurd to continue to do so. Even then, the Soviet Union sent no armies of "volunteers" but technicians and war materials. It is interesting, also, to see what price the Soviet Union exacted from the Loyalist Government for its military aid. There was in Catalonia a rather powerful revolutionary party called the P. O. U. M. (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification) which espoused a number of the principles of Trotsky, calling for the immediate collectivization of the land and the expropriation of the factories. Andres Nin, the leader of this party, was Minister of Justice in the Catalonian government. As soon as the Russian planes began to appear in Spain, Nin and his party were expelled from the Government.

Recently in the reorganization of the Valencia Cabinet, we have seen the same forces at work. The Communist Party put pressure on the Government to reorganize the Cabinet, to drop the Anarchists, who were also calling for revolution rather than democracy, and to replace Largo Caballero, a Left Socialist, by Juan Negrín, said to be

a more moderate Socialist, as Premier. There may be other reorganizations at both Valencia and Barcelona but these will only prove that democratic methods continue to prevail.

The Loyalist Government has now held out for more than a year with comparatively little outside help. There are easily fifty thousand "volunteers" fighting in Spain on the Rebel side, and this does not include the Moors. Apart from men, Portugal, Germany and Italy have sent highly important technicians and modern war materials. Spain serves the German and Italian general staffs as a war laboratory with the unhappy Spaniards providing the necessary human victims. On the Loyalist side, there are perhaps twenty thousand Englishmen, Americans, Frenchmen, German and Italian anti-Fascists fighting in the International Brigade. Today there exists an international ban on volunteers. The Government in France is living up, as best it can, to the letter and spirit of the Non-Intervention Pact. Volunteers have been arrested on the French border and sentenced to jail terms.

The Fascist powers have not taken Non-Intervention seriously. Both Hitler and Mussolini have declared openly that they propose to bring about a Rebel victory. They have formally recognized General Franco's Government as the legal Government of Spain, which is entitled to receive help. They define "intervention" as anything that helps the Loyalists and as legal and legitimate assistance anything that helps the Rebels. On most Italian and German ships that land in Spanish Rebel ports there are "volunteers" and war material. This may also be true of most French and Russian ships that land in Loyalist ports, but they are fewer in number. Nor has the Non-Intervention Pact made provision for a patrol of the air. Planes are arriving daily in Spain from France, Russia, Germany or Italy, carrying important supplies and, undoubtedly, technicians. To make Non-Intervention successful, an international checking officer must be stationed at every important air field in Europe.

Russia has been unwilling to risk her limited merchant tonnage since one of her finest ships was blown up in Spanish waters early in the Civil War. She is less willing since the Italian Government has threatened to intercept ships carrying supplies to the Loyalists. Merchant ships or warships of France, Germany, Russia and Italy have been damaged repeatedly by mines or aerial bombardment.

Apart from sending protests and warnings, Britain and France took no action. Germany has been bellicose. On an early occasion she seized Spanish merchant ships in reprisal. In June 1937 her new pocket battleship *Deutschland* was bombed by two Loyalist airplanes while at anchor in the Rebel harbor of Iviza, a Balearic Island. Germany took revenge for the death of 23 sailors by shelling the Loyalist port of Almeria and killing 36 inhabitants. Next came Germany's announcement that a Loyalist torpedo had passed under the cruiser Leipzig. When France and Britain refused participation in a naval demonstration before Valencia, Germany and Italy again withdrew from the Non-Intervention Patrol and Europe had another of those war scares which are likely to continue until the Little World War in Spain comes to an end. Then in July the French and British attitude stiffened and it again seemed possible that intervention might bring peace instead of war.

OUTLOOK: Non-Intervention will continue to be a failure. Munitions and men continue to pour into Spain to prolong a battle that has almost been at stalemate since the beginning of 1937. Spanish blood continues to flow in a Fascist effort to encircle democratic France. Madrid has been under siege since November 1936. Malaga fell, and the pitiful flight of her civilian population under aerial bombardment was another unhappy episode of the Civil War. Bilbao fell, and only a few thousand of her women and children have found refuge in foreign nations. The remaining Basque territory will soon be in Rebel hands. Yet this was a minor phase of the Civil War and the Rebels have yet to demonstrate their ability to achieve a major triumph. Churches and factories, private dwellings and public buildings, universities and museums have been devastated. Spain is disintegrating but the war goes on. Great wrongs have been committed on both sides, but the greatest wrong of all is that foreign powers should prolong the self-massacre of the Spanish people.

It is not true that, if the Loyalists win, a Communist regime would be established in Spain. The Communist Party leadership is itself opposed to such a notion, partly because it believes that Spain is not ready for Socialism, and partly because it has decided to throw in its

lot with democracy throughout the world in order to fight for peace and against Fascism. Some of the radicals of the rank-and-file, and the Anarchists, might be difficult to deal with in the event of a Loyalist victory, but they could be handled, as they have been throughout the war, by the common sense elements which still have an important voice on the Government side. In any case neither Soviet Russia as a Government nor Communism as an idea has ever had any important following in Spain.

On the other hand, no enduring government would be possible in Spain if the Rebels won. At least not without continued foreign intervention. General Franco's Rebels cannot win the Revolution. Italy and Germany may win it. But they would also have to maintain it. A Rebel victory means the disappearance of Spain's independence. "We want Spain's iron ore" says Hitler. What Mussolini wants is well known. The Rebels represent some of the best elements in Spain, but also all the forces of reaction, a corrupt army, an outmoded monarchy which has given Spain the weakest line of monarchs that have ruled in Europe since the time of Napoleon, and a politically-minded Church hierarchy which has forgotten its duty to the people. Moreover, if Spain becomes a Fascist country under the domination of Italy, democracy loses one more important stronghold in Europe. France might find it hard to maintain herself as a democratic nation shut in, as she would be, by one Fascist state along the Rhine, another along the Pyrenees, and a third across the Mediterranean. The Fascist movement in France is still strong. If Fascism were to triumph in Spain, it is at least possible that a French Fascist Government might succeed the Chautemps Government. The battle in Spain is between Fascism and anti-Fascism. Its implications are world-shaking, and its outcome is still uncertain.

2. DUCE— KING— EMPEROR

FOCAL POINT: *Rome.* The most ancient capital of Europe, which, by Mussolini's personal insistence, is being simultaneously rebuilt and restored to the end that its architecture will be an amalgam of Rome's heritage and objectives, in keeping with the manifest destiny which he has proclaimed for his "new empire," centered in a Mediterranean that is again to become a Roman lake. Incorporating, but disassociated from, the Vatican, the city is also the nominal See of the Roman Catholic faith, a spiritual union of 300,000,000 souls throughout the world who also subscribe to a temporal program of anti-Communism and anti-Collectivism. Although the internal policies of the nation are sometimes directed from Milan, and the diplomatic missions are often consummated at Venice, it is Rome (where the Fascist "trains run on time") that Il Duce calls Exhibit A. As ancient Rome recedes and the new Fascist era matures, the city wears a cloak of asperity rather than of grandeur. Roman legions still return under triumphal arches, but they go forth to conquer at Mussolini's bidding with considerably less grace.

BACKGROUND: After one has met the world's leading dictators it is fascinating to compare them. Certainly there is no dictator type. The world's leading autocrats are just as different from one another as the world's leading democrats. Mussolini and Hitler are no more alike than President Roosevelt and Léon Blum. In September 1935, within one week I talked to both Hitler and Mussolini, and I have never seen two men of more divergent type. The more I study dictators, the more I come to believe that like the divine right of kings, the divine right of dictators is non-existent. Of course every

man who makes himself a dictator must have certain positive qualities. Courage, initiative, persistence, devotion, a gift for popular appeal are all essential. But far more important than these primary qualifications are the accidents of history. It is the time that creates the opportunity for dictatorship, and at any given period there are always several men equally competent to take the lead.

Once a dictator has assumed power we are too apt to presume that the coming of this particular man was inevitable. Dictatorship may have been inevitable, but not the dictator. If we reflect on this matter we will see that Trotsky rather than Stalin might well have been Lenin's successor, Goering or Goebbels might be in the driver's seat in Germany, Gabriele d'Annunzio, had he been less of a poet, might today be ruling Italy. It is odd to think that Mussolini, the least visionary, the least idealistic and most practical of men, now leads a nation which once might have followed one of the most romantic and fiery of modern poets.

Shrewdness and realism, these are the dominant qualities in Mussolini's character. In fact, they might be said to constitute the whole of his character, for dictators, accustomed as they are to domination and obedience, seem more wholesouled than democratic leaders whose characters have been modified by the necessities of compromise. It is always easier to take the measure of a dictator than, say, of a British Foreign Minister, and Mussolini, of all dictators, is probably the most clearheaded, the most completely conscious of what he is and does.

He has a keen historic sense, together with a gift for realistic appraisal of the men and events of his own time. There is a hardboiled self-assurance about Mussolini that makes one feel he has both feet firmly planted on the solid ground of reality. Most other dictators, with the possible exception of Stalin, have a more dreamy quality, an imagination that sometimes runs away with them. Not so Mussolini. To find the real key to Mussolini's character, read Machiavelli's "The Prince," which he used for his doctor's thesis. Machiavelli is his patron political saint, and it is in the famous essay on Machiavelli that Il Duce gave the completest and harshest expression to his anti-democratic doctrine: "The adjective of 'sovereign' as applied to the 'people' is a tragic burlesque . . . governments exclusively based

on the consent of the governed have never existed, do not exist, and will probably never exist."

Mussolini's contempt for idealism is the basis of all his actions and many of his utterances. He takes a cynical view of humanity and its individual and mass motives, and he is moved to impatience and anger by those who believe in and hope for the best in man. In talking with me at the time of the Ethiopian crisis he expressed his fundamental disdain for international democracy as embodied in the League of Nations. He had outlined his intentions in Ethiopia. I countered with the suggestion that the League of Nations would probably take action against him. At this, his dark, penetrating eyes flashed,

"The League," he exclaimed in his precise but halting English, "the League, the League! What did the League do in Manchuria? What did the League do in the Chaco? The League did nothing for China. The League didn't stop the war in South America!"

Then suddenly, as he is apt to do in an interview, he changed the subject.

"Why didn't the United States enter the League?" he asked me with a challenge in his voice. I answered that we did not like the Treaty of Versailles. "Well," he replied with a satiric, I might say a Machiavellian, smile — "that Treaty is mostly gone. Reparations finished . . . Rhineland occupation finished . . . disarmament finished . . ."

He went on to indicate his contempt for those who agitate for peace,

"In America you are all for peace — peace — peace! All the Communists and Socialists and Bolsheviks — they all cry for peace. It is easy to cry peace, but I am in a difficult situation. I must be prepared to meet what may come. I must be prepared against attack. When attack comes 8,000 kilometers from the homeland [he was thinking of Ethiopia], it is no simple matter."

The sophistical turn the conversation took when it centered on the Ethiopian conquest was very much like Mussolini. I am sure that he did not expect me to take seriously the word "attack" used in this connection. Mussolini, unlike Hitler, is no fanatic; he merely enjoys a verbal fencing match and will turn any interview into one, if he can. He was more direct and more honest when he was dealing with the

rôle France and England played in the Ethiopian affair. Here his grievance was genuine, not histrionic. France and Britain, he declared, had made agreements to allot Ethiopia to Italy as a sphere of influence.

"Yet on two separate occasions," he said, "I was on the point of concluding a satisfactory agreement with Haile Selassie, when the diplomats of a foreign power intervened."

Having counted on the collaboration of France and England to effect a peaceful entry into Ethiopia, and having been disappointed in that hope, Mussolini proceeded to take realistic action. Thereafter, he had nothing but scorn for the diplomatic efforts which were made to change his course. It will be remembered that Britain made a mistaken move just before the Ethiopian war began. She offered Mussolini a Red Sea port by way of compromise, in exchange for peace in Ethiopia. On this occasion, Mussolini talked to Anthony Eden like a Dutch uncle, and Eden went home in a hurry, rebuffed and furious.

What happened afterward is, of course, history. Italy "took" Ethiopia, and now hopes to find there new markets and the raw materials she needs. She went to war for them without fear and without compunction.

"Peace is still possible," were Mussolini's last words to me in September. Only a few weeks later Italian troops moved from Eritrea across the Ethiopian border. In less than a year the Ethiopian conquest was concluded and the modest unimportant little Italian king was proclaimed emperor. To many American observers, it seemed incredible that Mussolini should have been allowed to get away with it. The impotence of the League to prevent the successful consummation of this war of aggression was bitterly disappointing to its friends. The complete failure of League sanctions presaged the necessary renovation of the Covenant.

If, however, we understand the nature of dictatorships as opposed to the nature of democracies, we will no longer be puzzled. We will see why and how Mussolini got away with it in Ethiopia; why and how he may get away with it in Spain today. In the first place, we must realize that the totalitarian state is singleminded where democracies are, by definition, "of many minds." Minorities do not exist under a dictatorship. The will of the dictator is the will of the people. Given this singlemindedness at home, given a dictator of no morals

and great personal force, it is easy to see how the Fascist state can shoulder its way through democratic opposition, which is necessarily divided, abroad. In the Ethiopian affair, Mussolini's whole course of action was based on the fact that external opposition to it was divided, and he made it his business to see that it remained so. Great Britain and France, acting together, could have smothered the Ethiopian conquest. Mussolini, counting on the fact that the needs and perils of these two democracies were different, drove a wedge between them, and went his own way.

Before the Ethiopian conquest, France had been hoping and trying for some time to effect a *rapprochement* with Italy. Relations between these two countries had been strained since the war, particularly after Italy had followed up the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 with a demand for complete naval parity with France. Mussolini was well aware that, to the Laval government, friendly relations with Italy, so long projected, so long despaired of, were more important than the immediate prestige of the League, diminished as this already was by Japan's conquest of Manchuria.

France, Mussolini was sure, would readily subordinate her obligations to the League, her responsibilities to her ally, Britain, especially in a conquest which was of so little direct concern to her, in order to patch up Italian relations. Mussolini said as much to me. "Today France is our friend," he told me three months before he put Laval's promises to the test. The outcome proved him right. France refused to cooperate wholeheartedly with Great Britain in the Ethiopian matter until victory was already within Mussolini's grasp.

Today Mussolini is pursuing the same policy in regard to Spain. A singleminded figure at the head of a unified state, he counts on a difference of opinion between France and England and within France and England, to allow him to win the war for General Franco. In this case, the internal political divergences of the democratic countries are perhaps more important and significant than are the variances of their foreign policies. Both in France and in England there are strong Fascist *blocs*. In France the Fascist *bloc*, as an important positive political unit, has been suppressed but it still exercises a strong negative influence on government policies. In the debate which preceded the fall of the Blum Government ex-Premier

Laval bitterly chided the Popular Front for its anti-Italian policy. In England, the Fascist group is vocal even though its influence at present is negligible. In both countries, countless minority groups are constantly exerting pressures on the parties in power, pressures which often modify and muddle decisive action which the Government might wish to take.

There are, besides, certain differences in the domestic and foreign policies of the two democratic nations which influence their behavior in the Spanish situation. Here the state of affairs which prevailed in 1935, during the Ethiopian campaign, is reversed. France is the more hostile to Italy's Spanish designs; England, the more conciliatory. Spain is, in the first place, geographically more important to France than to England. In the second place, France's Popular Front Government is closer in spirit to the Spanish Popular Front than is Britain's preponderantly conservative Coalition Government. In the third place, England, some six months after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, came to an agreement with Italy in regard to the Mediterranean, and this agreement she is no more anxious to scrap than Laval was and is to sacrifice the Franco-Italian *rapprochement* of 1935. That Mussolini is much less punctilious concerning the spirit of these new Mediterranean obligations, the events of the first six months of 1937 have amply proved.

In contrast to this democratic heterodoxy, we have in Italy opinion which is ceremonially orthodox. It is well known that the man in the street in Rome or Venice or Florence is actually afraid to mention Mussolini by name, and will refer to him only as "Etcetera." Furthermore, if the Fascist state was singleminded before, it is more intensely so now. We have only to look in higher places, to examine the characters and fates of Mussolini's lieutenants, to recognize to what degree power has been centralized in him:

Balbo was a colorful and popular figure and hence potentially dangerous to the dictator. Accordingly, though he conformed politically, he was sent to Libya as governor, permanently separated from the seat of power in Rome and may yet become another Scipio Africanus who orders his tombstone inscribed, "Ungrateful country, thou shalt not have my bones!"

Dino Grandi is also an attractive and dynamic personality, who achieved great international popularity as Italy's Foreign Minister.

He is now Ambassador to England. The post is important, but it is far from Italy.

Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law, is the only prominent Fascist who occupies a distinguished position in Italy, and Ciano is little more than a puppet to do Mussolini's bidding. (Those who know the Countess Ciano tell me she has inherited some of her father's mental power, and that he is much more apt to follow her counsel than that of his Foreign Minister.) Mussolini himself has become Italy, a single-minded, purposeful, unscrupulous Italy. There is secret opposition, of course. But it is sporadic and as yet unorganized. Even the Communist experts in underground technique have made little progress.

Using the same tactics which he successfully pursued in the Ethiopian war, Mussolini has played hob with France and England and the Non-Intervention Pact. From the very beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Italy poured munitions and men into the conflict, while France and England observed a timid and decorous neutrality. Had France and England acted jointly and at once, French and English battleships would in August have proceeded to Spanish waters, and Italian intervention might have been nipped at the outset. France and England, however, preferred to close their eyes to the Italian violations of the non-intervention agreement until they became so flagrant that it was impossible longer to do so. Then Italy, in February, was finally persuaded to sign the Non-Intervention Pact, and a few days later ten or twenty thousand Italian soldiers landed at Cadiz. The Non-Intervention Pact involved the establishment of an International Patrol to guarantee non-intervention in Spain. Shilly-shallying on the part of various countries postponed the organization of this Patrol until a month beyond the time which had been set for it to begin. In the meantime, Italian troops and munitions continued to seep into Spain, while Mussolini, with his customary bold disingenuousness, disavowed the obvious.

If Italy ever conforms to the rules of the Non-Intervention Pact, this can only mean that Mussolini is satisfied General Franco can win with the help already sent him. Moreover no patrol of airports has been established, and we know that new planes reached both sides in Spain long after non-intervention was supposed to be in effect.

It is indeed impossible that Italy should renounce her designs on Spain, as impossible as that she should have relinquished the Ethi-

opian conquest. In both cases, her aggressive foreign policy is based on a real domestic need. The Italian Fascist economy will break down unless Mussolini can find new markets and raw materials. He has chosen the dictator's way of finding them. The Ethiopian conquest was a step in this direction, but it was not enough. A Fascist Spain, headed by General Franco, dependent on Italy for the right to live would provide Italy with some of the markets, the iron ore and other raw materials, and the Mediterranean power she covets. A friendly Fascist Spain would, moreover, give Italy military and strategic bases in Africa, Spain and the Mediterranean in the event of a world war. It is not necessary for Italy actually to subjugate the whole or any part of Spain. It is not necessary for Italy to flout her Mediterranean agreement with Britain by seizing the Balearic Islands. If General Franco can win, these strategically located islands will serve Mussolini's purposes quite as well as if they were avowed Italian possessions. For still a third and a very practical reason, Italy espouses the Rebel cause. A Fascist victory in Spain would be a tremendous blow to Britain's Mediterranean prestige; it might even mean the beginning of the isolation of the British Empire, and it is Britain's Empire which tantalizes the Italian corporate state.

To one who has talked to Mussolini for any length of time, his motives in the Spanish conflict seem very clear. I know, for example, that Il Duce's ideological interest in the outcome of the Civil War is infinitesimal, compared to the other interests he has at stake. Mussolini is far too shrewd to be his own dupe, and Hitler's brand of idealism is as foreign to him as Woodrow Wilson's or Norman Thomas's. Mussolini is not motivated by an emotional hatred of Communism as is Hitler. Nor does he believe that the Loyalist Government in Spain is Communistic; he is far too well informed to be so deceived. He has his own reasons for desiring a Fascist Spain, practical, realistic reasons, and he will go about accomplishing his desire in the most practical and realistic way. Whatever shibboleths he may invoke in the process, he will use only for diplomatic and dramatic reasons. His real allegiance is given to power, and to power alone.

Mussolini is, in many ways, the most fascinating of the dictators. He is certainly the most unpredictable, for not being moored to any system of economics or social philosophy, he can veer as suddenly and as incalculably as the winds of history.

No one can deny that he has made real contributions to Italian economy. The draining of the Pontine marshes, the carefully planned modernization of Rome, the construction of a great network of motor roads, the electrification of Italian railroads, the substitution of "white coal" derived from the melting snows of the Italian Alps for imported black coal, Italy's general progress toward order and sanitation, are all substantial achievements.

But again we must ask to what end? The true conquest of Ethiopia has only begun. Yet the Italian Treasury is empty. Her economy is dislocated, her people are beginning to grumble more loudly at the heavy burdens they are compelled to bear. Yet the ideology of Fascism requires continued emphasis on war and the costly preparations for war. And spiritually the Italians are probably less happy than they were in the shiftless days of parliamentarianism. Living like a lion is no more fun for the average Italian than it is for the mis-named king of beasts who stalks the veldt.

OUTLOOK: In some ways the Italian people are more politically-minded than the Germans. Some Reichswehr dictator could readily take over Hitler's mantle but Il Duce's successor will have to deal with rapidly developing factionalism. Discipline and obedience do not rest lightly on the sun bronzed sons of Italy. Her workers and peasants have asked for little and have received little. Of the great powers of Europe, Italy has least in the way of natural resources or fertile land. That is why for many years Italian workers have been her most important item of export. Today the market for these workers is closed. The United States, France, Argentina, the French territories in Africa, have all imposed restrictions. Internal debts pile up. The lira grows weaker in terms of foreign currencies. Mussolini's problem is indeed difficult.

He has his empire but it is too distant and too undeveloped to be of value to this generation. Prestige he has also. But it has been purchased on credit and at a high price — high, at least for Italy. Payment will not be easy. Hence Il Duce's suggestion for an early arms conference, conveyed to the world in May 1937 through William Philip Simms, able foreign editor of the Scripps-Howard newspapers. Mussolini sees

Britain and France outstripping Italy and Germany. "Italy needs peace for a long time," he says realistically, throwing out a hint that President Roosevelt should call a meeting for arms limitation. As though he or Hitler would not be the first to call such a conference if they were willing to make a sincere contribution to its success! But he admits frankly that arms competition at its present pace must bring "war or economic collapse with armies of jobless perhaps in revolt, nobody can foresee what." It is helpful when that dictator, whose ruthless defiance of treaty obligations has launched the British Empire on the greatest rearmament program in history, admits that he at least cannot keep up the pace.

Export markets for Italian goods, not for Italian workers, will again develop as world prosperity returns. Italy's sunny climate, natural beauty and historic monuments will continue to attract tourists and help restore the balance of trade. But only by bringing under the Italian flag areas in the Mediterranean basin, now under French or British control, can Italy effect any important permanent change in her present economic situation. Libya is largely desert and French contributions which have made Italy's North African possessions seem more important on the map have largely consisted of more desert. But let France contribute Tunis, let Spain add Spanish Morocco or let Britain permit Il Duce to unify the Sudan with neighboring Ethiopia, and what a change in the picture! The only alternative that might satisfy a peaceminded Italy is collective security plus free and equal access to the world's raw materials. So, until dictators grow gentle and democracies grow generous, we must expect Italy to long for more than she has and to ponder ways and means of getting it. In that larger view of the Italian political and economic landscape Benito Mussolini takes his place as one of the minor Caesars.

3. IS HITLER GERMANY?

FOCAL POINT: *Berlin.* Capital of Prussia, residence since the late 15th Century of a family named Hohenzollern, and since 1871 capital of the entire *Deutsches Reich*, Berlin had not even heard of one Adolf Hitler until it read in the papers that an Austrian born Bavarian smalltown politician of that name had attempted a beer garden *putsch* on a November day in 1923. Berlin's tragedy today is that it forgot all about that episode, if indeed it heard about it. For when Hitler was released from jail in February 1925, he reorganized his patient band of *Hitler Volunteers* into the Nationalist Socialist Labor Party. He did not represent them in the Reichstag; he did much better by them as *Führer*. Hitler was one man in Germany who knew just what degree of dissatisfaction and humiliation there was in the hearts and minds of the people. Riding on the shoulders of malcontents, preaching a gospel of the Third Reich, pan-Germanism, anti-Semitism, *Anschluss*, equalitarian rearmament, he infected the minds of 10,000,000 German youth who had patriotism left, and not much more. They were without hope, without self-respect, without jobs — when he gave them uniforms and promised them the rest. Together, they conquered Berlin.

BACKGROUND: From the Fascist concept, one slides easily (perhaps too easily) over to the Nazi type of dictatorship, but we are bridging a far wider gap than is commonly accepted. Indeed, while both countries are operated under admitted dictatorships, that is about as far as the parallel goes. The two regimes are almost as dissimilar as the two peoples except in certain superficial customs and peculiar forms of exhibitionism. Even their basic symbols are entirely different, the Fascisti Party deriving from the fasces, a bundle

of rods bound together and surrounding a halberd, its blade projecting, an ancient Roman badge of authority. Thus, while Mussolini's party harks back to ancient imperial glories, Hitler's party name derives from a political theory that is distinctly present day, the name being a composite of initials denoting his National Socialist hegemony. Yet he does not forget that the ancient Teutonic gods have their own special value in stimulating a Nordic superiority complex.

Fundamentally the two regimes are as different as the two leaders. In Germany, you find the leadership in the hands of a man of narrow, limited outlook, a man who was frustrated in his youth, who fought desperately for ten years as a party leader before he achieved power, who carries a certain bitterness in his heart — yet a man who is a true German patriot. You can't sit opposite Hitler, as I have on various occasions, without realizing the man's complete sincerity, and his obvious limitations.

He is a man with countless prejudices, with a provincial outlook deriving from his own narrow experience in life; a man who is a fanatic, quite unselfish, with infinite courage and perfectly willing to sacrifice himself to his cause, but a man without balance, a man who was never created to be an administrator. A great agitator, a great speaker, a popular leader — yes, but not a man who has the breadth of view or the cosmopolitan background to lead aright a great people like the German people in a time of crisis and reconciliation, when their success and future depend not on what they can do by themselves, but on what they can do in cooperation with neighbor peoples. That is the fundamental lesson Germany must learn. Until she learns it, she cannot become the power which her material strength, her historic background and the intellectual and spiritual qualities of her people, entitle her to assume. It is the lack of a sense of relationship between Germany and the rest of the world which has hampered Germans ever since Bismarck created the German Empire in 1871.

Hitler, unfortunately for Germany, is just that type of man least able to provide the kind of leadership which would produce sound relations with other nations. Among his advisers there are many better qualified intellectually and with a broader outlook. Unfortunately they are all subject to his authoritarian principle which centers everything in Hitler, and makes his word law. Note the

adulation voiced by members of the Cabinet in every public address.

I used to hope that certain members of his official family like Schacht and von Neurath might be given more authority, but there is little promise of that at the moment. The regime, however, still has various elements and to arrive at a complete understanding of German Nazism today, we must recognize the duality of Hitlerism, which we find penetrating every walk of the national life, every negotiation and decision, domestic and foreign.

There is an "official" government, which still represents the front of the system, the barrier which absorbs certain inner and outer shocks of state. Then there is the highly efficient, omnipresent and even stronger Party Government conducted under the auspices of Hitler's personal hierarchy. In the sense that we may divide up Hitler's personal responsibility and leadership at all, this dualism provides the pattern. Schacht, for instance, with his genius for business and finance holds economic Germany together. Goebbels, on the other hand, in the peculiarly dominant and all-embracing portfolio of Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, is the inspiration of the Party. Both can accomplish a great deal because they leave at their command the absolute power of an authoritarian state. Yet these two could no more agree on any single principle or essential than they could be twins. Hitler's remarkable power, the quality that guarantees him continued leadership, derives from his rather extraordinary achievement in recognizing the talents and uniting the efforts of such divergent men. They are made to work by the sheer insistence of his belief in the *Drittes Reich*, for the common good — or at least the common ends which are his goal.

Because Hitler is a man of narrow vision, a sentimentalist and singletrack minded, one naturally turns to genuine career men like Schacht and von Papen for interviews on realistic aspects of Germany's plight. Von Papen, for instance, is a man whose determination to rehabilitate the beaten Germany together with his shrewd though sometimes mistaken political instincts provided the basis for his reconciliation with Hitler. It allowed him to step aside from the Chancellorship when the moment came, to continue his work in a secondary capacity. Von Papen made Hitler possible yet he narrowly escaped the blood purge to which his secretary fell victim. He was always convincing when he insisted that Germany's objective was

rehabilitation, rather than sheer aggression. He was always determined that Germany must achieve some basis on which to cooperate peaceably with other nations. I remember how ambitious he was, how insistent that the 1933 economic conference (when much might have been accomplished) instead of its becoming a new *débâcle* should succeed. He was of course insistent on that one clause in which he believed lay the solution to all future problems — the point on which Germany held out through the thirties and which the "Allies" managed to sidestep every time they were confronted with it. He told me then that he had given Ramsay MacDonald fair warning that nothing would be accomplished until "we Germans had been assured of that moral stimulus which we needed more than anything, and which could only come from the abrogation of the unfair clauses of the Versailles Treaty." He was referring to the armament restrictions and the war guilt provisions. But neither MacDonald nor Herriot felt that they were in a position to "give in" to that extent. When I carried Chancellor von Papen's words to Premier Herriot he told me that the Germans always asked too much too soon; that he might be willing to give them all they asked, but that he had a Chamber of Deputies to contend with. Today, Great Britain and France know that every single step in Hitler's foreign policy dates from the failure of those negotiations.

Foreign Minister von Neurath took the same stand. I had brought up successive points on which I thought he might reveal some optimism. The Lausanne Conference had just come to an agreement on reparations, and I asked about the outlook. "Reparations are agreed on," he said. "But I am convinced we will not have to pay another mark. Our agreement to pay is so limited by conditional clauses that reparations are done away with." And at once he came back to the old issue, the same old sore point. He found the widespread mistrust of Germany's motives overpowering; the French attitude was simply too antagonistic to admit any possibility of cooperation, much less arbitration. And the English — he described Sir John Simon to me as "unfortunately a second-rate intelligence." But my notes on that interview show me that von Neurath was a little over-anxious in his whitewashing of Germany's intentions. How his words echo back today, over all that has happened since then! "We do not wish to increase our armaments," he said, and this

was in August of 1932. "We cannot afford it and we do not want it."

Foreign Minister von Neurath represents, as I have suggested, the technical organs of government. He has continued to hold his post because he has been careful never to act or speak without first conferring with his Nazi party advisers. Statements that issue from the party machine often contradict what is said by the Foreign Office. We notice an utterly opposite tenor. No hedging, no conciliatory attitude, no catering to the several arts of diplomacy. The utterances of the Nazi regime, as such, are pure dogma — rigid, unequivocal principles from which there is rarely the slightest deviation.

It is always particularly interesting to talk to an intelligent non-Nazi in a position of authority such as Dr. Keppler, for some time Chancellor Hitler's economic adviser. The last time I talked to him, I questioned him about a certain word, a single word well understood nowadays on both sides of the Atlantic, but one which I had always wanted to try to fit into the Nazi picture, or at least see how and why it belonged there. This was the word "Socialist," which occupies a prominent place in the Party tag since its earliest days. Where, I asked Dr. Keppler, was the Socialism in present day Nazism? His answer was immediate and emphatic. "There is no Socialism in German industry under Hitler and there never will be." He implied, in later amplification of its origin, that while it was perfectly true that Hitler's original program did contain elements of Socialism, that had all been wiped out.

I pursued the point still further, because one of the Hitlerite particulars I had always noticed was the party's consistency. I had a copy of the 25-point-platform, the original credo, enunciated in 1925, and I had watched successive editions of it printed through the years with never a change. When one stops to consider that in our country no party platform ever envisions more than a four year duration and rarely maintains its integrity for even that length of time, one had to be reasonably impressed by a platform that stuck for twelve years.

On this point, however, Dr. Keppler's admission indicated that here, at least, was one plank which had been dropped by the wayside.

"Then why was it not struck out long ago?" I asked.

"Because," he said, "it was not really necessary. To have changed

the platform in any particular, would have reduced its whole stature, would have undermined its basic integrity."

"Hitler never was the world's greatest economist," he allowed. "He learned long ago that certain economic points in his original program were wrong. If he had changed them they might have opened him to attack all the way down the line."

So this was strategy. Well, I asked him, why was the socialization of industry thrown out? "Because," he said, "you cannot regiment industry or govern it with rigid laws. Instead, we have worked the problem out this way. I tell the industrialists what we seek, what *der Führer* wishes accomplished, and then rely on their cooperation to achieve the desired results. It has been manifestly successful. You see, Nazism does not believe in this principle of leveling one and all. It strongly defends the aristocratic principle of giving place and authority to ability."

This was enlightening on the internal aspect of the Nazi regime. That aspect has dominant importance since the success or failure of Hitler's economic program will probably decide the fate of his regime. Up to the middle of 1937 the balance has been on the side of success. Industrial production doubled from 1932 to 1936. Unemployment dropped from six million to two million. The "Battle of Production" made Germany eighty percent self-sufficient in food and fodder. Foreign trade showed an export balance of 550 million Reich marks in 1936 as against 111 millions in 1935. The Schaffendes Volk Exposition at Duesseldorf which opened in May 1937 ahead of its Paris rival, testified to Germany's continued progress in producing substitutes, some of them far too expensive, for foreign raw materials.

This, of course, does not present the whole picture. In 1928 Government orders accounted for one-fifth of production goods. In 1936 this proportion rose to around two-thirds because of tremendous Government expenditures for rearmament. Germany's progress toward self-sufficiency was purchased at the expense of an increase of over twenty percent in the cost of living. Real wages have dropped correspondingly since money wages have not risen. Subtract from the employed those in the army, those engaged in labor service, and those working in rearmament, and it becomes evident that Germany's re-employed millions are being paid by a Government that

is running on both a deficit and a two percent gold coverage on its paper money.

Which means that everything is all right so long as it lasts. Germany's foreign trade is, has been and will continue to be the big point in her economic situation. Until that improves far beyond its present status her economic future is insecure.

When it came to tracking down an equally controversial question of foreign policy, I went to another man of the party, because I wanted a realistic answer. I went to Dr. Rosenberg, who occupied the rather neat position of creating Nazi foreign policy without being responsible for it. Though he is a party agitator rather than a diplomat, his conversation was valuable because he says exactly what he thinks, and no beating around the bush. As a matter of fact, when his fanatic streak is subdued, he is thoroughly likable. As a human being he has much more personal appeal than Dr. Goebbels. I challenged him on the question of the Polish Corridor. "Do you still expect to get it back?" I asked.

"For the time being we are obliged to overlook it," he replied. "The problem of the Corridor remains, but we must put first things first. Hitler can sign a treaty with Poland because everyone knows he is a patriot, and that he does it because it is in Germany's interests. The regime that preceded ours sold Germany out in so many ways that its members had a perpetually bad conscience. They would never have dared to sign a ten year non-aggression pact with Poland.

"But that can and will wait because the really great problem today is Bolshevism. There is the enemy. The Communists continue to bore at us through Czechoslovakia and Switzerland. The Franco-Russian treaty gives them new strength. Some day the French will regret this alliance. It strengthens Communism within their own frontiers as well as in the rest of the world."

I have already suggested that there was a rather extraordinary basic consistence in Hitler's regime. Not that his interests and ambitions are not variable, or do not bend in the direction where new opportunities present themselves, but as a quality which gives Hitler a certain undeniable distinction. He is consistent, strangely, perversely consistent with his own original idealism. When he speaks, and where he takes the initiative, it is always recognizable as this young corporal-housepainter-politician proclaiming his own inde-

fatigable destiny. A few years ago, when he still believed in amassing a voting strength behind him (a gesture to cajole world opinion with which he has largely dispensed) he said to me with a romantic gleam of belief in his naive righteousness,

"Europe cannot maintain itself in the uncertain currents of democracy. Europe needs authoritarian government. Formerly this authority was provided by the monarch or the Church. Authority can, of course, assume a variety of forms. But parliamentarianism is not native to us Germans and does not belong to our tradition. Yet we cannot substitute brute force just because the parliamentary system has not functioned. *No government can maintain itself for any length of time by bayonets alone.* It must have the support of the masses. You cannot establish dictatorship in a vacuum. The soldier and the policeman do not constitute a state. A government that does not derive its strength from the people will fail in the face of a foreign crisis. Yet dictatorship is justified if the people declare their confidence in one man and ask him to lead them."

Anyone who has met and talked to Hitler several times will be able to accept that, however difficult it may be for the reader. If we look objectively at the "history" he has made since he came into power there is plenty to substantiate that he believes in his position of leader to just such an extent as that. You may say his infrequent elections or plebiscites are a fiasco, but that is not to say he does not believe he has the German masses with him. He has a keen instinct to sense majority will, however unscrupulous may be his attitude toward a minority. His career has consisted of gestures designed to appease — or better, *stimulate* — the patriotic sense of the majority. Right or wrong in his estimates, it is this effort which has been the spring-board of his successive rampages: anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, deliberate violation of the Locarno treaty, anti-Communism, remilitarization and rearmament. Occasionally his followers go too far as in the war against the Protestant Church and when that happens Hitler may exercise a restraining influence.

At various times in recent years I have discussed these moves with Hitler or his aides. At the interview during which I had made up my mind to broach the question of anti-Semitism, his greeting was perfunctory, suggestive of latent hostility. My first question concerning Jews brought it forth in full flame. I tried to find out whether

his anti-Semitism concerned Jews everywhere or whether he had something specific against German Jews. He began his reply by speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, declaring that since we had a Monroe Doctrine in the United States it was perfectly legitimate for Germany to hold a similar doctrine against Jews, whom he considers invaders of German soil. His mind and manner warmed perceptibly the moment he began speaking, and after a few minutes he was off full tilt with the natural orator's gift for crisp, epigrammatic exposition. From the Monroe Doctrine he turned to a discussion of America's immigration laws, citing our manifold restrictions.

"You exclude any would-be immigrants you do not care to admit," he said emphatically. "You regulate their number. Not content with that, you prescribe their physical condition. Not content with that, you insist on the conformity of their political opinions. You even insist that they must bring in a certain amount of money.

"We demand the same right in Germany. We have no concern with the Jews of other lands, but we are very much concerned about the anti-German element within our country. We demand the right to deal with these elements as we see fit. Jews have been the intellectual proponents of subversive anti-German movements, and as such they must be dealt with."

It was amusing to hear canary birds and cockatoos chirp away merrily on Hitler's balcony while his impassioned words were rushing forth. The arrival of a great wolfhound threatened to disrupt the interview, but a pointing finger and the single word "*Platz!*" pronounced decisively sent the dog scurrying to his place under a nearby table. For a few minutes he listened to our conversation, then, deciding the leader's mood was not favorable, slunk away at a moment when Hitler was not looking. It was evident that he had been taught to fear his master.

Perhaps the principal impression I received was the intense dislike of interviews displayed by Adolf Hitler. He has an instinctive aversion to dealing with people who are not completely in sympathy with him and his views. He is tense, suspicious and ill-at-ease. Perhaps it was this early and subsequently confirmed impression that has always made me feel Hitler is Mussolini's opposite. Mussolini enjoys interviews and I have always found them enjoyable.

The issues in German anti-Catholicism are a little less clearly

defined. Of course the Nazi state is totalitarian. Its one principle, attested to me again and again by every Nazi I've met in Germany, is obedience, complete coordination — *Gleichschaltung*, as the German word has it, or singleness of authority; it is the most positive of various such words, meaning one source of all authority and complete subordination to but one omnipotent command. And the Catholic Church, which has stood by itself for thousands of years, can't be *gleichgeschaltet*, either in Germany or elsewhere, not even by the Nazis. It has stood tests of this kind in many countries, in many periods, and it is not going to admit itself defeated by a mere Adolf Hitler.

After things had been simmering close to the flame for quite a while, open war broke about between the Nazi state and the Vatican in March 1937 with the reading in all Catholic Churches of a message from Pope Pius, in which he accused the Nazis of being unchristian and of having violated the Concordat with the Vatican.

This was a perfectly natural attitude for the Vatican to take. Germany has waged constant warfare against the Catholic Church. At any rate, certain Nazi subordinates have waged it, and even though Hitler himself has given indications in the past that he would like to see the war ended, subordinate action in the indictment of some one thousand monks on various charges from sedition to immorality cannot have been taken without his tacit consent. So Pope Pius, although it might have been more judicious to keep the peace and try by sweet persuasion to win the Nazis over, decided differently and his Papal letter caused quite a sensation. If anybody of any rank within Germany had written such a letter he would have been clapped into a concentration camp almost before it was read.

The climax came in June when the incalculable Nazi Government, not content with stirring general resentment by its unilateral reprisal bombardment of a Spanish Government port, chose this moment to withdraw its Vatican Ambassador because of "unsatisfactory relations." The immediate cause of the break was the Vatican's refusal to censure Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago for an ungracious reference to Adolf Hitler as an unsuccessful Austrian house painter. The saving grace of a sense of humor is well illustrated as one observes the reaction of a humorless regime to the casual comment of an uncensored American Mayor or Cardinal. That any Govern-

ment could at one and the same time irritate the world's liberals, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, does seem incredible. Even German diplomacy reached a new low in 1937.

What a contrast again between shrewd Mussolini and Hitler. The former made his peace with the Vatican at the very outset. This has made an enormous difference between Mussolini's success in gaining a genuine following, and Hitler's inability to cease persecuting the Catholics, Jews, Protestants and others merely because they disagree on some point with the totalitarian Nazi creed. How will all this persecution end? Not happily, because there is bound to be, sooner or later, an explosion.

But let us turn to the Reich's foreign policy. How does Hitler stand with the rest of the world? I am sure that he is completely sincere in his desire to achieve the salvation of the German people without another war, but I am equally sure that he is completely mistaken as to the right way of going about it. He has given them political unity; he has given them back their national self-respect; he has emancipated them from some of the stupid restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles — but at what a price! Look at Germany's position in the world: contrast the place she once occupied with that she holds today! With Hitler's demand for the return of Germany's former colonies I, personally, am in sympathy. It is justified. French and British statesmanship might long ago have proposed the return of these colonies under certain conditions. Not that they would be much of an asset. Hitler himself has told us in *Mein Kampf* that contiguous territory is far more important than colonies. Yet if Hitler received back some of the German colonies he might be able to pay a price. Since it would strengthen him at home it might enable him to be more conciliatory abroad.

But Hitler's sudden denunciation of the Locarno Pact; his abrupt remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936; the reprisal bombardment of Almeria, Spain, in May 1937; the brash brutal egotism of his public utterances — have given Europe, and particularly France, uncontrollable jitters. Western Europe feels as it did before the war. The mention of Germany is enough to make the French Government quake and rush troops up to fill those fortifications along the Maginot line, the "peace" barrier stretching from Switzerland almost to the North Sea. When Hitler made his Rhineland announce-

ment, France immediately turned to Great Britain and said, in effect, "You're not going to let Germany get away with *that*, are you?" Britain, of course, said and did nothing beyond sending an unanswered questionnaire.

It may have been just as well. Hitler's Reichstag speech, in which he tore up the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, looked like an immediate threat of war to France. But not so to England. I said over the radio that morning, and I say again now, that Hitler's re-zoning of the Rhine is perhaps more apt to make for peace than war in that sector.

If that speech of Hitler's had been read calmly and thoughtfully, together with General von Blomberg's that followed it twenty-four hours later (von Blomberg's speech indicated that Hitler's move had the all important and essential blessing of the Reichswehr), the rezoning of the Rhine would have been revealed as both a calm and thoughtful step on Hitler's part. He spoke disparagingly of no nation but Soviet Russia. He might have expressed frankly his heartfelt resentment on the subject of the Franco-Russian agreement. Instead he was almost plaintive in his attitude toward France, because she refused to grasp the proffered hand of friendship which he himself has again and again offered. Yet if one is inclined to pity Hitler for the moment, such a sentiment is soon erased by a full comprehension of the broader German tragedy. Hitler expects us to believe what he says and to ignore what he does. The tragedy for Germany is that this man has not the intellectual breadth to realize and face the inherent contradiction between his professions and his practices.

Well, he got away with the Rhineland occupation, the most dangerous thing he has tried so far if we except recent events in Spain. It probably helped him personally to maintain his *rôle* as the German national hero — which he certainly is. But the move was not essential either to German unity or to German self-respect or to Germany's military power. It could have come just as well two years from now, when Germany's military machine will be ready to make use of that Rhineland. It came, in other words, at this time not because Germany needed it but because Adolf Hitler needed it. Remember that the Nazi regime's prestige in Germany declines steadily, at regular intervals, until it is restored by some dramatic stroke, which is then endorsed with unanimity. Of course all those

who disagree maintain a discreet silence. In 1933, it was his withdrawal from the League, a matter of honor; 1934, the "blood purge," a matter of cleansing the higher ranks of a new military machine; 1935, conscription, in the name of ancient Prussian glories; 1936, the Rhineland occupation; 1937, Spanish intervention and for good measure a rift with the Vatican.

What next will "German honor" demand? Danzig? Austria? Silesia? Memel? But Hitler would not risk a war for these. The only ambition that would be worth such a risk would be that obvious equivalent to his greatest hate: Soviet Russia. Yet an early war against the Soviet Union is unlikely.

The German army is not ready for a war against Russia. The battlefields of Spain have proved the quality of Russia's war material. The Third Reich will not be ready for war until 1939 or 1940. It has the mechanization, yes, but not the men trained to deal with the new mechanized units. These machines are intricate, the men to handle them are not prepared overnight. Some of the machines did not stand up well in Spain.

And don't forget that Germany has a terrific experience behind her of failure and defeat, because of a lack of friends and potential allies. Today, she suffers that lack more than at any time in her long history.

OUTLOOK: Definite predictions about Hitler's Germany are almost sure to go wrong. Few observers find it possible to be objective concerning the Third Reich. Wishful thinking is the rule. My respect for German efficiency in industry and organization is such that I would challenge those who predict early economic or financial collapse. Because we fought Germany during the war we have never given her credit for the miracles she wrought from 1914 to 1918.

Today she is once more on a war basis, suffering privations but concentrating exclusively on the national purpose. Successful revolution may come again as it came in 1918 and 1933 and as it failed to come with the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and the Hitler Putsch of 1923. But there is nothing in Germany's present external or internal situation to suggest that it is imminent. Anyone of three develop-

ments might bring it about: factionalism in the Nazi party, a split between the Party and the Reichswehr, external war.

Factionalism there is since the Party has always had its right and left wings, its discontented elements, its corrupt bureaucracy. The expulsion and exile of some leaders — Otto Strasser's Black Front still functions from Prague — the Blood Purge which eliminated others, and the leader principle which enforces absolute obedience, have kept intra-Party divisions from becoming dangerous. The split between Reichswehr and Party was a possibility after General Schleicher's murder during the Blood Purge and continues to be a possible development. But since the Hitler regime is giving the army everything it wants including subordination of the Brown Shirts, and universal conscription has further identified Party members with the army, an open break is not in sight at this time. The unlikelihood of war has been emphasized in this chapter and will be treated again in the Epilogue.

Yet we must never forget that we do not and cannot know the whole truth about a dictatored country. There are many subterranean currents obscured by censorship and repression. Whatever else they may be, the German people are intelligent and they do not take Nazi propaganda at its face value. Millions of them bitterly resent some of the things which are being done at home and abroad. Once the break comes, the world will marvel that the regime could have lasted so long in the face of its loss of popular confidence.

4. RUSSIA: TWENTY YEARS AFTER

FOCAL POINT: *Moscow.* Here, overshadowed by the Kremlin (which for centuries symbolized Czarist Russia) is the home of the Communist Party, national and international, which deposed the weak successor of an autocratic government and set up a totalitarian one in its place. The Party became the organ of government for a federated Union of Soviet Republics, which was ultimately to include the entire world. Stalin, Lenin's successor as chief of state, decided to abandon world revolution in favor of building a perfect Soviet Russia, capable of "handling" the capitalist powers. Trotsky, who disagreed, was exiled. In Moscow the Communist Party thinks of itself as "the people's choice" and is therefore occupied with distributing as much *largesse* (*vide* the new subways, parks of rest and culture, theaters, ballets, circuses) to the populace — the urban populace — as rearmament and State Socialism permit.

World revolution is still on the Party agenda but even Moscow's much-feared radio broadcasts are silent on the subject. Also on the Party program are anti-Trotskyism, anti-clericalism, anti-capitalism and anti-German-Japanese imperialism. Yet we must never forget that Moscow looks to the East as well as the West. The patient Oriental bargainer and trader who haunts its streets at night now wears European clothes, but still loves to make a shrewd, illicit deal. Moscow is a city of many museums and few churches, of no Sundays but frequent Rest Days, of stale jazz and fresh caviar. It is a city of contradictions about which Americans are one-tenth as well informed as they think they are. The Second Five Year Plan is not progressing according to schedule. But that only means the schedule will be changed. Moscow is getting on because it never permits a Communist theory to stand in the way of a sound capitalist practice!

BACKGROUND: I was last in Russia in the summer of 1935. It was my fifth visit since the Revolution. In September 1934, Russia entered the League of Nations. At the time, it seemed to me that this public *rapprochement* with the bourgeois nations was but the outward and visible sign of an inner and spiritual change in the policy and temper of the Soviet Union. It was the climax of a process of evolution under way since the October Revolution of 1917.

Nikolai Lenin, prophet and idol of the first Communist State, referred to the Geneva organization as a "league of brigands." Yet the State he created, gratefully accepted its place in the Assembly and Council of the League. Time has shown that Russia's venture into international cooperation was no mere civility. Who can remember sanctions without recalling Russia's part in imposing them? Who can consider the Non-Intervention Pact in Spain today and forget Russia's support of it? The League may be tottering or somnolent but Russia is one of its sturdiest props.

There are left-wing Communists who will tell you that Lenin would turn over in his grave if he could see Russia's friendliness with the capitalist nations, Russia's advocacy of democracy at home and abroad. I doubt it. From the first, Lenin, the practical man, would not permit theory to interfere with common sense. He explained to his followers that Communism, as Karl Marx declared, had to be preceded by a temporary period of proletarian dictatorship. Communism would come later after the state itself had "withered away." It could not be achieved in Russia until it had been accepted in some parts of the remaining world. Hence the New Economic Policy, initiated in 1922, with its tolerance of private trade. Hence also the growing indifference of Lenin's successors to the literal precepts of Marx. Hence the outcries of the exiled Trotsky, and the grumblings of those who would "hold to the line."

Red Russia has gone pink. One who returns to that country year after year is struck by the steady transformation. Capitalist methods are forcing their way into farm and factory. Each year sees a further development of those competitive conditions and those special rewards for special service which have proved so effective in other countries. The Soviet Union has not abandoned Communism as a creed. But just as Christians believe in their religion while violating

its precepts, Soviet leaders have introduced the very capitalist practices they profess to abhor.

Throughout Russia I saw that private property had again become an institution and was being accumulated in many ways. There was steady progress toward decentralization. The heads of provincial administrations and the managers of industrial enterprises had become much more independent of Moscow and of the local Communist Party committees with which they share authority. There was more nationalism and much less internationalism. Already in 1935, one heard and saw little of the Communist slogan, "Workers of the World Unite" but one heard and saw a great deal about rallying to "the defense of the Soviet Union." The Communist Internationale still had its headquarters in the Kremlin but its authority and importance were greatly diminished.

The Second Five Year Plan has nothing to do with the world revolution. It is concerned first with a further development of the Soviet Union's defensive powers and second, with providing more consumer goods for Soviet peasants and workers. Exactly as in capitalist countries, higher wages and salaries are granted to those who do important work.

One way to see just what this change of policy means is to visit a Collective farm. Agriculture will continue to be Russia's most important industry for a long time to come. It still provides employment for three-fourths of the population. There is a small Collective, typical of thousands, located about ten miles outside of Odessa on the Black Sea. It has 250 members and since it is well run and profitable, many friends and relatives of members are trying to join. Nearly all the participating *kolhozniks* were recruited from the population of the village which lies at one end of the Collective's 650 hectare plot (one hectare is a little less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres). Half of this land was taken away from so-called *kulaks* who were expropriated because they refused to cooperate with the authorities in establishing the Collective.

In the year 1935 the Commissariat for Agriculture in Moscow through its local agent ordered 60 hectares to be planted with potatoes. Actually the Collective planted 75 hectares of potatoes. Under the new tax plan the State exacts a definite contribution of 270 pounds of potatoes from each hectare, but the Collective only needs to pay this contribution on the product of the 60 hectares.

The total crop realized from the remaining 15 hectares belongs to the Collective.

This particular agricultural colony has established its wages in terms of potatoes, every member receiving six pounds of potatoes for each normal labor day. But the man who runs the tractor gets four days' labor credit for one day's work, because he is an expert and the work he does is counted as four times as valuable to the Collective as that of the man who sows or digs. Even the president of the Collective is credited with only two normal working days for every day that he presides. He is on even terms with the blacksmith.

This particular Collective is exceptional in that each member owns a cow. This is an ideal which stands in the foreground of the Second Five Year Plan, but is still far from general realization. Largely because individual peasants are once more encouraged to own cows, pigs, chickens and other animals, the steady decline in livestock up to 1933 has been arrested. Each *kolhoznik* can sell the surplus milk which he obtains from his own cow. No effort is made to organize or collectivize the selling of this surplus milk. It is regarded as legitimate private business which the peasant can handle as he sees fit.

The Collective is expected to contribute 28 pounds of meat to the State for each one of its members during the current year. That is why there is a "piggery" at the farm. In addition many members raise their own pigs and have a considerable surplus of meat for sale. By Russian standards the members of this Collective are rapidly becoming wealthy. Last year they made a profit of 110,000 rubles from 12 hectares of cucumbers and a profit of 165,000 rubles from 23 hectares of melons. At the end of each harvest, the profits are divided among the members on the basis of their earnings. Some of them buy Government bonds but most of the money is spent on those consumer goods, unavailable until recently, for which they have been longing all their lives.

The married members live comfortably in small individual houses, while there are barracks for the unmarried men and women. Sixty percent of this particular Collective are women. Each family has a garden occupying one quarter of a hectare on which it can raise vegetables and fruits. Some take in summer boarders and make enough profit to build an addition to their houses which will enable them to accommodate more boarders the following summer.

The general store, operated by the Collective, sells both necessities and luxuries. The former are sold at low prices, but such things as perfume, vodka and strong wine command the same prices which are current in the private stores of Odessa.

There is a steady tendency toward individualism in the life of the Collective. It is the ambition of practically every one of the younger members living in the barracks to marry and secure a private home. The married man likes to spend his day of rest working in his own garden or improving his little house. He uses his share in the growing profits of the Collective to provide himself with better housing and with such limited comforts and luxuries as the market may afford.

In the Odessa area there is constant competition between farm and factory for young workers. Yet in every case where a Collective farm is well run and making a profit it has many more applications for membership than it can accommodate. The food is definitely better than it is in town, the housing just as good and many young people are glad to go back to the farm after a brief experience with factory work. Factory directors are learning that they can only hold some of their best workers by permitting them to go back to their native villages to work on a farm during the summer.

To a large extent these Collective farms are self-governing. At the beginning of the season the government prescribes how the land is to be apportioned to the different crops and just how much the State expects to receive from each hectare, but there is practically no interference with the operation of any Collective that delivers its quota of meat and produce to the authorities at the time specified.

There has been similar decentralization of authority in factory operation. The experience of the First Five Year Plan taught the Government not only what it could expect from each plant but also the need for flexible provisions. On the basis of that experience quotas have been fixed and adjustments provided. The director of any plant which meets its quota is not subjected to much interference. There is a Workers Committee and a Communist Party Committee in each plant, which occasionally meet with the director and discuss matters of common interest, but in all questions of managerial authority the director has the last word. If there is a difference of opinion which cannot be settled locally, the Workers or the Party Committee may carry the issue to Moscow.

Not long ago most heads of the more important plants were political experts rather than technical experts. They were selected for their services to the Party and to the Soviet Government rather than for their practical experience in a given line. Today this is no longer true. One still finds political directors in some of the more important plants, but they have an associate director with practical experience. It is also customary to move these political directors about to prevent their becoming routinized. What American engineers would call inefficiency is still the rule rather than the exception. It is probably impossible to eliminate politics and bureaucracy from plant control in the Soviet Union. Some of the plants are too large and for that reason too important politically. That may be why engineers who fail to produce according to plan are charged with sabotage, Fascist conspiracies and Trotskyism when the system under which they work is partially responsible for their delays and mistakes.

Decentralization has also been used to assure greater stability in food supply. Most large industrial plants now have their own farm to supply the factory kitchens and restaurants. A special committee of factory workers is charged with the supervision of this farm. At a meeting of the Farm Committee of the largest printing plant in Odessa, the discussion turned upon the best way to exercise control. Members of the Farm Committee were urged to pay frequent unexpected visits to the factory farm to check up on the new manager. In many plants throughout the Soviet Union, there were, for the last two summers, appeals to the workers to contribute their sixth day, the day of rest, to work on the factory farm. Those who did so received honorable mention on the wall newspapers and in the plant's house organ.

Wherever these factory farms are intelligently run they have produced material improvement in the food situation. It must be remembered that the factory restaurant supplies all workers with two of their three daily meals.

At Kuznetz in Siberia, where the Soviet Union has established an enormous steel plant, many of the workers preferred to live in hovels on the outskirts of the town when they might have enjoyed fairly good housing much closer to their work. They explained that they have a small vegetable garden back of their miserable shacks and gladly put

up with cramped quarters and the absence of all conveniences for the sake of the precious greens they can grow on their little plot of land.

The Socialist motto is "From each according to his means, to each according to his needs." The practical motto of the Soviet Union has become "From each as much as we can persuade him to do and to each as much as he deserves."

Piece work, the bane of labor unions, I found established everywhere. Where piece work could not readily be applied, a definite norm was established for each worker. If he produced less than this norm he was reduced to a lower category of workers. If he was unable to earn the minimum wage the factory manager had the right to discharge him. If he produced more than the norm he was rewarded accordingly. In the leading lathe factory in Moscow monthly wages ranged from 100 rubles for unskilled workers to 1,000 rubles, which was the pay of the director. When this plant had completed the demands of the Second Five Year Plan it received a premium of 40,000 rubles. This was divided among all workers on the basis of their wages.

Competition between plants for skilled workers is just as keen as under a capitalist regime. There has been a steady tendency to pay higher wages in distant Siberian plants because they find it difficult to attract skilled labor from those parts of the Soviet Union where living is, on the whole, more comfortable. Certain expert engineers in these plants are now receiving as much as 2,500 rubles a month, while salaries from 1,000 to 2,000 rubles for expert technicians are common. One of the unsolved problems is how to prevent plants from outbidding one another for labor.

Communist Party members are also permitted to receive higher wages than in the past. Formerly no member of the Party was paid more than 150 rubles a month, although he had special privileges in the matter of housing. Today practically all restrictions on Communist salaries have been removed for those Party members who are engaged in productive work. The aristocrats of the Soviet Union are the Stakhanovites (emulators of the worker Stakhanov who demonstrated efficiency engineering in his coal mine). Stakhanovites are those who show enthusiasm and develop skill in producing, particularly if they turn out material essential to national defense. They receive the highest pay, get the best food, occupy the first rows at the

theatres, and are sent to the most attractive rest homes for their vacations. Some of them even receive decorations.

At the entrance to each important industrial plant there is a roll of honor which carries the photographs of the shock brigaders, those who have been doing the best work in the plant. They are heralded as the "noblemen" of the community. Sometimes the group that has the best production record is permitted to carry a red flag as it marches in and out of the industrial plant. The members receive free tickets for the circus, the theatres and the big sporting events. Foreigners, who may be invited to occupy the seats of honor on the occasion of some public demonstration, find themselves surrounded by these shock brigaders who are in the best seats because they have done their work well.

The attempt to speed up machines and get more work out of each individual laborer is just as common in the Soviet Union as in any capitalist country. At the Ural Mash plant, the great machine building factory at Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains, the director engaged an American engineer to help him speed up production. He was making a technical survey to determine how all the machines of the plant could be kept busy all the time. The Soviet Union has invested enormous sums in its new industrial plants. It has begun to sense the importance of getting full value out of this investment. Hence the constant effort to cut costs and speed production.

It is the custom to pit plants against one another to secure the advantages of competition. But comparisons are often made unfairly and the poor manager who falls behind may find himself denounced as a Trotsky conspirator engaged in deliberate sabotage. Throughout the "witch hunt" of 1937 industrial efficiency was at low ebb. Every plant was filled with spies and informers. No one was willing to accept responsibility. Foremen and plant managers frequently resigned in an effort to escape reckless charges of willful sabotage.

Until Stalin launched the 1937 party purge and treason trials there was distinctly less evidence of strain in Russia. Life was more comfortable for almost everyone. The immediate danger of foreign attack was less frequently stressed and the Government felt itself strong enough to repel any probable invasion. The dreaded Cheka had been absorbed into the Ministry of the Interior and until another secret police got busy in its place one heard less of arrests and punishment

for political crime. A larger sense of security on the part of those in power brought some tolerance of dissent until the assassination of Kiroff brought back the old spirit of repression and reprisal.

It might seem, on the face of it, that the Moscow trials which began in the summer of 1936 marked a return to the old ways, to the original harshness and severity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet, leaving aside the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused — Kamenev, Zinoviev, Radek, Piatakov and the others were tried and condemned precisely because their doctrine and, assertedly, their behavior had taken a line far to the left of the official Government line. These men, by their own confession, and Trotsky himself, were appalled by the introduction of capitalist methods into the Socialist State. They lamented the new domestic inequalities of wages and perquisites and the abandonment of the old-style world revolution. The fact that the trials were conducted in a manner that seemed ruthless and barbarous to many foreign observers does not prove that Russia is on her way back to October 1917. The manner of the trials is one of the many contradictions which exist when a kind of democracy is growing within the shell of the Socialist State. The content of the trials indicates that the Soviet Union is determined to lop off her left wing ruthlessly and speedily.

It is worthwhile to remember, in this connection, that just before the first Moscow trials, Russia got a new constitution, democratic in theory, since the text assures to the people, among other things, the right to the secret ballot. It is easy to dismiss this constitution as nothing more than a paper instrument but it proves at least two things: that Soviet leaders have a definite sense of responsibility to the people and that they believe in the theory and methods of democracy even though they are not ready to apply them. No one in Soviet Russia talks like Mussolini about stamping "on the putrid corpse of Liberty."

The old revolutionary purity and some aspects of the hard revolutionary discipline are on their way out in Russia. Occasional mass executions such as those reported from Siberia in May are of course remnants of the old Terror. They are dramatized and widely publicized to frighten Government opponents into quiescence. Much more serious is the recent evidence of disaffection in the Red Army. Stalin has executed some of his ablest generals. If they had any

considerable following he has not heard the last of this particular revolt.

The Government is no longer averse to making large profits out of the accepted weakness of human nature. The lottery has been a constant source of income, despite the fact that it caters to the instinct for private accumulation. Horseracing is justified on the ground that it breeds horses for the cavalry, but its chief attraction for the proletariat is the pari-mutuel betting system. They are now breeding polo ponies thanks to former American Ambassador Bullitt who taught the Red cavalry how to play the game. Perhaps our new ambassadress will teach the ladies of the Soviet Cabinet to enjoy Post Toasties with imported cream.

There has been a steady increase in the Government's income from the sale of intoxicating beverages, although Government posters condemning alcoholism are often displayed at the entrance to a Government brewery. People in Moscow and Leningrad are better dressed from year to year. There are more motor cars and more paved streets. Motor cars are being given away as prizes for good work. The show windows in all the larger cities display a growing variety of merchandise, practically all of it Soviet made.

Government manufactured perfume and face powder were and are immensely popular. In 1926 customs officials were finding it impossible to prevent smuggling of cosmetics in the face of a rising demand which could only be satisfied by illicit importations. Artificial silk stockings are no longer frowned upon, since they are manufactured at a profit by the Soviet Union. Tennis, once condemned as a bourgeois sport, has now received the official blessing of the Union's Director of Physical Education. At a recent national tennis tournament in Moscow, he appealed to Soviet players to develop their competence so that they might demonstrate the superiority of Soviet tennis to that of bourgeois countries. In tribute to the tradition of mass action, the competitors, shouldering rackets, marched and counter-marched before play began. As a tennis player, I can affirm that it will be some years before the proletarians defeat the capitalists even though they whack their non-resilient balls with a force American players might envy.

Up to 1933, the Soviet Government frowned on public dancing, unless it were a revival of some native dance. Jazz and the fox trot

were derided as evidence of the degeneration of the capitalist world. Now in the public parks there are open air dancing platforms with jazz orchestras to provide the only kind of rhythm which the youth of Russia seems to like. The tunes are old, but here, as in matters of feminine fashion, the time lag is being reduced.

Even Russian radio has become less seriously purposeful. As far back as 1926, the Director of Radio admitted to me that his listeners were always asking for popular music when he insisted on giving them an almost unbroken succession of speeches on the merits and achievements of Marxism. Government authorities here, as in other dictated countries, learned that propaganda has only a limited appeal and that it is useless to try and force more than a modicum into the ears and eyes of indifferent recipients.

Russian radio programs have become much more entertaining. One of the most popular features is the physical exercise period in the morning, which some stations repeat three or four times to meet the demands of listeners who rise at different hours. Into the special programs for workers and farmers, which formerly included little more than exhortations to do better work and to produce more, there has now been introduced a large amount of lively music. This is considered more effective than mere talk in stimulating workers to renewed efforts. Provincial radio stations have even created their own jazz bands because of the general delight on the part of young and old in this lively kind of music.

Programs for children have undergone a change. No longer are the youngsters obliged to swallow heavy doses of Marxian theory. The old dramatic pre-war fairy tales, which once were deemed improper mental food for Soviet children, have now become the most popular part of the children's hour. They are read by actors and actresses trained in special schools of speech and declamation.

Less propaganda, more facts, has also become the rule in universities. The study of history had become extremely unpopular because, as one university student put it, "We learned practically nothing about men or events. So much time was devoted to the Marxian interpretation of what happened that there was no time left to describe what really happened."

The last Communist Party Congress decreed a change and beginning in the summer of 1934 history teaching in all Soviet universities

was transformed. Every history teacher has been instructed to give his students a full array of facts about events, the dates when they occurred and biographical material concerning the chief personages. Only when that has been done is he permitted to go on with Marxian interpretations. At Kiev University in the Ukraine, the number of history students doubled as a result of this change.

On my last visit it seemed to me that Russian Nationalism had largely displaced Communist Internationalism. In the newspapers and in public addresses there were frequent references to the "Fatherland" and the necessity of doing this or that for its defense. There continued to be much sympathy with and interest in what workers in other countries were doing, but the Government considered that its first responsibility was to make a success of administering the affairs of the Soviet Union. Foreigners willing to cooperate to this end were regarded and treated as friends, whether they were capitalists or Communists.

There is growing independence of foreign aid. In many industrial plants one saw a red banner inscribed with the words "We completed the First Five Year Plan without foreign aid. Let us do the same with the Second Five Year Plan." The statement was not true but it stimulated old-fashioned patriotism.

The number of foreign engineers and technicians is steadily decreasing. Out of 40,000 workers in the great Ural Machine Works at Sverdlovsk, Siberia, only 100 were foreigners. Most foreigners who remained had to take their pay in Russian paper rubles. This meant that they had to continue to live in Russia, for the paper rubles have little value beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The current rate for rubles paid during the summer of 1935 by those foreigners in Moscow who had a secret source of supply was one American paper dollar for forty paper rubles. On April 1st, 1936 the ruble was revalued at a fixed rate of five to a dollar but this was too much out of line with supply and demand to eliminate the "black," illicit market. In 1937 black rubles could still be purchased in some places at the rate of twenty-five for one dollar.

The Spanish Revolution has once more fixed Russian eyes on the outside world. The Soviet Union is naturally anxious for the Loyalist Government to win the Spanish Civil War. She has aided the Spanish Government, but her aid has been of a far different character than

that given the Rebels by the Fascist states. While Germany and Italy have been sending troops, the Soviet Union has sent munitions, airplanes, food, and a few technicians. While Italy and Germany have openly violated the Non-Intervention Pact, Russia has been its most ardent supporter. Her motives, on the whole, have been more in line with democratic policy than the motives which prompted the Fascist intervention. It has been the desire for markets, for new spheres of political influence and, predominantly, the desire for Fascist success which has prompted Italian and German interference in the domestic affairs of Spain. What help Russia has given the Loyalists she has given to help Spanish Communists fight "oppression," though of course she does not relish the idea of a Fascist Spain on the southern border of her ally, France.

First and foremost Russia is for peace. She supports the Non-Intervention Pact because she has no desire to see the Spanish conflict spread beyond Spain's borders. She believes that the Government, with a majority of the Spanish population behind it, can win if the Rebels do not receive outside help. Russia is and must be a force for world peace because she needs time — time to complete her Second Five Year Plan, to accelerate industrialization, to erect a real Soviet economy, to rearm against an international war, to overcome the internal dissension that seriously weakened her international position toward the end of June 1937. Russia has seen that, isolated, she might be helpless against the Fascist powers. She has accordingly lined up with the democratic countries, who also want peace and time to adjust their domestic economies.

When I talked to Litvinoff in Geneva in September 1935 at the height of the Ethiopian crisis, this old Bolshevik was comfortably rubbing elbows with the diplomats of the democratic and even the Fascist states, and making a realistic adjustment to necessity. "We are on good terms with Italy," he said. "We have no prejudice against her. But it is essential to preserve the Covenant of the League and to maintain European solidarity in the face of war. . . ." I asked him if he believed in sanctions. "Why not?" he demanded. "If the Council of the League votes in favor of them. Of course, there must be unanimity. And I am not in favor of military sanctions. Economic sanctions will suffice . . . Mussolini is a sensible individual. He knows that he cannot fight all of Europe. The economic sanctions

could be applied without war and would in the end prove effective. Moreover, it would be an important demonstration to the world that the League is prepared to apply the provisions of the Covenant to any breaker of the peace . . . Of course Ethiopia is far off. What happens there is not of decisive interest to Europe. But a principle is at stake, and it is most important that the Covenant should be maintained."

If Litvinoff had controlled French or British foreign policy in 1936 the sanctions would have been effective as he said they would be. Perhaps that excuses his mistake in prophesy which turns out to have been wishful thinking.

Later we spoke of Russian relations with the United States. There had been considerable criticism in the United States of the fact that delegates of the American Communist party had been present at the Congress of the Third Internationale in Moscow. This was said to be a violation of Litvinoff's agreement with Roosevelt, in which the Russian diplomat had promised that the Russian Government would not harbor on its territory, organizations or persons agitating for the overthrow of the United States Government.

"We do not consider that we have violated our understanding with the United States," Litvinoff argued. "President Roosevelt knew perfectly well our attitude toward the Third Internationale . . . It is not correct to say that it, the Third Internationale, is an organization which preaches the violent overthrow of the American form of government. The speakers of the Third Internationale preach certain doctrines . . . These doctrines . . . have been preached for fifty years and governments have not been overthrown . . . The speakers of the Third Internationale . . . are not organized on Russian soil to overthrow governments but to preach certain theories."

Listening to Litvinoff, I remembered my interview in 1929 with the late Comrade Lunacharsky, Soviet Commissar for Education, and I marveled at the contrast. That famous and indeed notorious Bolshevik with the head of an intellectual, the eyes of a tired cynic and the lips of one who loved the good things of life, expressed himself quite differently.

"The very existence of capitalist society constitutes a war without end against humanity," he said. "This situation must be changed

radically. The bourgeoisie will never change, will never give up its possessions of its own free will . . . Humanity must take its fate in its own hands . . . We are convinced that there must be further suffering before our ideas can be put into effect . . . We do not wish to risk a war before the people are thoroughly prepared for it . . . Our task is to explain to the people and to organize them for the struggle. Then, when the proletariat is organized we propose to present our ultimatum to the possessing classes."

In the abyss that separates this impassioned fanaticism of Lunacharsky from the cool diplomacy of Litvinoff lies the corpse of the October Revolution. Indeed, the Revolution of Karl Marx is now no more than a rattling skeleton in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Russia has not achieved Communism. She will never achieve it though her leaders tell us otherwise. She has, however, almost in spite of herself, come a long way on the road to that democracy with which her system of state socialism is not necessarily incompatible. Those who have seen the changed temper of the Russian people do not find it surprising that this Socialist State identifies itself in world affairs with France, Great Britain and the United States. For, as Communism in Russia has not achieved the aims it once set before itself, so Capitalism has also failed to justify its pretensions before the world. Even America, home of rugged individualism, has been forced to accept certain aspects of state socialism and of that planned economy which is the heart of the Soviet system. Perhaps the combined experience of a proletarian state under Stalin and a democratic state under Roosevelt will teach a much befuddled world which way it must or must not go to find salvation.

OUTLOOK: Soviet Russia is one of the few European powers that has every right to look into the distant future with quiet confidence. Stalin may go but Russian power will remain. Well armed, secure in the possession of practically all essential raw materials, agriculturally self-sufficient, industrially independent, strangely successful in winning and holding the loyalty of her far-flung peoples there is little to provoke alarm on her less immediate horizon. The continuing bloody purge of 1937 may strengthen the party as Hitler's 1934 blood purge

strengthened his. Yet dictatorships are always uncertain and not even the dictator can be sure of just what is going on in his country.

For the present, Stalin and his policy of making Russia more important than the Revolution, control the Soviet Union's destiny. A steadily increasing gold reserve foreshadows the return of Russian influence in world finance. She is able to buy more abroad and is also finding profitable markets in such places as Turkey, Persia, China and the Baltic States for her cheap if inferior industrial output. For the Soviet state, politics and business go together. Political influence grows as trade expands.

Litvinoff's bilateral non-aggressive treaties with neighbor states have eased their apprehension. We are far beyond the days when a French Government persuaded all Europe to join in drawing about Russia a tight "*cordon sanitaire*" to prevent the spread of Communist infection. On my first visit to the Soviet Union in 1926, I became convinced that for years to come the Russian Government would be on the side of peace. It had to be then and it has to be now. Soviet Russia has all the land, all the resources, all the people, all the prestige she requires. Having suffered constant invasion during the first five years of Soviet history, she remembers it and fears it. She is still the lone Communist wolf confronting a capitalist world which might be unified against her in the face of Communist aggression.

So Russia moves forward, as reasonably secure as any country can be that has a jealous land-hungry Nazi Germany on one side and an ambitious land-hungry militarized Japan on the other. Let it be added that the Soviet Union's military power is growing as fast as Japan's plus Germany's. But Moscow is also showing signs of those internal tensions which are becoming more evident in Tokyo and Berlin. Desperation in those two capitals may conceivably force Russia to face a difficult war on two fronts but in this case she would not be without powerful friends and allies. Dictator Stalin is a successful leader because he has learned that every government must adjust its new political theory to the facts of history, geography and racial traditions. And Stalin will necessarily be concerned with the present conflict near his Eastern frontier, where Japanese theories are confronting Chinese geography.

5. THE ORIENT ASTIR

FOCAL POINT: *Tokyo.* Stripped of all romantic notions and political illusions, the future of the Far East will be decided in Tokyo; not in Nanking (however much publicity Chiang Kai-shek may be getting), not in Manila or Singapore, not in Moscow or even in Washington, D. C. At present the city has none of the austerity, none of the tension, none of the self-importance of such a strategic position. Indeed a city so ill equipped for defense against aerial bombardment is hardly going to swagger. Tokyo today wears the same airs it has worn since the memorable earthquake — intense industry, hampered neither by legislation nor Western ethics. Strange reverence for an apocryphal emperor provides the touch of romance in a harsh struggle for existence. Everybody is busy; a good deal of money is being made and spent, little of it for show. It is a real, if not altogether healthy, vitality — a characteristic superabundance of energy and patriotism, boldly indifferent to protest from abroad or dissension at home. It is a city always absorbed with two unrelenting problems: getting enough to eat and getting rid of surplus population. With birth control as the only real solution, it is still a question of method. And while Tokyo's decisions, crucial alike to Russia, to China, and to England, are being formulated, the military party continues ascendant.

BACKGROUND: Japan is an exception to almost every rule, national and international. Both diplomats who have dealt with the problems of this country, and students who have gone there to try and understand them, have found that out. No formula is applicable; there is no pattern; there are no standards by which the Westerner can judge events and portents in the Far East. Hence he likes to dis-

miss the enigma (this was the custom until recently) by condemning it. From the American standpoint, except for the "open door" experiment and the Nine Powers Treaty which embodied it, we have never even formed a policy with regard to Japan.

The only Japan we recognized was the statistician's picture of the nation, a table of figures (as remote as the geographical distance intervening) from which Congress was able to draw a single deduction, namely, that there are too many Japanese for anyone to deal with. The result was legislation which said they mustn't come to the United States and mustn't own land after they got here. That attitude, unfriendly or wise, depending on how you look at it, is about as far as we have gone, except for a subsequent condemnation of Japanese "imperialism" in Manchuria, when we were represented in the findings and report, filed with the League of Nations by the Lytton Commission. And when League Powers decided not to recognize the Japan-created state of Manchukuo, the United States followed the same policy.

But one can neither dismiss the Far East nor condemn it simply as a "yellow peril." It is not as easy as that. The greatest segment of our coastal frontier borders on the Pacific, for one thing, and for another — a little item that is always comprehended quite speedily at home — we have considerable commercial investments in the Far East. So much for Uncle Sam's point of view. It is amazing, under the circumstances, that the Japanese bear us comparatively little ill-will.

To interpret news of the Far East, in the light of recent events, it is necessary to go a little deeper than this, however. We know today that the Orient is astir. What, exactly, does that mean?

As with other nationalities and races, we must, of course, disassociate domestic problems from foreign. Japan is, in a thousand different ways, a contradiction of terms. To the outsider, it is a contradiction in itself. To begin with: the domestic policy is the maintenance of the *status quo*. Internationally, the large objective is just the opposite. The present situation in the Far East is intolerable to Japan. It cannot stay as it is any longer. She must change it, and change it to suit herself.

There is no sham, no selfconsciousness about Japan's internal structure. But for all this realism, her vice is her extremism. In a "capitalist" world she is still unique. Nationals of socialist leanings

who are looking around for a rockbound capitalism to berate could scarcely find a more fruitful subject than Japan. Of course, they cannot accompany their charges with the cry of "bourgeois!" because there is too insignificant a middle class. As in Germany, before the "deluge," it has been taxed practically out of existence. So Japan presents not only the most flagrant form of capitalism; it is also an example of arch-imperialism. Certainly a greater percentage of the population is "exploited" by a comparative handful of industrialists than in almost any other country of the world.

And — to turn to its foreign complexion, Japan is intensely, patriotically militarist. But that is not to say she is engaged in warfare any more than other powers. Just as pre-war Germany waged three successful wars of conquest against Denmark, Austria and France, Japan waged them against China, Russia and Germany. And today Japan is still controlled, to all intents and purposes, by those members of her cabinet who wear uniforms.

Japan might also have inspired the rather precarious advice: "Let not thy civil hand know what thy military hand doeth." For surely the two arms of government in Japan have no relationship to each other, have no objectives in common with each other and assume no responsibility for each other.

| These two arms of the government, civil and military, often operate in direct opposition to each other. The only recognizable goal of Japanese foreign policy, consistent throughout the twentieth century, is the acquisition of raw materials suitable to Japanese manufacturing facilities, and the control over permanent acquisitions from the same sources. This means that Japan wants access to what neighboring China has. Internally, the national policy of the moment is not quite as old as the present century but, since 1925 at least, it has been to satisfy the liberal elements with minimum concessions in the way of democratic rights, while maintaining (for its obvious convenience) the traditional *divine right* of the Emperor. Only in the Emperor is there a titular authority, recognizable to the masses, under whose protection legislative and fiscal powers are centralized and manipulated to the satisfaction of the militarist or ruling class.

| The same two arms of government seldom cooperate. When they converge it is to provide a mutual opportunity for both groups to rationalize, or to "pass the buck." This utter divergence of respon-

sibility was best typified in the admission of a Japanese officer in Manchuria, when I was trying to find some sort of explanation for recent acts of unprovoked hostility. "We act," he said, "and Tokyo explains." As Americans once were accustomed to saying, it sounds like the old army game.

But let us look back a few years, to see if there hasn't been some method, as well as madness, behind Japanese foreign policy, for it is that aspect of this nation's progress with which we, in our world tour of the news, are more properly concerned. It knows but two "fronts": a territorial one, which, for the present, can be presumed to be China and China alone, and a political one, Communism, as specifically embodied in the "menace" of Soviet Russia. It is important to remember that this fervent enmity is a political and economic rather than a territorial matter. Japan has not forgotten what happened when she last tried to take land from Russia, and she would not risk a war of any real proportions to try it again. But Communism presents a real terror to Japan, which nothing could stay her hand from combating. Japan well realizes the consequences that must follow, the day Communism gains a foothold on her island empire. The entire national economy would collapse; not even martial law would be able to protect the proletariat against itself in what would surely follow. So fearful is Japan of the Red menace that she passes a law against "dangerous thoughts" at home and signs an unpopular anti-Communist Pact with Nazi Germany.

The Soviet countenance is a rather new one, compared to the whole sweep of Japanese continental ambition. The beginnings of her aggression, prompted purely and suddenly by the increase in population at the turn of the century, began when Asia was dominated by a very different Russia.

When Japan first cast a covetous eye on the mainland, it was toward Korea, then under Chinese control. The first invasion was directed to "put down an insurrection" there, so we see that as far as military tact is concerned Japan hasn't changed much. China's startled attempt at resistance was quickly defeated, and out of it all, Japan managed to annex Formosa. When Japan, during the same foray, attempted to wrest a portion of Manchuria as well, Russia stepped in. But the partitioning of China had begun, that steady process which, as we now know, was only briefly suspended by John

Hay's "open door" agreement wrung from the reluctant powers in 1900. Only half of the "open door" principle — the commercial investments secured by Great Britain, Germany, France and the United States — was consummated. The other half, the guarantee of China's territorial integrity, remained until it was successfully violated by Japan.

In 1904 the Russo-Japanese war began with a surprise attack by the Japanese Navy, without benefit, incidentally, of any declaration of war, an unhappy precedent that is expected to be followed by other Have-Not Powers. Of Japan's losses, the very least was that a pledge exacted from her prescribed Korea's independence for a period of five years — five years during which Korea vainly struggled to keep her freedom, only to be annexed by Japan "in the name of the Emperor" in 1910. With the World War, in 1914, Japan found her next opportunity, and though by no means obligated to intervene under the terms of her alliance with Great Britain, Japan anticipated that she could annex the German concessions in China. China was forced to yield to the eventual settlements, of which these were a part, little realizing they would eventually form the basis for Japanese claims, and the origins of the puppet-state Manchukuo in the thirties. China might have known — perhaps she did know but was too helpless — that Japan was bound to resume her aggression, since such an appetite grows by what it feeds on. The banditry that ravaged the ever-disputed Manchurian territory was something disunited China never had the resources nor authority to combat. And in so far as there was any unified purpose at Nanking, this was intimately affected, even as Japanese policies, by the fact that the revolution in Moscow had brought a new kind of neighbor, a Red army which had little respect for sovereign rights in the East.

Manchukuo is a *fait accompli*, like the annexation of Ethiopia. Perhaps it is only one item on the agenda which has been prepared in the army headquarters at Tokyo. Certainly it fell into Japan's lap without a prolonged or even a very costly struggle. China's vain attempts to withstand the Japanese military machine are no longer subjected to such minute analyses as were fashionable among Far Eastern "authorities" for a while. China's internal predicament has been so enormous that her failure to prevent Manchurian and North China inroads and her staunch defense at Shanghai dwindle in

proportion. We must recognize China as she is, not what she might be or what she may well become.

You cannot consider China, much less recognize it, without considering Chiang Kai-shek, one of the most debatable figures in world politics today, and certainly the most unique of all dictators. One might begin by asking, why Chiang Kai-shek? Why, indeed, a dictator? He constitutes almost the only rebuttal to the prevailing Japanese view of China (and Japan is realistic, if nothing else), as it was put into words for me recently by a spokesman for the foreign office. He said, "China cannot be divided, and cannot be united."

Chiang Kai-shek was the first man to disagree with such a contention. He is a realist, too, and has no truck with theories, even democratic ones. He has learned, as his predecessors learned before him, that no theory of state and no concept of a "new China" will stand in Japan's way. He knows only that unity, and only unity, plus force, will stem the tide. He also knows, and probably largely relies on the fact that has been borne out by some five thousand years of Chinese history: namely, that whatever transient powers dominate the Far East, China's 450,000,000 people can never be "conquered." They have always absorbed and assimilated within themselves, whether the outsider fancied himself a conqueror, pretender, or guardian angel. Invasion can, on the other hand, undermine first morale and secondly, the national economy.

It is this move which he has elected himself the one-man machine to resist. He had to become a dictator (albeit one who sometimes resigns that he may be recalled). Successful or not, he has shown that he can wear the precarious robes of dictatorship with more assurance and less anxiety than any of his aspiring fellow-contestants. The fact seems to be that nobody is as capable for the job, nobody wants it as eagerly and no one is anywhere near as confident as he. Personally, having met both Chiang Kai-shek, and his brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, China's financial expert, I am convinced that the latter is essentially the more competent leader. But while T. V. Soong would only be efficient, Chiang Kai-shek is also romantic and full of zeal for the holy cause of Sun Yat Senism.

Like all dictators, Chiang Kai-shek has no concern with democracy. It would certainly get in his way, and anyhow he knows it will be generations before China is ready for it. His dictatorship also re-

quires the established arts of the profession, and he was able to learn them first hand from the Russians, when he made his debut across the board from the Communist envoys who tried to set up a Communist regime (though they called it a "Nationalist" China) under the leadership of Borodin. When in 1927 Chiang expelled Borodin and his Soviet organizers, he retained their propaganda technique, and turned it against them. By a simple change of phraseology on the old posters, the Chinese Nationalist became the hero, and the Communist the villain. That Chiang Kai-shek was an able pupil of Borodin's was shown by his answer to my question as to why he didn't march his army into North China. "I must first prepare the way by Nationalist propaganda," he said.

There is one too-seldom considered point in Chiang Kai-shek's background which has definitely contributed to the solidarity behind him. He stems from Sun Yat Sen, and therefore is representative of a dynasty himself. On top of this advantage, it must be readily admitted that he is as able, as conscientious and unselfish — and more than all, he is as successful as any man on the scene. He is, perhaps, the first and only leader in its whole sense that China has had since the dissolution of her empire. This in spite of the fact that it has always been difficult for me to believe that a man so sweet and gentle as he, could, even by the most able military and political leadership, have made himself a dictator.

He is by far the most courteous and charming of all dictators. He was genuinely concerned about the comfort of his Occidental guest when I interviewed him in a Buddhist temple on a mountain top in his native province of Ningpo. When I explained, at the conclusion of our conversation, that I had to return immediately to Shanghai, he seemed grieved. "I had so hoped," he said, "to ride with you this morning to a beautiful waterfall we have nearby. It is particularly lovely in the morning sunshine. I am sorry that after having come so far you are going to miss seeing it." And there you have speaking the President, Generalissimo and Dictator of the Chinese Republic.

However important the Chinese Dictator may be, or may become, the positive step, the next step in the Far East, will nevertheless come from Tokyo. What, then, of Tokyo today — and its relations with the rest of the world?

We have seen that, by "hook or crook," the military power

prevails; in spite of an increasing social consciousness and a more vociferous use of the suffrage, liberalism, though triumphant in elections, seems unable to prevail. Although it is not fair to draw conclusions too precisely, the spirit of democracy appears to be a negligible entity in official Tokyo now. Of course, they have no such thing as a democratic tradition; even the semblance of democratic structure is new. I remember one conversation in particular which I had with old Baron Tanaka, sometimes termed the last of the liberal premiers. A comparison between what he was frank enough to admit with the discourses one hears from the Foreign Office today indicates how wide a gap there is between Japanese concepts and our own. We had been talking about conditions in China, whence I had just arrived, and which he agreed was and would remain an important market for most Japanese products.

"It is therefore utterly out of the question," he said, "that the Japanese attitude should be in any sense aggressive toward China, as has sometimes been erroneously reported." (I think his added clause was a personal dig at some of my earlier dispatches from China, but I repeat his words now for the emphasis they give to his liberal view, the expressed convictions of an "old liberal" who had at least a broad understanding of the interrelationships in the Far East, and the necessity of Japan's cooperation with her neighbors.)

"Japan considers it a matter of vital interest and benefit to herself," he went on, "to cooperate with the Chinese people in the development of our economic interests in these regions. Such development can only provide the advantages of mutual prosperity.

"However, Japan cannot tolerate the destruction of rights and interests long established by treaties. She is compelled to protect her legitimate rights and interests in the face of the continuous disturbances in China. To accomplish this purpose it is most necessary for Japan to cooperate with the other powers interested in China, particularly with the United States and Great Britain, and to maintain a good understanding with them."

Today, by contrast, instead of this temperate view of a broad program of economic and political cooperation, designed to promote the general economic recovery which is so necessary to world trade and Pacific trade in particular, we find Japanese foreign policy far

more intimately concerned with potential Russo-Japanese crises and dalliance with German-Japanese talk of a united anti-Soviet solidarity. These topics may provide good food for thought, and subject matter for debate in the cabinet meetings, and an excuse for steadily higher armament appropriations in the Diet, but are they really positive? Aren't they sidestepping the real issue — the economic future of Japan? Where can impoverished Japan continue to find the money to compete with Great Britain and the United States in naval expansion or with mighty Russia in land armaments?

As I see Japan today, spending half her national receipts on new arms appropriations, I am reminded that Japan used to appraise the situation a little more judiciously. I am reminded of the contrast between the successful disarmament conference in 1922, and the failure of every succeeding one.

Debuchi, the Japanese diplomat, was substantially accurate in his pessimistic view of the future of naval arms limitations. He must have envisioned the crazy race under way today when he said there were three reasons for the failure of all our disarmament conferences, and that for these same three reasons he saw no immediate prospect of a successful one. There are three prerequisites; that is the way he put it:

First, there must be a psychological unanimity of purpose and conviction on the part of all participating nations at the given time (which is palpably a rare coincidence). Secondly, there is the primary necessity of a strong leader, the right kind of leadership, the personal synthesis of the principal objectives (and here he cited the invaluable *rôle* played by our present Chief Justice, the then Secretary of State Hughes). Finally, he said, the conference simply cannot take shape, much less arrive at any real consequence, unless it is solidly backed by public opinion.

That is quite an order. It may be a most difficult ideal to aim at, but I am convinced that amicable cooperation in the Pacific is certainly within the realm of possibility. Japanese-American relations figure prominently in such an outlook. That is why we might well make a friendly gesture toward Japan by excluding her immigrants on a quota instead of as a race. Japan's leaders still hope that America will realize one day that the 1924 Exclusion Law was an unnecessary affront to a friendly power. After all, the Japanese reasoning is

logical: we have the capital, the machinery and engineering skill; they have the labor. There are places in the world where they can work together.

OUTLOOK: Nothing better typified the actual political situation in Japan than the continuance in power of General Hayashi's Cabinet for many weeks after its overwhelming defeat at the polls early in 1937. At the end of May the two largest political parties united in a successful demand that the Cabinet resign. "A strong united Cabinet, based on the people's will, is essential," they declared. "The present Cabinet has interpreted the Constitution in its own way and has violated constitutional policies established for the last fifty years. We demand that it apologize to the nation by immediately resigning."

The military dictatorship in Japan was in a dangerous position while it tolerated such frank expressions and, at the same time continued to disregard them. It dissolved the Diet and forced an election after which it sought to ignore the people's will as expressed at the polls. The political crisis in Tokyo continued until the Hayashi Cabinet resigned on June 1.

Prince Fumimaro Konoe, who succeeded Prime Minister Hayashi, is one of Japan's few strong men in whom people, parties and army have confidence. He reversed his predecessor's policy by co-operating with the parties in organizing his Cabinet, thus relieving tension. He also made his peace with the militarists by the simple expedient of accepting their vaguely-phrased demands. The second youngest Premier in Japan's history, he appeals to conservatives because he belongs to a family of hereditary Imperial Guards and to liberals because of his broadmindedness. His should be a Government strong enough to deal with revolutionary radicals and to defy those militarists who preach aggression. But there is still ferment in Japan. Such a compromise Government as that of Prince Konoe has little real popular support and is open to attack by extremists of the right or left. When, early in July 1937, a clash on the Amur River created a momentary crisis between Russia and Japan and a clash in Peking produced a critical situation with China, some observers thought the militarists were trying to force Prince Konoe's hand.

Though the new demands in China may be his, the army is still taking its own steps.

The stuff of war and revolution is lying all about in Japan. Reasonable concessions can easily prevent it but continued stubborn resistance to the popular will could bring it on. Even the army and navy are not in complete agreement on just how the country should be run.

As for slow moving China no one can ever guess just what will emerge from the conflicts of diverse forces now under way. As a first hand reporter of the 1927 Revolutions, I envisaged the possibility of a united China. The possibility still obtains, but we must now exclude Manchuria. It is also true that there has been only a little progress toward unity from 1927 to 1937. Here, as in all other things, old China follows the rule that with her a century is as a decade in other lands. President Chiang Kai-shek who led the Nationalist Revolution eleven years ago still heads the Nanking Government, but its authority has definite limits. Nanking has prevented the general spread of Communism and anarchy. It has defeated various upstart generals who sought to spread their autocratic rule from one province to another. But it has been unable to arrest the steady spread of Japanese influence and control in North China. The so called "autonomy" movement there represents Japan's attempt to bribe and use provincial Chinese military leaders to accomplish her avowed purpose of economic penetration and military control. There will be temporary setbacks to Japanese plans but for the moment it is still Tokyo and not Nanking which holds the key to China's immediate future.

One thing alone might bring about a change in this situation — the triumph of the United Front movement in China. This is a long-standing attempt to bring together every group in China including the powerful Communists in a common front against Japanese aggression. The movement began in 1931 as a reply to Japan's seizure of Manchuria and it has made steady progress. It is in line with the decision of the Communist Internationale in Moscow in 1935 to urge the union of Socialists and Communists in a common front against war and Fascism. It differs from the Popular Front movements in France and Spain in that it seeks to unite parties of both

Left and Right against Japan. Its motto is: "One country against one enemy."

The remaining Red Russian leaders in China may before long make common cause with the Nanking Government. Ever since Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped and released there has been a tacit understanding between him and certain leaders of the Red armies. The Kuomintang Executive Committee has offered the olive branch. If the Red armies will accept incorporation with the Government forces, if the remaining Chinese Soviet Republics will agree to dissolution, and if the Red leaders will forget about the class struggle, the road to unity lies open.

It is definitely on the way. The characteristically staunch resistance to this year's hammering at the gates of North China gives a new indication of the nation's belief in its own destiny. Further aggression by Japan will almost certainly cement the United Front. Thus it is quite possible that the aggressor who seeks to divide China will, at long last, provide the stimulus that will unite her.

6. OTHER DANGER SPOTS

FOCAL POINT: *Vienna.* Physically, mentally and historically one of the oldest cities in Europe, Vienna is nearly exhausted. Although unfairly discredited for the effort it exerts to attract tourists and maintain its cultural traditions, it is not in the least selfconscious about its muddy-watered "beautiful Blue Danube." The locale of many *Geschichten aus dem Wienerwald*, actually the musical monarchy has known very few years of such superficial relaxation. Its bloody history dates from the era when it was the last frontier in Europe to resist successfully the invasion of the Turks, down to the present day when it is the most strategic of numerous hot spots along the Rome-Berlin axis. No longer the seat of an empire, it is an isolated economic incongruity, with insufficient natural resources and surplus man power, dependent for its salvation and self-preservation on flirting with Fascist paternalism as an only alternative to submersion in Nazi *Anschluss*.

BACKGROUND: Even as you might switch your radio dial from one foreign station to another, let me bring you back from the Far East to Europe again — not the same Europe we have looked at in earlier chapters, the so called "great powers" who seek to carve out a new Europe to their respective tastes and ideologies, but to that family of smaller nations, the little firebrands. They are popularly thought of as so many tinder boxes, whenever the subject turns to war threats, but this is over-simplification.

In contrast to the weighty problems which must inevitably arise in the Far East, these smaller powers represent collectively a very different Europe. They are important to the *status quo* not so much as individual menaces to general peace, but as so many little brothers in a family of overpowering giants. We cannot look at them except through the eyes of the large powers which, indeed, covet the weaker neighbors.

To demonstrate this contrast, it is perhaps logical to turn first to Austria, since it, in turn, contrasts with all the others. For these smaller powers have their own sharp differences. One must not think they are all Fascist or that they are all innocent victims of threatened absorption. Many of them, out of the sheer necessity of national defense are actual or near dictatorships. But as we have already seen, there are several kinds of dictatorships. The one thing which the little states have in common is their instinct for self-preservation. Because they are small, or because they have few natural resources, or small standing armies, or navies, they are by no means negligible.

It is interesting to look back over history and count among the surprises the number of instances where, by force of circumstance, a number of small nations were banded together to become a single tremendous power for good or evil. It is not so long ago that a group of independent, autonomous German states and principalities, with only [a language and customs in common, were molded into a German Empire which veritably rocked the world, and defied all comers in *Mittel-Europa*. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was, at best, a conglomeration of lesser kingdoms and states which professed little love for so centralized a monarchy or for one another, but found that the protection of inclusion was the lesser of two evils.

It is significant that in both cases many of these elements chose to break away from the imperial domination, even at the cost of considerable bloodshed. History has demonstrated that an ideal of political, social and intellectual freedom shared by a minority of only a few millions of Nationals has been sufficient to inspire them with a thirst for independence. Whether they were subsequently able to indulge themselves in the struggle for this independence, and how long and how successfully they fought for it, is the history of the present map of Europe.

We can line up the Haves and the Have-Nots with a few flourishes of the blue pencil, but such alignments take little account of the future. Perhaps tinder box is the word. Yet if a single bullet which strikes an Austrian Archduke can rearrange almost every boundary in Europe, it also indicates that each one of these boundaries has an importance of its own.

AUSTRIA

Austria, although between two great Fascist states, and although it has exchanged numerous pleasantries with both powerful neighbors, is hardly to be called Fascist, or even cited as having Fascist leanings. The very fact that it has been able to withstand Fascist and Nazi propaganda so consistently, shows that it has a certain compelling liberal vitality, even if its present government falls far short of what we, in America, like to think of as a democracy. But stop to consider the revolution that it survived three years ago, in which a liberal republican Government suffered losses so severe that commentators had begun to see the final chapter of the country's history. Austria may have only exchanged dictators, but what a difference. The Constitutional Government, which newspapers reported as having been practically wiped out by Stahremberg's private Fascist Heimwehr army, when he tried to establish a "corporate state" à la Mussolini, was revived by Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg. Today it is holding its own against heavy pressure from within and without. It is not in a position to deal with Hitler and Mussolini on its own terms, but it can continue to hold out while it has the French promise to back up its independence.

Schuschnigg's ascendancy was important for all Europe, even though he is a dictator. But his regime, in concert with President Wilhelm Miklas and their Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt, is able and stable. Austria today is a little further away from both Italy and Germany and closer to France and Great Britain. Schuschnigg is at once a diplomat and a politician. Thus far he has succeeded in winning tolerance from both Mussolini and Hitler. He is also exerting a practical and beneficial influence on his Danubian neighbors. The importance of his visit to Budapest and Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, in May 1937, may develop later. With Mussolini's approbation of his plans, Schuschnigg may actually succeed in selling such important allies as Czechoslovakia and Hungary the wisdom of a Danubian alliance which might forestall political *Anschluss* with Hitler's Reich.

Such an alliance is far from being a *fait accompli*. It will be achieving a goal against almost insuperable odds. For the penetration of Nazi propaganda has never ceased since it began along the ether waves which extend with such facility from Munich to Vienna. And

the intensive campaign of German Nazis in both Austria and Czechoslovakia is an even greater barrier. As far back as 1933 one of Hitler's chief aides confided to me: "We have Austria in our pocket—watch Czechoslovakia!" Schuschnigg's immediate problem is to find a way of undoing the antagonism that has been wrought continuously by mutual hatred between extreme Czech and Austrian Nationals. The development of better trade relations will help. Perhaps both countries can make a deal with Hitler to buy more German goods if he will send them less Nazi propaganda.

HUNGARY

Hungary is farther from being a democracy than any of the Danubian states. Still encumbered by its monarchial tradition, the Regency which has been Admiral Horthy's well handled form of dictatorship since 1920 is quite capable of keeping abreast of the times, and of keeping a thoroughly realistic outlook.

When, in my last interview with him, I tried to find out just how Europe's senior dictator rationalized his position, Horthy put it this way: "The world is pretty well agreed that a beneficent despotism is the best kind of government for any kind of people. There must be discipline." This sounded palpably reminiscent of my talks with Hitler and Mussolini. Discipline, whatever the colors of the flag, means a continuous process of persuasion and consolidation of power, the dictator's determination to keep all things under his thumb. Horthy pursued the point avidly enough. He banged his clenched fist on the table to resound with the word "discipline," and after offering me a cigarette, softened his mood and began again.

"After all," he continued quietly, "parliaments are too likely to be dominated by demagogues. Look at the type of men parliamentary government has produced in Europe. Compare the character of the men who made the great peace of Vienna a century ago with those who recently settled the world's destinies in Paris. France under Napoleon had run amuck in Europe. There had been ruthless, unprovoked aggression as there was not in the last war. Napoleon the upstart had placed his backdoor relations upon the proudest thrones of Europe, humiliating peoples as they had never before been humiliated. Yet the people of France had their old boundaries restored.

Not a foot of land was taken away from them. Why? Because true gentlemen made that peace. After all, there is something in blood tradition — and inherited sense of honor. This gives human beings a sense of dignity and of duty which upstarts can never have. An elected president would never do for the Hungarian people. We are too hot-headed, too quick at quarrels. If we had to elect a new president every four or five years, we would be knocking one another's heads bloody in the course of the electoral argument. That is why for a thousand years we have preserved the monarchy."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Certainly Horthy is a realist — and yet, look across the boundary — one can never call Beneš of Czechoslovakia a visionary. He has been called an idealist, but then everybody in Europe, who so much as mentions the word democracy, is called an idealist and usually not in a spirit of flattery.

There is much doubt and some apprehension in Prague today. One can only wonder at the success of this composite state, and assuage a part of this wonder by recalling Masaryk, the founder, together with an appreciation of his logical, understanding, more politically-minded successor, Beneš. To withstand the infiltration of Nazi undercover activities in this 18-year-old nation would be a job in itself for anyone. In addition President Beneš must dominate, and keep control of the strategic position his country occupies geographically in relation to Russia and Germany. The presence of three million Germans under the Czech flag has given Hitler unrivalled opportunities for propaganda. Yet the Czechs have persevered in their task of building a lone democracy in the almost exact center of a tyrannical continent. Such a staunch display of faith and determination deserves respect.

The convictions beneath this determination are best expressed in Dr. Beneš' own words, as he recounted them to me during one of our conversations in Geneva.

"I always conduct my policy as though it *must* succeed," he said. "I am not concerned if other countries gain specific advantages. I rejoice in their success, and I am glad to cater to their pride. My attitude in politics is positive rather than negative. For years my people have been satisfied with a democratic regime. There are dis-

satisfied minorities, yes, but they are negligible. I point out to our people that they must consider the beginning and the end of any dictatorial regime. Dictatorship begins in violence and ends in violence. And I raise the question for them: after dictatorship, what? A return to democracy, perhaps, but with a sad record of two periods of violence.

"Our people are politically literate; that is why we have remained the only country in Central Europe with a true democratic system. Compare conditions in democratic with those in dictated countries, and you have your own explanation."

When he raised the point of "literacy," I naturally asked him about Germany, to receive this characteristically apt reply, "The Germans are intellectually literate, but politically illiterate."

I then took the opportunity to ask him his frank opinion of the possibility of Hitler's annexing Austria. "I still hope," he said, "that we can bring about a Danubian pact with Hitler and Mussolini co-operating, a pact guaranteeing the integrity of Austria."

Dr. Beneš manages to retain both a resolute calm and his accustomed optimism. He seems able to seek out the potential good. "And," he added, "we must never lose hope." He concluded with a homely analogy, "I play a good deal of tennis. When the score is against me I think only of winning, never of losing. By applying that same helpful spirit to politics, a great deal can be accomplished."

PALESTINE

The Mediterranean has its share of minority problems and they have become more prominent due to Italo-British tension in that area. There are Italian intrigues on the British island of Malta; Greek revolutions due to European inspiration; secret diplomatic intrigues to win favor from independent Egypt. In Palestine, race riots are manifestations of basic elements of unrest. The Palestine disharmony, as an example, is a British problem, rather than an Arab or Jewish one. It is only one spoke in the British Mediterranean wheel, which revolves less smoothly with every passing year. The important question for Great Britain is that the wheel continue to revolve in spite of Mussolini, Zionists or anyone else. Local differences that get in the way of its tread must be settled promptly. The years 1929, 1933 and 1936 saw serious outbreaks of violence in Palestine.

Britain tried to ignore them but finally had to intervene with British troops.

It all began with a grievous error of British diplomacy in 1917, for which Jews and Arabs have paid with blood on many occasions since. Britain simply overlooked the consequences of a gesture designed to placate the Jews at home and abroad at a time when it was more concerned with other matters. Two visits to Palestine taught me that the Balfour Declaration has proved to contain two wholly incompatible promises. In the first place, Great Britain promised to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people. At the same time she promised to do nothing which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Arabs and of their non-Jewish communities. How would it be possible for an administration in the United States, say, to promise to establish a homeland for 50,000,000 Mohammedans in this country, and at the same time promise to do nothing that would prejudice the civil and religious rights of Americans?

With 800,000 Arabs and 375,000 Jews in Palestine, with the number of Jews steadily increasing and buying up more and more of the good land, the Arabs are naturally fearful of what is to happen. There was bound to be conflict. Great Britain is still preoccupied at home, and has not found a real solution for this difficult problem.

"When all else fails appoint a Royal Commission" is a well tried British rule. It has been tried in Palestine and the result is the Commission's proposal to divide Palestine, like Gaul, into three parts. But unlike Gaul, Palestine is a tiny country already too small to serve as a homeland for the world's persecuted Jews. The Arabs are offered the larger barren part, the Jews the smaller more fertile part, while the shrewd British keep for themselves the most important parts and enough territory for all possible military purposes. Neither the Jews, nor the Arabs, nor those who fear or envy Britain's power in the Mediterranean are happy over the proposal. Yet before the Mandates Commission and the Council of the League, Britain will prove a powerful persuader.

BELGIUM

For further contrasts among smaller powers we can turn to the North Sea. Belgium, which Americans are rather too prone to think

of as a French province, is today anything but that. She even prefers neutrality status, despite 1914, to the definite commitments of the Locarno Pact. Belgium is another of the smaller nations which has managed to work out its salvation without the aid of Fascism. If her political course had been a matter of doubt for some time, during the periods of French and German extremism, all such doubts were dispelled in April 1937 when young Léon Degrelle, the personable but overconfident leader of the Rexists, Belgium's only extreme Right organization, was roundly defeated in the national elections. Premier Paul Van Zeeland, when he learned that Degrelle would run for a vacant seat in the Chamber of Deputies, decided that this was a challenge to constitutional government, and presented himself as the opposition candidate for the seat. The resulting campaign was interesting.

The Catholic Church authorities came out and backed Van Zeeland, in spite of his Socialist leanings. When Al Smith made his first trip to Europe to talk with the Pope about radical propaganda he would have done well to stop off in Belgium to learn how Catholics and Socialists can work together to preserve democracy. The Belgians are afraid of extremists, whether of the right or left. And what has happened in Germany has taught the Catholic Church that even a Concordat with the Vatican may not be a barrier against unscrupulous action on the part of a dictator who is determined to root out any semblance of authority that does not completely accept his domination. Degrelle received less than 70,000 out of the 370,000 odd votes that were cast.

POLAND

Swinging our way around Germany, we come upon a definitive example of the victim-nation. Poland, which is reluctant to be classed as anything other than a primary nation in Europe, must nevertheless take her every cue from neighbors of greater consequence. Hers is a secondary *rôle* by the very nature of the Versailles Treaty, which crippled Germany and created Poland. Her course is inextricably tied up with that Treaty's provisions.

The most radical change in Poland's foreign relations has come through her reluctance to duplicate French attitudes and policies toward Germany. She has given France cause for alarm on a number

of occasions, since France and the Little Entente depend on the Treaty for their present frontiers. France is not, however, the only country which finds Poland's placid understanding with Hitler's Third Reich difficult to comprehend. The treatment of Poland's Jewish minorities (there are roughly 3,250,000 Jews in the country) is an issue which keeps up an almost constant tension. By its silence or indifference it often appears that Poland's government has, if not an out-and-out sympathy with many of the Nazi ideals, at least a sort of tacit satisfaction in seeing them creep within her own boundaries. "The Poles are not so bad," a Nazi leader remarked to me. "They hate the Jews as much as we do." Tolerance of Jewish persecution and evidence of increasing anti-Semitic discrimination give substance to this remark.

Danzig, the free city which is the port of the Polish Corridor (and through which passes 60% of Poland's foreign trade) used to present a greater problem to all concerned before it came under Nazi control. Poland seems well content to allow this particular sphere of Nazi influence. Perhaps she hopes thereby to avoid Hitler's opening up the question of the Corridor itself. He has closed the issue, in verbal and written assurances, and Poland seems to have complete confidence in such an understanding, in spite of the fact that the world believes today that Hitler's first and last expansion can only be toward the East. As a matter of fact, Dr. Rosenberg, head of the Nazi Party's separate Foreign Office told me quite frankly that for the present the Corridor issue is only being "overlooked."

One definite hint of Poland's changed attitude toward Germany was dropped more than a year ago when Count Potocki said that "Germany is a big country of 65,000,000 people. She is our neighbor. We believe that a system of friendship with neighbors is better policy than a system of alliances." What Poland would like is to retain her military alliance with France while at the same time enjoying the benefits of a re-insurance treaty with Germany. Has she such a treaty in Hitler's written promise to enforce no change in Germany's eastern boundaries by force of arms before 1944?

To find out just how the Poles feel about Hitler, and why, seemed to me the most important element for arriving at an understanding of their relations at present. I asked Premier Kozlowski a number of leading questions and suggested that the Treaty of Locarno (to

which, we must remember, Poland was also signatory) was signed with a different Germany, for Gustav Stresemann was then Germany's Foreign Minister and a cardinal point in Stresemann's policy was the restoration of good relations between Germany and France.

"Hitler is no different," he replied. "Stresemann was just as much of an imperialist as Adolf Hitler. The only difference is that he concealed his purposes with fine words. Hitler is more frank and outspoken. Fundamentally we are dealing with the same Germany with which we have had to deal in the past. Hitler is just another Kaiser. When he goes, there will be another Kaiser to follow him. We Poles have been telling France for years that Adolf Hitler was bound to come into power in Germany. It is just the same in Russia. They have always had a Czar. The succession in leadership in Russia is always maintained by the man who has the ambition and force to make himself Czar. Stalin is such a man. There will be another Czar as his successor. The important fact is that neither Germany nor Russia has any democratic traditions."

"Poland wants just two things," he said tersely, when I asked him about his policy, "a strong army and the right to live in peace. I don't bother my head about theories concerning disarmament. Let the diplomats play with such unrealities. Such organizations as the League of Nations mean little."

How often have we heard *that!* I sometimes catch myself, on the lecture platform and over the radio, repeating the familiar "We only want to live in peace!", thus quoting words of some minority leader or dictator. How many of them say that, over and over again, and how little real peace there is! One comes to feel a new respect for countries like Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Holland, which not only "want peace" but live in peace!

It is astonishing but not difficult to understand why there is so little peace. It is simply that there is so little real freedom, that priceless element which we guard so zealously, but which in our zeal becomes a form of bigotry. In other words we will allow *ourselves* freedom, but not our fellow men. It is a lesson that we never learn from the past, and that it is always a little too late to learn in the present. We all know now that "it can happen here." But can we avoid it? Will we recognize it when it first appears? Let me close this chapter with one pertinent example.

KALTENBORN EDITS THE NEWS
DANZIG

Less than a year ago I arranged, for one of my Columbia talks by short wave from Europe, to interview Dr. Greiser, President of the Danzig Senate. In substance, the President of the free city-state of Danzig was to speak to the free people of free America through free air. It did not seem to me an occasion for international complications, but — to make a long story short, that interview never reached America. Dr. Greiser was denied permission to speak by Berlin.

But I was there to report the news, and since that refusal became the news story, I flew immediately to London, to arrive in time for the scheduled broadcast, and tell my news from there. I told my radio audience the truth — that the Nazi Government of Germany had refused Dr. Greiser permission to speak; had refused permission to the President of the Senate of Danzig, which is supposed to be governed by an independent liberal constitution as administered under statute by the League of Nations. The news behind the news which I reported to my radio audience that night was a simple statement of fact: that the League of Nations has lost the last vestige for any respect it may have had in Danzig. Mr. Lester, then the League's High Commissioner, lived in the largest house in the city, but he was just about the loneliest man in town. Neither he nor the Polish Commissioner wanted to be quoted, but neither disputed what Dr. Greiser, speaking for the Nazis, was perfectly willing to have quoted. And this was the story in brief: The Danzig Foreign Office, in explanation of cancelling the Greiser interview, advised me that "technical difficulties" would prevent transmission from Danzig.

Of course there were no technical difficulties. The Saturday broadcast, which had been all arranged on the previous Tuesday, did not take place because Dr. Rosenberg (who is not associated with Baron von Neurath's foreign office, but heads the "other" foreign office maintained by the National Socialist Party for contact with other National Socialist authorities outside Berlin) did not want it to take place. Dr. Greiser, after making arrangements with me, reported to his superior.

You wonder that the State President has a superior? He has, and openly acknowledges him, in the person of Albert Forster, the Nazi, or National Socialist Party leader in Danzig. Mr. Forster told Dr.

Greiser in no uncertain terms that he should have applied to Berlin for permission before making the arrangements. So he, Forster, consulted with Berlin, and received a negative reply. This created the "technical difficulty." The irony was that radio, the miracle of science which, if nothing else, *is* technically perfect, should get the blame!

OUTLOOK: The cockpit of Europe was once in the Balkans. Today it is in Spain. Problems are relative and until the Spanish Revolution is over, such names as Danzig, Palestine or Austria will hardly suggest challenge or menace. Germany's stake in the troubled Spanish situation is too great for a rational dictator to court more trouble elsewhere.

Germany has fostered a Nazi movement in Rumania, a country where many things can be bought and paid for. And Dr. Schacht has made barter agreements with Jugoslavia intended to draw that country out of the French orbit. Yet there are such offsetting factors, as the construction of a strategic railroad across Northern Rumania, to provide a direct transport link between Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia. The French are financing Poland's and Rumania's rearmament, while Germany's efforts to break King Carol through the Fascistic anti-Semitic Iron Guard have been unsuccessful.

The Little Entente has been weakened by Jugoslavia's apparent defection toward Italy and Germany, but its opposition to Hapsburg restoration is still backed by Hitler and Mussolini. Germany and Italy having been drawn together by events in Spain are trying to bring Austria, Hungary, Jugoslavia and Poland into a Central European pact to challenge the Russo-French alliance. Their success is unlikely. But in all such deals the small nations are only pawns in the game played by the Big Powers. In so far as their Governments are neither weak nor corrupt they will remember what happened to the smaller allies during the World War. In general, their policy will be to sell themselves to the highest bidder and then not to stay sold. This may not be ethical, but a small man, menaced by a big club, is rarely guided by a moral code.

Danzig is German in all but name, and it only remains for the Nazi State to purchase Poland's consent to its reincorporation. Palestine will remain a British problem even after partition becomes effective. Jews and Arabs must still learn to live together amicably. Austria will never be independent except in name and will some day be a part of Germany.

Europe will always have its share of minor danger spots but they will remain unimportant until and unless one of Europe's Big Five persuades them to play a strong hand in the dangerous games of power politics.

7. BRITANNIA, THE BALANCE WHEEL

FOCAL POINT: *No. 10 Downing Street.* The political if not the geographic center of an empire on which the sun never sets. The principal structure on an obscure little street in London, where that same sun, if it ever rises, rarely succeeds in penetrating the blanket of fog, smoke and imperturbable calm of the British temperament. Nominal seat of the world's most resplendent Monarchy, the Downing Street residence of its Prime Minister represents the actual leadership of a usually conservative parliament functioning under a usually liberal constitution. Described commonly and with equal frequency as the world's greatest Monarchy and the world's greatest Democracy, Great Britain with its Dominions and Colonies overseas is actually neither. It is a commonwealth of far-flung, mutually dependent, like-minded nations, whose fiscal policies, determined quietly and fairly amicably at 10 Downing Street, London, W.C.1, make that address the world's center of gravity. An Empire Conference in Downing Street is always successful. It is a meeting of equal partners in a common enterprise whose differences are minor and whose agreements affect the world. Here is the hub of a well balanced wheel whose solid spokes unite to give it strength.

BACKGROUND: Great Britain, the mightiest power of them all, has been at once the most placid and the most deeply concerned over every recent turn in the course of events which are shaping present day European history. Like all big bodies, she moves slowly, but the significance of those rare and cautious moves are such that the whole world must take notice. While she has weathered the economic burdens of recent years with conspicuous success, on political matters she

has had continued cause for anxiety. The signs of that strain have been made clear to me on each of my visits and in every conversation I have had with British representatives. We need only remember the defeat of disarmament, the growing weakness of the League of Nations, and the successful acts of aggression committed by Japan, Germany and Italy to get a sense of what Britain fears.

But England is something more than a ponderous balance wheel in the intricate machinery of European tension. That she occupies such a position is only one of her responsibilities. The others are the problems of maintaining a suitable balance in the empire's economy and the perpetual renovation of the commonwealth's complex structure. These hang no less heavily on the shoulders of her statesmen. Recent months have put Downing Street in a more acutely embarrassing situation than it has experienced in many years. The importance of the last few decisions made there have been nearly as strategic as those made from 1914 through 1918.

It is as though the back and front doorbells had rung simultaneously every day. As if the British foreign policy at this point were not crucial enough, the Government has had to admit, and openly admit, that all was not well at home either. This revelation was all the more enervating because of the coronation of George VI. Precisely at the time when it was necessary for England to put her best foot forward, everything was at sixes and sevens. In retrospect, it now looks as though she may have leaned over backward in her desperation to get things ironed out by the 12th of May, 1937. Such an achievement was, of course, impossible, but the way in which His Majesty's propaganda machine stormed into high gear and pulled the Empire through the day is staggering testimony to the English determination to do the big things in the big way. It is the ability to "carry on" in spite of all adversity and the unanimity of feeling behind the Englishman's loyalty to his King-Emperor.

This was a task that had to be faced, and England faced it. But the fine point of "recognition" has always played an important rôle in England's diplomatic history. England does not go around looking for decisions to make. She has not forced crises when they could be avoided. She believes, certainly, in "making haste slowly," in a "wait and see" policy, in "muddling through." Witness Spain!

When is a crisis a crisis? Whenever His Majesty's Government

chooses formally to recognize it as such. Then, you may depend on it, it will act, and it will act "honorably" according to its own rights; it will act efficiently, as far as its own interests are concerned; and above all the action taken will be that of a gentleman, very much according to code, with the proper flourish, a carefully measured appreciation of just how the action will look and sound, and a decorous salute from the press. When England acts all the world sits up to take notice; and more, the world usually is compelled to admire the English manner and method. But the fact remains, that from the European point of view, most of the last two years have been spent waiting for England to act, to make decisions and to carry them out.

She can be as inscrutable as she is efficient; she can be as hesitant as a young horse at the jump; she can be, Europe has had reason to claim, as indifferent when she wants to be as if the Empire were three-fourths, rather than one-fourth of the earth. When reluctant to take a stand or when unconvinced that a firm stand will serve her own best interests, England can sidestep decisions as ruthlessly as certain other powers can make them.

Then why, you may ask, is Britannia the balance wheel? Simply because, over the greatest part of the earth, she rules the principal channels of aviation and navigation and because the Empire's outposts are so strategically situated that her sphere of influence is actually much broader than her total area.

It is elementary that her resources also make her the most conspicuous of the Haves in the eyes of the Have-Nots. Whereas America's resources are for the most part self-contained, and hence not to be disputed, Great Britain's principal wealth has been exploited through hundreds of years of gradual expansion. She had to fight for most of it and has always been prepared to fight again to keep it. And while little of her sovereignty is disputed nowadays, almost every bit of it is open to world-wide competition or jeopardy from some specific aggressor. Thus the "life line" we have heard so much about, the direct route across all bodies of water from one British possession to another, is not only the web on which her complex balance is woven, but is also necessarily guarded with jealousy and maintained at great expense.

Confronted with the news of the world today, my own estimate of England's position is, that while she is more than ever the balance

wheel, preserving (for how long no one can tell) the European *status quo*, this balance is more precarious than ever. Things happen so fast nowadays. Things have been happening so fast in the past few months. The fact that Great Britain may have a suitable preponderance of power today is not to imply that one of the Have-Nots could not upset it tomorrow. The loss of control in the Mediterranean, for instance, would amount to a mortal blow to England's possessions in North Africa and the Near East. It would make the security of India doubtful. It would make for a realignment of Balkan powers that would disadvantage England and France. It would affect France in many ways, and would certainly dismember the outlying democratic strongholds.

Similarly, were she even for a week to fail her rigorous patrol of channel waters, including the contiguous North Sea and French coastwise paths, her own food supply would be menaced. Much more self-supporting in food than in 1914, she must still rule at least the neighboring seas to avoid starvation. If England preserves the balance faithfully, doggedly, reliably and stubbornly, it is for the good reason that this balance is as much a matter of survival as it is for that motley string of smaller powers dependent on her predominance for their own integrity.

Since this balance works both ways, there are certain issues which England cannot avoid; certain recurrent problems which must be dealt with; certain situations, minor in themselves but with immeasurably broad implications, that call for decisions. The relationships which England maintains, therefore, with the other nations of Europe are, in sum, English history as it is being made today. Anglo-Saxons the world over have, for generations, been content that what England did, or was forced to do, she would do well. And while we may feel as confident as ever, we can none of us disregard the fact that England's ways and means have recently been challenged with increasing frequency. Englishmen themselves are inquiring into these matters a little more closely. My experience indicates that if England is having more trouble with her various relationships it is because of the dictatorships. It is different to deal in slow, ponderous, diplomatic fashion with spokesmen and *attachés* of a "Foreign Office," which is in turn obliged to go over the details with a Cabinet. It has been a new experience for England to take simple, short-and-to-the-

point replies or rebuttals from one man, one invincible leader who speaks at his own pleasure and with perhaps none but his own counsel for fifty or sixty millions of militantly-propagandized Nationals. So today's diplomacy is a new game for all concerned. And those intricate relationships which are the spokes of the balance wheel bear a new inquiry.

To begin with, one must consider England's relationship to the League of Nations. England, of course, believes in the League thoroughly — and with a thoroughness that is compelling even if it is not contagious. It is regarded by England, aside from all merits or defects, as the one important revelation, the only worthwhile institution to arise from the ashes of the terrible World War.

If it can be the instrument of political recovery, thinks England, and of a new era in the practical, beneficial management of a revived world trade, then the League will surely have justified itself; it will have made an invaluable contribution. Yet this belief in the League is not wholly ingenuous. For the League, its very presence at Geneva, has been valuable to England for very different reasons. England has found in the League a new foil for the niceties of difficult diplomatic situations. When taking the initiative required too great a strain on national defense or public opinion or even someone's political prestige, the move has often been neatly thrust into the League's lap, to be taken conjointly by the member nations or to be abandoned as their considered rejection. England, by that almost incredible miracle of juxtaposition which is His Majesty's foreign policy, always seems to be considered first. The issue at hand may be thoroughly idealistic; its practical consummation will be such that, with no loss of prestige and no disparagement of the ideal, England's immediate objectives are completely satisfied, her honor vindicated.

Britain's attitude toward the League is perhaps best summed up in the way I heard Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, give it at Geneva. "Our motivating principle," he said, "both as an Empire and as a member of the League, is collective security. Both the Empire and the League stand for this principle; that is why Great Britain was fitted for her leadership in the League movement both ideally and practically." It is a curious anomaly that this broad picture of collective security as both an ideal and an objective, was

outlined as the British Empire's policy before the Assembly of the League. If we inquire into its practical effects at this later date, we must confess that the British "put it over again" — because the principle of collective security, so far as Great Britain was concerned, was a statement and no more than that. It was never effectively carried out as applied to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. It so happened that England was not then ready for war; that is, she was not ready to back up alone, materially, her belief in the principles of collective security. And France, under Pierre Laval, was not ready to help her.

But Sir Samuel continued on that occasion to believe in the League. He explained just why England believed in the League. "It is sometimes difficult for our foreign friends to follow the workings of the British mind. We respect our 'British mind' as such because past experience has shown that British public opinion usually shows an altogether sound instinct. The British stood behind the League because the old system of alliances had failed completely to prevent the World War. They saw that a more effective system was needed. And in spite of the contemporary worship of force, Great Britain holds to the ideal of peace, and believes in the League, with no selfish interests."

You can see, after you've sat in those august chambers at the palace in Geneva and heard an Englishman make a statement like that, why we like the English. Although it is not altogether reassuring to record such words at this later date, I remember being convinced that he actually believed every word he was saying. So it is a recognizable integrity, after all. It's such a very practical integrity, this belief in the cause of Empire which blends all its forces into a single, almost fanatical self-belief. It is a great art in the world of diplomacy, too. It signifies a quality of democratic statesmanship that will be an important bond in cementing the necessary alliance of democratic powers, to keep them strong during this difficult, if temporary, "dictator period."

It is not only a matter of coincidence, that the Have-Nots are the three dictated nations. The fact that the emergencies existing in Italy, Germany, and Japan were contributing causes of their present plight does not alter the obvious nature of their existing kinship. Their joint destiny is obviously to break through the democratic *bloc* which keeps them (materially) in bondage. England has been duly conscious

of this political significance and therefore has been deliberately hesitant to deal with them solely on the basis of lack of resources. She has considered the risks in dealing with them while they are under dictatorial, and hence necessarily irresponsible, governments.

To return to the question of the League, there is one important thread to its relationship with Great Britain which deserves much wider recognition; at least the British concept of the League's relationship to its members is at once much fairer and broader than ours. Sir Samuel took the opportunity to point out that the League is not in any sense that much-dreaded "super-state" from which we shied away in 1919. It does not transcend the other states. It is solely what its members make it. The League, therefore, is nothing but a membership; it is nothing but its members.

The United States has never been able to see it that way. The United States has looked upon the League as so many fixed obligations, instead of recognizing it only as the expressed will of the majority for the greater good. The only obligation involved essentially is the rigid adherence to the spirit of its founding, a thorough conviction of the principles which it embraces. The principle of collective security means something more than automatic imposition of sanctions; it imposes arbitration — it means armaments limited to the lowest point consistent with national safety. "One great nation," Sir Samuel declared at Geneva, in terms which left no mistake as to his reference, "is always absent from our council board. Other great nations have left it. Our lack of universality makes us cautious. For with us who remain, our League obligation is part of our national conscience."

And during another part of his address he made a statement which had considerable significance. "Something must be done about the causes of war," Sir Samuel said those words as the representative of his government, and be it noted — it was the first time that Great Britain openly recognized the relative positions of the Haves (Great Britain, the United States, France and Russia) and the Have-Nots (Germany, Italy and Japan).

The problem of raw materials was recognized officially as serious — as, in fact, the ultimate problem. And from an official of his Government, this was an admission of Britain's share in the respon-

sibility for the solution of the problem. Sir Samuel held himself in check, however, with his equally frank statement of the Conservative Government's attitude toward this responsibility. "As a Conservative," he said, "I oppose change when it is premature or unnecessary. The justice of a claim is not necessarily in proportion to the national passions that have been aroused to support it. The artificial incitement of national feeling by government propaganda is sometimes made the excuse for the exercise of force. Yet certain changes will have to be made when the time is ripe. But by consent, not by dictation — by agreement, not by unilateral action."

He drove his point further home as he came closer to the question at hand: Ethiopia. And because he so succinctly summed up Britain's attitude, and because this summation was the framework upon which her entire policy was based, I want to quote his conclusion. He said:

"The change must come through peaceful action — not by war or by threat of war. This is a matter in which enlightened self-interest is also the interest of all involved. I refer to the distribution of the world's economic resources. An abundant supply of raw materials gives definite advantage to the countries possessing them. Some countries possess a preponderance of raw materials in their native soil or in colonial territories. Others, less favored, view the existing situation with anxiety. They fear exclusive monopolies. This is a real problem, but the problem is economic rather than political or territorial.

"It is our desire that distribution be not impeded. The British Government stands ready to take its share in the investigation of these matters. But we must remember that the trouble now is that materials cannot be sold at remunerative prices. I believe there should be an inquiry into raw materials as distributed in colonial territory, protectorates and mandates. The inquiry should consider the fear of exclusion. The fear of monopoly should be removed.

"But such inquiry needs calm and dispassionate consideration. It is impossible in the face of war or in the face of threats of war. Once these threats have disappeared, we can turn to those economic questions which often matter so much more than political issues. In the meantime Britain will continue to stand for collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression."

Sir Samuel's statements during this session showed me how

desperately England was trying to prevent a war. I realized what a terrific jolt the entire Ethiopian affair had given England, and I realize the scare she got more than ever today, when I can see the marks that scare has made. The whole national psychology has changed, and not least among the population to feel the blow were its elected administrators. One might say Downing Street was nearly unnerved by the fiasco, for never before in the life of her present rulers had she been faced with the imminence of a national emergency, a militant emergency for which she was unprepared.

It is plain now in every Government statement — in every single headline. It is implicit in every diplomatic negotiation. It lies beneath the rearmentament program. And in dealing with Hitler, Britain's attitude shows the lesson she learned from being scorched, if not burned, in the Mediterranean. To have had Mussolini succeed in his bluff was bad enough. No Hitler is going to place her in the same unhappy situation, not after the Ethiopian experience.

It is the shock of the Mediterranean crisis that underlies the unsatisfactory relationship between Mussolini and Great Britain today. The ill-feeling between the two was acute enough without the recent fireworks which were so timed as to prove one more Downing Street headache during the coronation. In my Italian chapter I indicate the series of disappointments which filled Mussolini with such profound resentment against what he decreed British interference with legitimate Italian ambitions in Africa, and which motivated his defiance of Britain's status in the Mediterranean. As we trace the course of this mounting antagonism, we must remember that its seeds were sown the day it dawned on Britain that her long-uncontested dominance in the Mediterranean was being disputed by a one-man nation. Had she then chosen the course of action which presented itself to many minds as the logical military rebuttal — the closing of the Suez Canal, she might have faced the necessity of putting her entire fleet in the Mediterranean to have it out at close quarters. And the fear of heavy naval losses which haunted Downing Street at that juncture influences Britain's foreign policy today. It is singularly British that so much splendor was pumped into the coronation of George the Sixth, that so much unnecessary ignominy was heaped upon Edward the Eighth. The rare experience of fright has had a definite effect upon the British lion.

Perhaps Great Britain will learn that the best way to deal with dictators is to deal firmly. Persuasion is of little value unless the big stick is ready to back up the gentle speaking. Dictators believe solely in power politics, and all their proclamations, writings, and actions are based on power politics. Perhaps that is why their foreign propaganda usually hurts more than it helps.

Their opponents must have force in the background, always ready for use. Britain had it in the Mediterranean in 1936 to the extent of 400,000 tons, but it was vulnerable and the British knew it. To ask whether Mussolini knew this or was confident of it, will remain speculative. Would Mussolini have challenged Great Britain in the Mediterranean if, acting on behalf of the League and with the approval of League Powers, she had closed the Suez? Personally, I don't think so.

But whether England was tempted to take the risk, or afraid to take it, depended largely on the French attitude. This is important, because it was not England's fault that she had to bear the brunt of the issue. If Laval had not been so jealous of the success of his Rome agreement which had secured Franco-Italian understanding (in January 1935), and if he had thought as much when the crisis came of the principle of collective security as, say, Léon Blum does today, England would not have been threatening Mussolini alone. Franco-British cooperation on the declared principles enunciated in the League Council would have produced very different developments in Ethiopia, and a less challenging attitude on the part of Mussolini.

Of course, the worst has happened. The way things finally worked out Great Britain lost face anyway, with the result that Mussolini is foolishly contemptuous of her today. He would have been far more respectful had Great Britain stood her ground and wielded the big stick. He might have even decided, in a humbler appeal for Italo-British understanding, that the bigger stick-wielder had been right after all — that there were other ways of annexing colonial acreage than by ravaging Ethiopia in defiance of the League. Mussolini's rather ridiculous "snub" of the British coronation does him little credit. The reason for that was, of course, the fact that the English press, searching around for descriptive material to enlarge upon Italian fumbling in Franco's ranks on the Spanish front, had mentioned the worst of all possible thorns in Mussolini's side — Capo-

retto, the scene of Italy's overwhelming defeat during the World War. In rebuttal, Mussolini seized upon the occasion of the coronation to order all Italian correspondents out of England. The Foreign Office comment: "The British Empire will probably survive the shock," was thoroughly appropriate.

Great Britain's attitude and actions in the Spanish Revolution reveal a different side of the Empire. Great Britain, at present, is predominantly conservative, a thoroughly normal situation. The substitution of Neville Chamberlain for Stanley Baldwin as Premier and the retirement of Ramsay MacDonald pushes the Cabinet still further to the right. As a natural consequence she is apprehensive of all kinds, colors and manifestations of Communism. From the moment the war in Spain began, there was definite cleavage in the British cabinet. Sympathies were admittedly divided between the Leftist Government and the Rightist Revolution. The net result, as far as foreign policy was concerned, was Nothing. No positive policy was developed during the first year of the Revolution and England has still to commit herself. British warships and merchantmen have even been attacked without anything happening. It is a neat example of her strategy when it is easier to stand aside and deal with events as they develop rather than take the initiative and formulate a policy. Thus in regard to Spain, France assumed a lead which most of the other powers were glad to accept, just as Great Britain took the lead in Ethiopia.

England did not wish leadership even after the Civil War had become the Little World War. It was at this time, when arms and volunteers began pouring into Spain, that it was France's turn to fear either a war or the success of Fascism on another French frontier. She was the first to notice that Italy was taking an interest in the Balearic Islands, and that such overtures to Franco gave Germany an "excuse" to manifest a similar interest in Spanish Morocco. This latter suspicion represented the first intimation of a possible clash of interests that Great Britain recognized. Her Mediterranean lesson learned and not easily forgotten, Downing Street immediately approached Mussolini and invited him to sign a treaty maintaining the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. It was quickly signed, because it meant nothing.

Some 15,000 Italian troops were landed at Cadiz almost before

the ink was dry. Then, at French instigation, after much bickering, a Non-Intervention agreement was concluded, which was just as meaningless. It was convenient for the chief signatories to ignore what they all must have known full well: that their non-intervention plans did not include an air patrol — and it was by air that technicians and highly important technical material had been pouring into Spain.

By an irony of fate Great Britain and France have never had their Labor Governments at the same time. How differently current history might have developed if, for instance, MacDonald and Blum had been elected to work these things out together. Baldwin and Blum only got along under sufferance; necessity was the unwilling stepmother of their relationship.

As Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain will be even less amenable to suggestions from a French Popular Front Government even though this is no longer headed by a Socialist. He has the business man's outlook and limitations, realistic and unimaginative. Harold J. Laski says that Neville Chamberlain reminds him of Herbert Hoover.

Great Britain is still determined not to "recognize" this bloody battlefield beyond the Pyrenees as being anything other than the local scene of a battle between political theorists, while France is blindly conscientious about duty to avoid war and yet prevent a third Fascist dictatorship at her frontier. Both nations are also contending with pressing domestic problems to which they need to devote time and thought.

Turning to the East, it is difficult to rid the mind of the Baldwin quotation which reverberated through Great Britain to the effect that "our frontier is now on the Rhine." Those who heard the relayed broadcast of an interview I had in London with Lord Eustace Percy, the diplomat who was a co-author of the League's covenant, may remember his amplification of that statement. "Napoleon once described Antwerp as a 'pistol leveled at the heart of England.' That is why for centuries Britain has believed that her frontier is in the Low Countries. Now the pistol can be leveled from further off, from aerodromes on the Rhine, and even further afield. That is all Baldwin meant by his phrase." And that, we might say, is enough, too. But the statement was heard round the world, nevertheless.

That is why whenever one asks the question, "Against whom is Britain rearming?" someone steps forth with the almost immediate reply, "Against Germany." But there's more to it than that.

Americans are inclined to forget the consideration that a considerable part of the British population and an important faction in the Government are pro-German. This should not be difficult to understand if we remember that several satisfactory bilateral documents have been executed by the two powers. It is something that France, above all, is reluctant to appreciate; yet the fact remains that Germany and Britain do understand each other.

If, on the other hand, the commentator can point to ever widening breaches between the two, it is because of this same "new experience" upon which Great Britain has had to mold her new technique. Adolf Hitler is neither the kind of German nor is the Third Reich the kind of Germany that England knows and understands. Faced with a new Germany, a wholly alien Germany, we can see something of the difficulty Great Britain encounters, again in the words of Lord Percy, where an entirely new pessimism in Anglo-German relations has developed as a result of Hitler's and the Nazi Party's extremism. This is no longer a Germany bound to the rest of Europe by a common destiny, but a malignant distortion of the economic hegemony which all sound European economists are trying to develop.

"Germany is not interested," he said, "in Sir Samuel Hoare's point about colonial raw materials. That's no longer very much the point anyway. The British Colonies, for that matter, are as wide open to foreign buyers of raw materials as they would be if they were owned by the League of Nations. But Germany doesn't want to be a foreign buyer; she doesn't want to trade; she doesn't even want to own investments in South America or the British Dominions. She wants to own for herself under her own sovereignty all the food and raw materials that her people need."

I then asked him if that, in the last analysis, didn't mean war.

"If Germany really aims at being economically self-supporting," he replied, "it does mean war."

Such pessimism shows how wide a gap has developed between prospects for some Anglo-German *rapprochement* on the basis of cultural and hereditary sympathies, and the antagonism arising from the hyper-sensitivity of the Germans' self-styled savior. If Hitler had

what we call common sense he would long ago have found ways of capitalizing on the pro-German tendency that is still strong in Great Britain and that is only waiting for an opportunity to find expression.

One important step has shown that there are still basic possibilities in the cooperation of these two powers, and that was the naval treaty, signed readily and reciprocally two years ago. Although this document placed all the obligations upon Germany, Hitler was anxious to sign because it was the first important treaty signed with a great power. He limited the size of his navy to one-third of Britain's, and although France was terribly grieved over the whole matter, it represented a step toward normalcy. It constituted definite recognition by a signatory power that the arms clauses of the Versailles Treaty were dead. After discussing this treaty with a number of representatives of the British Foreign Office, I was interested to note how ingeniously they rationalized going "behind" France's back in signing it. Of course, France did know about it. Britain didn't go out of her way to get France to cheer about it; indeed, France had less than a fortnight's notice. But it wasn't entirely the surprise that Paris pretended it was. I asked Sir Herbert Samuel, former leader of the Liberal Party, how it had come about. Sir Herbert, who was made a Viscount by George VI among his coronation honors, has just returned to political life to fight for the lowering of trade barriers.

He said: "For three years we tried to limit arms in Europe by general agreement. The effort had completely failed. Then Hitler made us a concrete offer. It would have been foolish to refuse. We must now follow this naval agreement with a similar agreement on air armament. As matters stand today we are really building against France. Hitler has already agreed to parity in aviation. If we can make an agreement on parity all around, it will be just as sound from the security point of view for each country to have five hundred front line planes as to have fifteen hundred."

The Foreign Office told me, however, that "we do not propose to follow the separate agreement with Germany on navies with any separate agreements on aviation or land armaments." At the same time they gave me the answer to my original inquiries about the French reaction. The reply was tersely to the point: "we do not feel that our decision to sign this treaty is in any way inimical to French

interests. Germany had refused before the war to accept a navy equal to fifty percent of ours. As matters stand today Germany will need five years to build her navy up to thirty-five percent of ours, giving her at that point some 400,000 tons. Even today the French have 650,000 tons and they can build as much as they like between now and 1942."

This is progress and if we find we have a little hope to balance in with the basic pessimism, it does not need to be shattered even by the new arms program Britain has under way today. I have come to believe thoroughly in Britain's anxious desire to maintain peace. In certain circles rearmament is always held suspect, but a comprehensive study of the respective economies of European powers proves conclusively that Britain's arming is negative rather than positive. If the simple words "national defense" do not seem to be telling the whole story, we have only to look at a map of the world to see that she lives cheek by jowl with the embattled powers in Europe — the embattled, embittered, internally chaotic powers on whom none can rely even with the best will in the world.

The fright over Ethiopia and the Mediterranean is still there, to be sure, and it created a determination to launch the largest naval building program in the Empire's history. But there is no doubt that these are to be maintenance reserves. For it is England's one and only desire to preserve the peace, simply because the present peace, the *status quo*, is entirely satisfactory to her as one of the Haves.

But Ethiopia had other consequences. Mussolini's success has newly inspired the Have-Nots. He taught them that there were still ways of going about getting what they wanted or needed. So Britain considers the Have-Nots potential tinder boxes, all of them. She sees them over-populated, under-resourced, debt-harassed, imperial-minded, on a fiat money basis, building their extravagant armaments and waiting, watching for their chances, without friends, even among each other. And I imagine Britain's fears can be paraphrased as simply as the great German poet Schiller wrote them, in the lines from "Wilhelm Tell" I heard recited to thunderous applause at the World Economic Conference in London in 1933 by the late Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss:

*Es kann der Beste nicht in Frieden leben
Wenn es dem bösen Nachbar nicht gefällt.*

Which I have freely translated,

*For e'en the gentlest cannot live in peace
When wicked neighbors choose the way of war.*

Finally, it is to be remembered that Great Britain has those tremendous "Home Affairs" which no foreign entanglement or crisis can ever relegate to a remote part of the national conscience. The Englishman feels much about his Government as he does about his home and castle. He likes it in good running order. That accounts for the only really nationwide misfortune which beset England during the coronation. The recrudescence of the labor struggle in London indicated that all was not really well in the best of all possible worlds. Englishmen were as loyal to Britannia as ever, but they strongly suspected that London, without its omnibuses, left something to be desired.

The crisis was naturally seized by the Fascist press throughout the world to indicate structural weaknesses in Britain's national economy. To me it was one more indication of England's rapid recovery. Without having made a first hand appraisal of the grievance involved in that particular strike it is my belief that the transit employees were taking advantage of the unique time and occasion to grab their slice of the larger profits that have followed in the wake of better business.

More serious strike threats in other regions might alter the picture somewhat, but after talking to several British financial experts I am convinced that there are sound forces for a durable recovery at work in England today, strong enough to absorb a good many minor shocks. This recovery, which began almost two years ahead of ours, stems back to Britain's going off the gold standard, and there is a steadily widening satisfaction with the managed currency basis. With well balanced currency control measures in effect she has managed to regulate the value of the franc, lira, and even the dollar to her satisfaction, and of course her completely nationalized control of the financial situation enables her to hold down interest rates — while carrying on numerous "social programs," that make certain aspects of our own New Deal appear reasonably conservative. Her great economic danger is the temporary rearmament boom.

Americans are too apt to forget that almost fifty years ago Britain took some of her own New Deal, varying from ours but certainly as

extensive, in her stride; and with it an income tax levy that would not only stagger our Congressional committees but would probably realign our entire party political system. And in the summer of 1937 the rates were still further increased. Perhaps only the British could pay in and spend from the national treasury on such a scale with such aplomb.

As Neville Chamberlain said in connection with his announcement of increased income tax proposals, "they were received with resignation if not with enthusiasm." That happens to be the way in which Britain faces the inevitable.

OUTLOOK: The two years from July 1935 to July 1937 have not been among the happiest in British history. Italy triumphed over England in Ethiopia. British rearmament on a large scale got under way but was not sufficiently completed to justify a "strong" foreign policy. Italy and Germany rather than France and England took the lead in the Spanish Revolution. The narrow-minded attitude of the Baldwin Government toward the Duke of Windsor stirred increasing resentment abroad and in the Dominions. Recovery had slowed down and was accompanied by labor difficulties. Neville Chamberlain, who became Prime Minister at the end of May 1937, was expected to show more vigor and imagination than the "bumbling" Baldwin but needed time and opportunity to develop his talents.

Yet, as so often in the past, time is likely to be on Britain's side. She can afford to wait where others must press for prompt decisions. India voted against accepting the new measures of local autonomy which Britain proposed after years of careful study. Yet nothing happened. India remains relatively quiet under continued British rule. Egypt is no longer under British tutelage and has become a full-fledged member of the League of Nations. Yet British ships, planes and soldiers still stand guard over the Empire's life-line on the shores of the Suez Canal. In the Far East, British prestige has diminished but Singapore and Hongkong will soon be strong enough to maintain Britain's position in south and central China, the only parts of the Celestial Kingdom where British investments are important. If in

1931, the Japanese had threatened the Yang Tze Basin instead of Manchuria, Sir John Simon's response to Secretary of State Stimson's suggestion for joint action would have been less evasive. It will be remembered that he could not discuss it with Mr. Stimson because it was a matter before the League and he could do nothing at Geneva because it was under discussion with the United States.

But that was five years ago and Americans have short memories and bear few grudges. Cooperation with Great Britain was resumed in 1936 and continued in 1937 when the United States Treasury twice acted with the Bank of England to stabilize the French franc at lower values. Cooperation will continue if and when the time comes to arrange another economic conference. There has been talk of such a conference following the visit of Prime Minister Van Zeeland of Belgium to the United States in June 1937, but the difficulties in the way then made concrete plans impossible. The complete failure of the 1933 meeting in London is still remembered. At the Imperial Conference in London in June of this year (1937), Anglo-American trade relations dominated the discussions. Canada and Australia both desired England and the United States to sign a new trade treaty but the opposition of South Africa and other areas frustrated agreement.

Fundamentally Great Britain and the United States are drawn together by a community of interest in stable finance, in world trade development and above all in democracy and peace. The issues that divide us are temporary, the causes that unite us are eternal. It remains for true statesmen, British and American, to recognize and emphasize the dominant importance of those larger national ideals which have always been cherished by both peoples.

8. A NEW DEAL IN FRANCE

FOCAL POINT: *Paris.* It is perhaps more difficult for the Parisian himself, than for the foreigner, to realize that the Paris of today is the city that saw Louis XVI guillotined on a cold November morning and the city which Napoleon III recreated. We know these things simply, chronologically. But *le boulevardier, le député, le concierge, le gendarme, le professeur, le rédacteur, le petit homme* — even the “two hundred families” — none of them saw it coming; and all at once there it was. The rival minorities had suddenly compromised to achieve a united front, a solidarity which quickly realized its strength and presented demands which neither the electorate nor the Government could afford to refuse. And thus, for the first time in hundreds of years, Paris, which had never really been a part of France, and was a sort of cosmopolitan city-state in itself, became the political center of France, the most integral factor in the national regime. The city which had been previously the French show window, with its famous expositions, its fairs and *fêtes*, its myriad hotels, international bars and railroad termini, was once again the supreme focal point. Here French history was to be written again, and here, even as during the Revolution, the destiny of France was at stake. And, as before, Paris contained most of the extremes of France, jealous of each other, intolerant of each other, and only united in preparedness for a “national emergency.” The result has been an unsettled Paris, ill-suited to the occasion of the much-publicized 1937 Exposition. Even as it opened, Premier Chautemps displaced Premier Blum. For the third time the franc was devalued. Visitors are conscious that something important has happened and may happen again. Paris, itself, doesn’t know what to expect.

BACKGROUND: On Bastile Day of last year I was in Paris watching the recently elected Popular Front Government and its supporters on parade. I am no stranger to France for I have lived there. I know the countryside as one who loves walking and bicycling gets to know it. I have talked, at one time or another, to most of the prominent French politicians and statesmen of the post-war era. The France I saw marching through the streets of Paris on July 14, 1936 was at the same time familiar and strikingly new as happens so often in France.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. France has long been considered, and justly so, the most civilized country in the world. No country has contributed more to our knowledge of life or to the art of living. There is something profoundly mature in French philosophy, French art, and the French way of life. We who belong to a much younger civilization are conscious of a certain mellow quality the moment we set foot upon the soil of France. It is an old, thoroughly developed, richly experienced country. Yet one could wish for France that fate had given her eternal peace and security to develop, undisturbed, those finer shadings of the art of living for which she is famous. Unluckily, she has long been situated in the very heart of an embattled Europe. Her constant preoccupation has been to keep from getting soft through good living, to remain hard enough to preserve and maintain the good life. This paradox has existed at the roots of French society. There has been a perpetual struggle between the Frenchman's normal trend toward individualism and his country's need for united action. This struggle has, in the past, expressed itself rather haphazardly in the reiterated political crises which have beset French governments. The average term of office for a French Premier has been nine months, though the same names would emerge again and again when the ministerial cards were reshuffled.

Today it looks as if this contradiction in the French nature may at last have found the way of harmony. The average Frenchman has retained a good deal of his individualism, that is, his right to *think* for himself about political problems, by maintaining his own political party, whether it be Communist, Socialist, or Radical Socialist. But for the moment, at least, he has submitted to social discipline by allying himself in *action* with other persons and parties to effect a specific program. Whatever his private quirks of thought or

behavior, the Frenchman has publicly become a consciously social animal.

This was what struck me about that great parade. Here was the observance of a traditional French Republican holiday, which was at the same time a celebration of the emergence into power of the new Popular Front Government. Here I saw, for the first time in a Western democracy, that the people can have self-discipline. New social ideas were everywhere in ferment that day, yet the old French sense of form and order prevailed. The gendarmes were kept out of the parade, and the people made up their own "*service d'ordre*," which maintained extraordinary discipline. Two huge organizations were marching: the Confédération Général de Travail, which claims four million members, and the League of the Rights of Man, which is itself very sizable. I have never seen anything to equal this parade, save in the Red Square in Moscow. It was a parade for the Popular Front, a parade for the petty bourgeois and the working class; but it was, above all, a parade for peace.

The *Anciens Combattants*, the French equivalent of the American Legion, took part in the March, carrying banners which declared *Rien faire pour diviser, tout faire pour unir*. (Do nothing to divide, do everything to unite.) Army reserve officers marched, getting more cheers than any other section, simply because they, the *officers*, were, for almost the first time in history, on the side of the People. Everywhere peace and unity were emphasized. The Communist section used for an emblem the Hammer and Sickle together with the French Radical flag and the French flag. "We will remain united," was the Popular Front motto. Another one was "The Popular Front of France and the Soviet Union together assure the peace of the world."

Any number of banners cried out *A bas la guerre!* — "You think you die for your country; you really die for the Industrialists," was another favorite; *Liberté ou Mort*, still another. One of the most impressive groups in the parade was The Order of the Wooden Cross, an organization of war widows and orphans who carried banners for peace. War cripples were featured as a part of the anti-war propaganda, and, indeed, in all demonstrations of the Left in France, these victims of the last war play a prominent part. It was in this parade that I saw again the three arrows, the anti-Fascist emblem used all over Europe. A tremendous photograph of Jaurès, the Socialist

leader who was shot as the war began in August 1914, was one of the most striking exhibits.

There was tremendous variety and color in this march of the Popular Front, but its dominant motif was Peace. This was the more exciting, the more inspiring, in that it came from France, a nationalist nation, hitherto restrictive and imperialist in its dominant policies and sentiments.

Finally, when the parade reached the reviewing stand, the speeches began. There I saw the leaders who were responsible for this amazing mass demonstration. I caught my first glimpse of Léon Blum, the Popular Front Premier, old Socialist, old esthete and *littérateur*, one-time friend of Proust. An altogether unpretentious individual, older than I had expected, keen-eyed, with a fine intellectual face.

The whole Cabinet had the same air of democratic simplicity. Looking at them, one realized that these leaders of social reform were, at bottom, solid, unassuming, bourgeois citizens. Yet when Léon Blum rose to speak, he was greeted with the strains of the *Internationale*, and he sang the words of the chorus himself. His speech was simple, factual, unrhetorical. He pointed to the achievements of the Popular Front Government. Within fifteen days, he said, the Chamber of Deputies had accomplished revolutionary reforms. They had voted nationalization of the munitions industry, the democratization of the Bank of France, the forty hour week for workers, and vacations with pay. He closed with an exhortation to the elements of the Popular Front to maintain their unity. "The first break in our ranks," he declared, "opens the way to reaction. The workers of France," he reminded his hearers, "three times created a Republic. They will go to any lengths to maintain it."

The speeches which preceded Blum's were in much the same key. Victor Rasch, the President of the League of the Rights of Man, spoke, reviewing the achievement of the forty hour week, and warning against the horrors and bitterness of deflation. Former Premier Edouard Daladier spoke. "The Popular Front," he announced, "has sealed the alliance of the Third Estate with the proletariat." Jacques Duclos, Secretary of the Communist Party, admitted he was glad "to note the reconciliation of the tri-color with the red flag." He, too, dwelt on the victory of the forty hour week, the paid vacations, and the right of contract for the workers; but he made further de-

mands for the freedom of debtors, tax adjustment, and a program for the farmers.

The revolutionary nature of the occasion and the speeches, combined with the sobriety of the speakers' language was impressive. Here was revolution, but revolution controlled, disciplined, well behaved.

My mind flashed back to talks with Herriot and Laval. The men were not dissimilar, but their words and tone were radically different. Herriot, optimistic, easy going and politically knowing, in 1931, chatted with me genially and almost inconsequentially about the problems then confronting him as Premier. We spoke of German rearmament at a time when the French press was very much excited about German demands for equality. Herriot laughed and joked and slapped my shoulder in friendly fashion, but refused to get excited about anything that Chancellor von Papen or General Schleicher had said or might say. He was quite as much at ease on debts and tariffs. Even the Hitlerites did not alarm him.

In Geneva in 1935, I interviewed Laval. We were all preoccupied with the League then, for the Ethiopian conquest was looming definitely on the horizon. Laval insisted that France had not and would not fail in its obligation to the Covenant of the League. French politics, he asserted, was founded in its entirety on adherence to the League. He spoke forcefully, but he spoke like a diplomat. What a contrast between the matter-of-fact attitudes of these two former Premiers and the warmth and fervor of the speakers of the fourteenth of July! Will I find the same hot enthusiasm when I return to Paris for Bastile Day in 1937? Or have the Popular Front leaders, forced by a conservative Senate to realign their Cabinet, already been bowed down by the eternal difficulty of making practice conform to theory and action equal promise?

Everywhere I went in July 1936, I sensed that France was breathing a new social atmosphere. In Government circles they were speaking a different language. Three women members had been included in the Government, and this too was part of the new social order. It is significant that they were all dropped when Chautemps moved the Cabinet only slightly to the right. In France women are still struggling for the right to vote.

I talked to one of the women members of the Blum Government,

Mme. Léon Brunschvigg, Under Secretary of State for Education and Fine Arts. Suffrage for women, of course, is discussed but it was not and is not a definite part of the Popular Front program. Still, Mme. Brunschvigg was optimistic. The majority of the men in power, she declared, were in favor of votes for women; and she expressed the hope that, when the question of woman suffrage came up before the Parliament, the Government would speak in its favor. Feminists in France, she said, were particularly interested in the part women were playing in political affairs in the United States. Frances Perkins, America's first woman Cabinet Member, was expected in Paris and among all politically-minded women her arrival was attended with a great deal of curiosity.

Such a sense of fraternity and of collective good will was felt in the Popular Front Government, in the streets of Paris itself, that one might have thought that no opposition existed. This is, of course, not the case. Radical Socialists, Socialists, and Communists united to form the Popular Front Government with the avowed intent of crushing the Fascist opposition. Colonel de la Roque's *Croix de Feu* was outlawed, but Fascism is not yet dead in France.

I interviewed Charles Mourrat, editor of the *Action Française*, right wing, Catholic, royalist paper, and found him uncompromisingly and bitterly hostile to everything the Popular Front stood for. Mourrat is no ordinary demagogue, no Hitler or Goering or Goebbels; he is a man of immense culture and brilliant intellect. He is an old man and was in delicate health when I saw him. It was the more shocking to find him dedicating himself to violence as a political principle. I was so struck by the contradiction of intellect and action in his own person that, quite openly, I asked him to explain this unity of intelligence and violence. His answer was direct.

"There are times," he said, "when the baton is needed. Republics were always established in France by outside forces. Monarchy and dictatorship have much in common. Arbitrary power must be used in times of crisis. Today the Bank of France under Government control is at the mercy of petty politics. The deputies in the Chamber are all local representatives; not one of them speaks for the whole nation. . . Popular suffrage," he went on, "is a stupid illusion. Votes do not express opinion. France is a rich country which wastes its energy and power on politics." I remembered that Mussolini has repeatedly

said much the same thing. This Fascist willingness to use violence to achieve aims parallels the doctrine of revolution as preached by the most violent Communists. It goes far to prove the existence of an intellectual Fascist International.

"What are your plans for alleviating social injustice?" I asked Mourrat. "We have a social program," he said, "but we do not speak of it because the radicals can always outbid us. One reason why they can outbid us is that we keep our promises and they don't." Since M. Mourrat's party has never been in power and very likely never will be, part of his statement cannot be tested. But it is true that the Popular Front has an almost 100 percent record on translating its political platform into legislation.

Before I left him, M. Mourrat showed me an emblem which, he said, had been carried in the Popular Front's July Fourteenth parade, a little flag bearing a hammer and sickle and a cross, with the inscription, "I am a Socialist because I am a Christian." This small badge appeared to make him angrier than any other manifestation. To me it did not seem particularly unnatural or startling that some of the French radicals should have appropriated for themselves the title of Christians, but to M. Mourrat it was monstrous, revolting, unbelievable. In both France and Spain, Fascist leaders are profoundly convinced that a man cannot be religious and radical.

Opposition to the Popular Front Government in France is not confined to admittedly Fascist groups. Manufacturers all over the country are grumbling at many things for which they hold the Popular Front responsible. They maintain it is now impossible to manufacture goods cheaply enough to compete for export trade. Social legislation has raised production costs thirty-five percent. The Popular Front Government, they insist, has taken the profit out of industry, and has thus removed industry's incentive to function. The 1937 budget is the largest in French history; deficits pile up while interest already consumes one-third of the Government income. The national debt has reached a staggering total. This explains Finance Minister Bonnet's decision in June 1937 to again devalue the franc from four and one-half to four cents. Such complaints are not unfamiliar to us. They have been an *obbligato* to the New Deal in America. Nor are the French workers satisfied. They complain that although wages have increased by twelve percent, the cost of living is up thirty percent.

In Paris, in July 1936, I interviewed over the Columbia network, M. André Phillip, Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies. I asked him about this problem of rising prices. He is a professor of economics and finance at the University of Lyons, and a member of the important Finance Commission of the Chamber. M. Phillip, though a strong political partisan, has the faculty of discussing government problems as if he were merely an intelligent, and personally unconcerned observer. When, on the air, I mentioned those increases in the cost of living which were already noticeable, he replied: "This is partly the result of speculation. It can be stopped. A moderate rise in prices is an inevitable result of the better conditions granted to French workers. The price rise can be slowed down by government action. We propose to ease the financial strain by providing cheap credit for small industries, and to exercise control over certain industries in such a way as to reduce the struggle."

When M. Phillip came to New York in 1937 we continued our discussion. In our radio interview I was chiefly concerned with having M. Phillip clarify for American radio listeners the nature and composition of the French Popular Front. I wanted the American public to understand on what terms the radical parties and the middle-of-the-road parties had united. Many Americans suspected that these three parties, Radical Socialists, Socialists, and Communists, had joined to overthrow capitalism. Actually they had joined to fight Fascism. Their political platform was in no sense revolutionary. The main features were the forty hour week for workers, vacations with pay, the compulsory arbitration of strikes, the nationalization of the munitions industry and the democratization of the Bank of France. Today this program has been almost wholly achieved, and it was in terms of accomplishment that M. Phillip recently discussed it. Naturally he is a biased observer. But since the new Popular Front Cabinet headed by Camille Chautemps promises to remain in power until long after the appearance of this book, the summary of Popular Front achievement by one of its leaders is worth recording in that leader's words. Particularly on those issues and problems which President Roosevelt is keeping alive here. Here is what M. Phillip says about the labor problem on which he is an expert:

"After the beginning of its power, the Popular Front Government

faced a strike of two million workers. Fortunately they stayed in the plants and sat down. If they had gone out into the streets they might have caused riots and revolution. The Government acted as conciliator. Strikes were settled without anyone being killed or hurt, and without any property damage.

"The National Association of Manufacturers and the Workers Federation got together. Wages were raised from twelve to eighteen percent. We passed a new law on child labor, raising the age from twelve to fourteen. We hope to put the age up to fifteen. The workers got two weeks' paid vacation, one in summer, one in winter. They also secured a forty hour week. We had intended to approach this particular problem by degrees, but the Government's hand was forced. [The forty hour week produced a strike of small employers in July 1937.]

"These changes have brought many real difficulties, but industry is adapting itself. As a result of the general recognition of collective bargaining there has been a great development of unionism. The General Confederation of Labor had 800,000 members — the more radical union had 200,000. Last February the two combined. Their unity resulted in raising the total membership to five million.

"The Labor Unions of France now even include technicians and technical directors. The union also includes members of the civil service such as teachers and university professors. They are now discussing the possibility of making farmers eligible to join labor unions. Of course it has not been easy to coordinate and discipline these four million new members and to develop new leaders to handle them.

"We have now a special law on arbitration. At first any labor issue is discussed between the worker delegate and the employer. If there is no settlement in three days, the issue goes to the general union. Two arbitrators are selected — one by the union, one by the employer. If there is no settlement in three days, these two choose a third arbitrator. These arbitrators then make their recommendation. If the employer refuses to accept it, the Government will cooperate to prevent the plant being operated by strikebreakers. If the workers refuse to accept, the Government will protect the employer in operating his plant with non-strikers.

"It is a neutralization plan. The Government does not tolerate

sit-down strikes. It ousts the strikers from the plant, but it also keeps the plants closed while mediation is in progress. This plan has worked. During the last six months there have been three cases where arbitration has been refused by the workers, two cases where it has been refused by the employers. In all five instances, the Government imposed the solution. If any representative industrial group makes a collective bargaining agreement, the Government has the right to impose this on the entire industry."

France, like the United States, has worked for both recovery and reform, sometimes seeking to accomplish both purposes with the same measure. M. Phillip summarized the task and the accomplishment as follows:

"Our first task was to overcome the terrific deflation. That meant rebuilding the purchasing power of the workers through higher wages, and of the farmers through higher prices. It also involved a public works program. We worked on prices chiefly through marketing agreements. We found that in some instances the farmers received only one-fifth of the prices paid by the consumers. We established a wheat control board, which represented the interests of both farmers and consumers. Today the big mill owners no longer dominate the wheat market. Similar agreements are being applied to all industries. We have found that eliminating middle men has been a great factor in reducing prices.

"We made an appropriation of twenty billion francs for public works. This will be devoted chiefly to housing and road construction. One interesting item in our public works program is the construction of one hundred and twenty-five cable railways that carry people up to places in the mountains where they go to ski. During the Christmas holidays last winter sixty thousand people from the City of Lyons, went skiing. There has been an enormous development of outdoor sport activity among the working classes as a result of the new leisure created by the forty hour week.

"One of our great problems has been the increase in prices. Last year agricultural prices were up eighty percent. Wholesale industrial prices were up fifty percent, retail prices thirty percent. The general cost of living was up sixteen percent. Naturally the workmen asked increased wages. As a rule the arbitrators handled matters diplomatically. They decreed increases, but ordered them applied at the rate

of four percent every six months to enable industry to adapt itself to the new conditions.

"Industrialists were informed that they must not raise prices more than enough to compensate for increased costs. They were informed that unless they maintain reasonable prices, the Government would admit more foreign competitive goods by reducing tariffs or increasing quotas. Within the past year partial employment has been almost completely eliminated. Unemployment has been reduced from 500,000 to 400,000.

"The pace of recovery has slowed down this year, but we do not expect any important setbacks. Recently tax receipts have been above the estimates. [This was the case for only one month.] We still have a deficit, but we hope the success of the 1937 Paris Exposition will help balance the budget. So much for recovery.

"Our chief contributions to reform have been the nationalization of the manufacture of arms and munitions, and the reorganization of the Bank of France. We nationalized the plants that manufacture airplanes by the Government's buying one-half of the outstanding shares at the average value of these shares during the preceding five years. In dealing with the Creusot-Schneider Metal Plants, the Government bought only those plants devoted to making munitions.

"In the case of the Bank of France the original statute provided votes and control only for the two hundred biggest stockholders. These were the famous two hundred families of France. Today control has been spread among forty thousand stockholders. They have two direct representatives; the Government has four and various economic organizations have twelve. In this way we have established community control rather than Government control."

Now what does all this mean?

It means that new and younger blood is dominating one of the three great democracies left in the world. Half the members of the present French Chamber are under forty years of age. It means that a French Socialist in power is just about as conservative as a British Liberal out of power. He is the political blood-brother of the New Deal Democrat. A new spirit is alive in France, but it is the spirit of reform. Nor must one ever forget that while French extremism centers in Paris the Popular Front Government derives its real strength from the Provinces. Of sixty Communist Deputies, fifty-five are

from Paris; of twenty Fascist Deputies eighteen are from Paris. The Popular Front Government on the other hand gets the great mass of its votes from the workers of the North and the farmers of the South.

French foreign policy has been in keeping with the moderate tendencies of those in power. A Popular Front Government had been attacked in Spain, and it might have seemed only natural that its sister government in France would come to its rescue. Yet, while Italy and Germany sent troops and munitions to Franco in Spain, France, responding to pressure from Britain's pro-rebel Government, kept the original neutrality agreement until it had become a farce. She refused to follow Soviet leadership and aligned herself with Conservative England, not with the legitimate Government of Spain. When the first neutrality agreement cracked up, she launched and developed the Non-Intervention Pact. While Italy was still sending troops into Spain, the Chamber of Deputies passed a law prohibiting the enlistment of volunteers in the Spanish struggle. The Popular Front Government arrested volunteers of other nations who attempted to cross the border to Spain. Even the Communists, who organized parades of protest against the ban on volunteers when it was first proposed, failed to vote against it in the Chamber of Deputies. Even though non-intervention has broken down, France will be found on the side of peace until and unless the Fascist powers make peace impossible.

Thus it is clear that the Popular Front in France under Radical Socialist Premier Chautemps as under Socialist Premier Blum, stands for peace abroad and rehabilitation and reform at home. Like the conservative pre-war French Governments, she has an alliance with Russia, but she is a better friend of democratic England, and closer in spirit and in policy to democratic America.

OUTLOOK: The Popular Front Cabinet under Léon Blum gave France the most stable government it has had in years. During its year in office it weathered an industrial revolution, the continuing Spanish crisis, and the second devaluation of the franc. This is worse than three Stavisky scandals one of which sufficed to bring on a semi-

dictatorship under the late "Papa" Doumergue in 1934. Now that the Government has moved slightly to the right under Chautemps, there is still ground for hope of greater Cabinet stability than marked the period from June 1932 to February 1934 when seven ministries succeeded one another. Even when Blum was voted out it only meant less power for the Communists and Socialists but no more power for the Fascists. The Popular Front has given France a stable interlude, a much-needed overhauling of labor relations, and an opportunity to take away from her two hundred economic royalists some part of their overweening power.

Many difficulties lie ahead. While he was American Ambassador, Finance Minister Bonnet told us France is ready to discuss war debts. Discuss them perhaps but not pay them. France is in no position to effect transfers. Her internal debt is around 350 billion francs. About \$400 per capita against \$275 in the United States. Interest consumes over one-third of the Government income. Foreign trade is about one-half what it was in 1931 and there has been an unfavorable balance of trade for a decade. In 1936 French imports totalled twenty-five billion francs against exports of only fifteen billions. Progress in recovery will help France as it is helping the rest of the world. If the much-delayed Paris Fair — the workers didn't hurry for fear their jobs would end — turns out to be as popular as its predecessors, that too will help. But Premier Chautemps' economic and financial problems are almost as serious as those which Poincaré partly solved and partly postponed when he became the "savior of the franc". Finance Minister Bonnet refused to join the Chautemps Cabinet until assured of power to devalue the franc again and to increase Government income by new taxes and charges. But it is well to remember that financially the French are never as badly off as they appear to be. A country that saves and that does not buy luxuries on the instalment plan always has hidden resources.

In foreign affairs France is strong, at least against attack. Britain and Russia have separately assured her against German aggressions. The British Government diminished the force of its guarantee when it informed Premier Blum in 1936 that France must forego its legal right to sell arms to the Spanish Government, otherwise if Germany and Italy took reprisals against France the Locarno guarantee would

not come into operation. But this statement came at a time when Britain had hopes of getting something from Mussolini. Since then France and Britain have drawn more closely together. The logic of events links the democratic as well as the Fascist powers and with that alignment France is secure.

9. STRIKE!

FOCAL POINT: John L. Lewis is the moving center of the labor whirlwind which is sweeping over the American continent in 1937. This leader, born of Welsh parents in Lucas, Iowa, raised in the tough, hard environment of the coal mines and small-time union locals, roughed his way to leadership of the United Mine Workers, America's largest labor organization. To run this union in the face of perpetual splits and revolts, took the realistic shrewdness of a trader plus the demagogic tricks of a popular orator. With his shock of iron-gray hair, his heavy, grizzled eyebrows, and his powerful frame, Lewis looks like a human gorilla transformed into a statesman of labor. He married a school teacher who infected him with culture so that his talks are sometimes graced with literary rhetoric. It was with 1933's NRA, that Lewis emerged from the Tammany Hall of union politics into the national arena. He wrote Section 7-A of the Recovery Act, drove it through Congress and confirmed it in practice by a gigantic Mine Workers' Union campaign. The future of American labor is for the moment inseparable from the future of John L. Lewis. If, in 1940, American labor for the first time in history, decides a national election, John Lewis, who would rather make a President than be one, will achieve his ambition.

BACKGROUND: In June of last year the Blum government in France was welcomed into power by a mass of sit-down strikes. A little more than six months later a rash of sit-down strikes met the Roosevelt administration, which had emerged decisively victorious from the November elections. The General Motors strike in Flint, Michigan, touched off a host of strikes, first in the state of Michigan itself, and eventually in the whole of America. These strikes, an ocean apart, were strikingly and significantly similar both in timing and in method.

In the first place, they represented the determination on the part of the working class to take its share of the fruits of electoral victory. The working class in France put Blum in office. In America the C. I. O. contributed something, we cannot tell how much, to the Democratic sweep. In cash, the United Mine Workers' Union, contributed \$400,000 to the Roosevelt campaign chest. At any rate, the workers of France and America used the sit-down strike to indicate to their Governments that they expected a return on their investment. The strikes were shrewdly timed to exact that return. Both Governments were caught in a honeymoon mood, and, as we all know, bickering and ingratitude are distinctly out of order in the honeymoon period.

In the second place, a new method, a new kind of ammunition, was introduced into labor warfare. The sit-down strike had been tried by French cathedral builders centuries ago, and by small groups in the Akron rubber plants, but it had its real large-scale initiation in France last June. There has been a great deal of debate this year as to whether the sit-down strike was legal or illegal. The anti-sit-down faction asserted that this form of strike was illegal because it took possession of the property of an individual or a corporation without due process of law. The advocates of the sit-down technique countered by saying that the worker's labor gave him a certain vested interest in his job and therefore, by contiguity, in the property on which he worked. The courts denied the legality of this claim. But though illegal, there is no doubt that as a strike technique the sit-down is efficient so long as public opinion is willing to tolerate it. In four ways, it is advantageous to the strikers: it enables an aggressive minority to tie up a plant; it places the burden of violence on the employer and public authorities on the theory that possession is nine points of the law; it gives strike leaders complete control of strikers; and it prevents operation of plants by non-strikers. In another way — from the humanitarian standpoint, the sit-down strike may be considered desirable since by keeping the workers together within the plant, it tends to prevent friction and bloodshed. However regarded, the sit-down strike is a discovery in the field of labor tactics. The workers of America were delighted with its novelty; and they played with it as enthusiastically and carelessly as a child with a new toy. The freedom with which they used it after agreements had been

made, soon provided employers with an argument against signing C. I. O. contracts.

In still a third way, the early strikes in France and America resembled each other. They were both successful. The Chamber of Deputies of France voted the forty hour week and vacations with pay; while the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Wagner Labor Act. In both countries trade union organization was tremendously accelerated. Trade unions sprouted overnight in France, and in America the C. I. O. swept the automobile and the steel industry, and made inroads in textiles, rubber and many other fields. Its first set-back came in the 1937 steel strike. Public opinion in the smaller steel towns turned against the C. I. O. when its pickets used or threatened force to keep non-strikers out of the plants. Governor Davey of Ohio lost sympathy with the strikers and achieved widespread popularity with the public by his declaration that the right to work is as sacred as the right to strike. After that the Ohio militia prevented C. I. O. pickets from interfering with men who returned to work.

Nothing like the C. I. O. has ever happened to American labor. In its efficiency and energy it is unparalleled in American labor history. The only labor movement comparable to it in vitality was the much more radical I. W. W. The I. W. W., however, was too violent to make any decisive dent on the great mass of American workers. It was confined geographically to the far West, for the most part to rural, unpopulated districts; and it took no account of the great mass industries of this country, which center in the Eastern cities.

The American Federation of Labor, on the other hand, has always been too conservative, too apathetic, and too exclusively concerned with skilled artisans, the aristocrats of labor, to deal effectively with the broader organization problems of American labor today. Its basic principle is horizontal unionism. Its personnel has largely consisted of small, mutually jealous, loosely-federated unions of skilled, highly paid craft workers, topped by an entrenched and somewhat parasitic bureaucracy. Since American industry has technologically progressed to the point where skilled individual craftsmanship has been replaced rather generally by unskilled mass production labor, such an organization as the A. F. of L. can only

encompass and provide for a small proportion of American workers. Historically, the A. F. of L. has been callously neglectful of the great mass of workers, and has contented itself with organizing those men who are best able to defend themselves.

When John L. Lewis, who headed one of the few industrial unions in the A. F. of L., the United Mine Workers of America, undertook to organize the lower two-thirds of the working mass of this country, the common workers who had nothing to sell but their labor, he sounded a tocsin in the ears of the old-line labor leaders. He made it his business to organize and to protect not only the well paid craftsmen, but all the men in any particular industry, aristocrats and plebeians together. As always happens, the aristocrats resented being lumped with the plebeians, and the A. F. of L. split wide open, the C. I. O. unions were expelled, and an intra-mural battle in the labor movement was on. Today the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. are working in competition with each other to organize the automobile and the steel industries, but the C. I. O. has the jump on the parent organization. Perhaps it has moved too fast but John Lewis has the happy faculty of correcting a mistake before it is too late. He has a realistic picture of the nature and stratification of American, twentieth century industry, and he has surrounded himself with young and aggressive leadership. During the Michigan automobile strikes, John L. Lewis called William Green, President of the A. F. of L., an "old lady with a wooden leg," and the epithet was not without relevance. Lewis and his henchmen, Homer Martin, Frankensteen of Detroit, Philip Murray, are "new men." Efficient, intelligent, vigorous, educated, they have very little in common with the old-fashioned, well-padded, demagogic labor leaders.

The sit-down strike seemed to be the ideal weapon for John L. Lewis in his organization drive, and it fell opportunely to his hand. The sit-down strike would be utterly ineffectual unless it closed down an entire plant, and therefore only a plant or industrial union could properly use it. The fact that it was used indiscriminately by A. F. of L. and C. I. O. unions, craft and industrial unions, only proves that American workers did not understand its nature. The American public was even more ill-informed than the labor movement itself, and what was more, it was frightened and therefore angry. All the old names have been hauled out of the bag against the sit-down

strikers and the C. I. O. Father Coughlin went back on the air to tell the American people that the United Automobile Workers of America were smeared with Communism, and many industrialists throughout the country privately agreed with him on this, if on no other point. Yet anyone who assumes that the labor organization movement headed by John Lewis is red, radical or un-American is making a very unrealistic approach to an important issue. Personal inquiry on a trip through the Middle West during the epidemic of sit-down strikes convinced me that we are experiencing an altogether normal and probably inevitable development of American labor organization. It is to the credit of both workers and employers that there has been comparatively little violence, for which they are responsible.

I was in Flint during the General Motors strike. This was the first major sit-down strike of America, and, in a sense, it set the tone for the successive strikes it germinated. It is easy enough to have pat opinions about sit-downs or anything else at a distance; but those who deal with these sit-downs — employees, workers, families, public authorities — are compelled to translate them into human terms. It was on these terms that I saw the strike, and moved about in it. I should like to recreate this strike, which was the archetype of all the sit-downs of 1937, to make clear what its nature was — what human situations it engendered:

When I arrived, Flint was tense. You cheered for the strikers or you hated them. Flint has 165,000 inhabitants, of whom 42,000 are General Motors employees, so the strike concerned everybody.

No city buses were running. The drivers were on strike against the transportation company. But the Flint streets were full of automobiles bearing signs "Courtesy Car."

"I work in the Buick plant," my driver explained. "It had to close down because of the strike in the Fisher Body plants."

"How are things in Buick?"

"All right. I have a pretty tough job lifting heavy metal but the pay is good."

"Any labor trouble?"

"Not much. We have had the Workers Council System ever since NRA. That irons out a lot of trouble."

A sound truck swung into South Saginaw Street, preceded and

followed by half a dozen cars carrying strike guards. The two loud speakers on the truck blared:

“When a scab dies he goes to Hell,
The rats and skunks all ring the bell,
Hinky-dinky par-ley-vous”

Using sound trucks was new strike technique, introduced by the Automobile Workers of America. Strike leaders barked orders and appeals half a mile in all directions. Whenever the police heard the song “To Hell with Scabs” they thought it had personal application.

“That sound truck has raised hell with the police,” said Joseph R. Joseph, Flint prosecutor. “How would it make you feel to have that thing bellowing jeers at you every day? I blame that sound truck for our first bloody riot. We may have to stop it.” When the National Guard took over the Flint area, the first thing they did was to ban the truck.

“How do Flint people feel about the strike?”

“I don’t know,” the young prosecutor replied. “When I go to the Elks Club for luncheon everybody is against the strikers. When I go down to my uncle’s place — he runs a restaurant near the Fisher Body plant — everybody is for the strikers.

“I wish we could get help from the National Guard. Bloody riot may break out at the plants any time. The few Flint police are helpless. Colonel Lewis, the Guard Commander, tells me he won’t interfere until after a riot begins. By the time he gets his men down there, it may be too late.”

“My orders are not to take sides,” Colonel Lewis explained when interrupted at a staff conference in his Durant Hotel headquarters. “Our mission here in Flint is to protect life and property should the situation develop to the point where civil law enforcement agencies cannot do so. Unless and until such a situation develops our task is that of mere watchful waiting.”

“But, Colonel, suppose the Flint Alliance carried out its threat to marshal its members to clear out the sit-down strikers? Would you wait until the fight begins?”

“That situation will be met when it arises,” the suave and diplomatic Colonel replied.

His guardsmen were not happy in Flint. They were closely con-

fined and their sympathies were divided. Armory-printed newspapers, home-talent shows, and generous treatment help develop patience.

The Flint Alliance, called the Company or Stooge Union by the strikers, an organization of General Motors employees who wanted to get back to work, had membership headquarters in an empty store at 221 South Saginaw Street and a high powered publicity office in the Durant Hotel. The Alliance representative claimed enrollment of 15,000 — 12,000 General Motors workers and 3,000 Flint business men. He guessed that the American Automobile Workers Union might have from 2,000 to 6,000 members.

The Buick division of General Motors was not on strike at the time. I talked to Harlow H. Curtice, its president, who said his chief concern was to provide work for men who need and want it.

"How are wages?"

"Buick workers averaged \$147 a month in 1936."

"Isn't the work hard?"

"Not too hard. We have 500 men over sixty years old. During a recent busy spell we put on boys fresh out of high school. They were able to do the work and they earned ninety cents an hour. This charge that we only employ young men is nonsense. Out of 17,000 people on the Buick payrolls about 10,000 are under forty and 7,000 over, which seems a reasonable ratio."

President Curtice was proud of the Works Council system of labor relations at Buick. Henry N. S. Bierre, a competent mechanic of Danish ancestry, had been chairman of the Buick Works Council for some time. He said:

"We established this system at Buick under a labor board election, in which the American Federation of Labor Union and the Automobile Workers Union and the Company Union all got only a small percentage of the vote. Since NRA went out we have maintained the system voluntarily. We have a board of seventeen members that handles complaints. We have semi-monthly meetings with the management, at which we work out points we can't settle. We adjusted four thousand complaints last year. They deal with all sorts of things, discrimination by foremen, balancing the work of day shift and night shift,

working conditions, discharges. The men in this plant are well treated and are satisfied."

Most of them may have been satisfied, but there was always a minority. Here's what one Buick worker said:

"The trouble is that no one around this plant has guts enough to go further than this worse-than-useless Works Council. What are we afraid of? Our jobs. Don't forget that job-cutting, the bonus system, and coercion are all a part of the Works Council plan. The seventeen members of the Council keep the management informed about the morale of the workers. That makes it easy to eliminate so-called radicals and agitators. Of course, they don't often fire them. What they do is to lay them off and forget about them, or else they keep laying them off, even during the rush time, for one or two weeks throughout the season. The idea is to make the man sore so that he will quit."

Inside Fisher Body Plant No. 1 sit-down striking seemed something of a lark. The strikers were all young, with a high average of intelligence. Their organization was excellent. Sentinels and pickets relieved each other in three-hour shifts. They were summoned to duty over a loud speaker system. Every guard had a nice home-made policeman's club, manufactured on Fisher lathes. Some were wound with decorative leather strips. Miniature clubs were turned out as souvenir watch fobs. Ping-pong was a favorite game. It alternated as a pastime with classes in public speaking and parliamentary law.

Burdine Simons, Chairman of the Strike Committee of Fisher Body Plant No. 1, conducted a strike-leaders' meeting for my benefit. A dozen men contributed answers to questions.

"Are you satisfied with your pay?"

"The pay is all right, except that it only continues for nine months in the year and the cost of living is just as high during the three months that we don't work.

"What we object to is the speed of the conveyor system. We are all worn out when we get home at night, not good for anything except eat and sleep. It has gotten so you can't even leave the line for a hundred-foot trip to the water faucet. If the pitcher isn't right beside you, you haven't got enough time to get a drink."

"Don't you know that the sit-down strike is illegal?"

"It is not. The Company ordered us into the plants. All we do is to stay in. We are not trespassing. We are sitting on our jobs."

"Isn't it funny," another leader chimed in, "in 1934 the Company would not negotiate until we came back into the plants. Now they refuse to negotiate until we get out."

"What is your chief demand?"

"Real collective bargaining."

"What about the charge that you are radicals?"

"Apple sauce. We wouldn't even let a radical newspaper come into the plant until after an hour's discussion in which we decided that a man had the right to read the *Daily Worker* if he wanted to."

"Why did you start the strike so soon?"

"Because the Company started to move out the dies. They were going to take the dies to Pontiac and manufacture bodies up there. That would have left us flat."

Company representatives called this statement absurd. President Curtice of Buick insisted that it would take several months to transfer the heavy stamping machines needed to make bodies. But the strikers went right on singing to the tune of *The Martins and the Coys*:

"Now this strike it started one bright Wednesday evening
When they loaded up a box car full of dies
When the Union boys they stopped them
And the railroad workers backed them
The officials in the office were surprised."

"How many men have you got lined up?"

Chairman Burdine Simons answered, "Out of 7,400 workers we had eighty-eight percent signed up when the strike began, and we have a good many more now."

This figure flatly contradicted those given at the office of the Flint Alliance. One explanation may have been that many men have signed both Union and Flint Alliance applications. It would have been easy to do. Then they were on the inside no matter who won.

After an hour of cross-examination, the strike leaders wanted autographs. They were proud of the neat way in which everything around the plant was organized.

Flint was full of outsiders, Union leaders and Union members from

other cities, men who looked like detectives, members of strong-arm squads, strikebreakers, idle men of all sorts wandered through the streets. Fearing to cause trouble, Flint's only radio station WFDF refused to give time to either side in the strike, but the Union succeeded in getting some strike news on a small Detroit station.

The editor of the Flint Journal showed visitors a four-pound steel door hinge which he said had become a favorite strike weapon. Inside the Fisher Body plant, tables piled high with these hinges were conveniently located near doors and windows ready to be used. Fire hose and chemical extinguishers were also ready.

As always in any kind of war, the women had to bear the brunt, but the strikers' wives were with their men. Wearing red berets and arm bands they paraded, cooked and delivered food, and reported for every kind of strike duty.

Here is the comment of an intelligent young mother of two children:

"Our whole objective is to live good, clean lives and to raise our little family to become useful citizens. It is so heart-breaking to read everywhere that we are Communists. The strikers are called law violators. Go back and consider the world-famous Boston Tea Party. The Colonists confiscated property that was not lawfully theirs. They objected to the unfair advantage of those with power. The situation is similar in the General Motors plants, only the men are not confiscating anything."

"The strikers do want to work. It is just that they have started this thing, that has so quickly grown to such staggering proportions. They will use violence only as a means of self-preservation. That's no more than any man would do. They are fighting for the right to be heard."

That was Flint. Later in March, I was in Detroit when the town was tied up by all the little strikes that came on the heels of the General Motors trouble. All through the Middle West there had been strike talk and Detroit itself was a beleaguered city. I went to have a look at the Woolworth strike everyone was talking about. There the Waiters' and Waitresses' Union in control was an A. F. of L. unit, but the spirit was much the same as it had been in Flint.

I was struck by the businesslike way in which that Woolworth

store strike was handled and with the quality of the union personnel. I must confess to a certain uncomfortable feeling of trespass on someone else's property when I entered the Woolworth store with a pass from the labor union which was holding it. Yet, after talking with the Woolworth girls, my human sympathies were with them. Their pay was small, and their work was hard. A forty-eight hour week is not an easy stint for girls from 17 to 19. Most of them lived at home. Many were high school graduates. Two weeks before the strike none of them had known anything about unionism or collective bargaining. Yet a few days of living together and fighting together for a common cause had imbued them with an amazing sense of solidarity.

"Won't they let you go home to see your parents?" I asked one youngster. "Oh, yes," she said, "my sister was sick and I went home to see her. But I didn't feel comfortable while I was away."

"Why not?"

"Well, it seemed to me I was letting the rest of the girls down by not sticking with them."

That was a concrete demonstration of one of the advantages of the sit-down technique from the union's point of view. If these girls had gone home they could not have been held together. The store could have been reopened with others. More union spirit can be built in one week among sit-downers than in months of individual work on the outside.

The Waiters' and Waitresses' Union had imported the Flint's sit-down strikers' song sheets. By changing a few words, they had simply adopted them. The girls sang them better than the men I had heard sing them in Flint.

The strike chairman, a pleasant-faced girl in the middle twenties, was nonplussed when asked what they would do if the police secured an eviction order. A hardboiled strike leader would have replied, "They'll have to carry us out by force." But this girl had not even considered such a possibility. She looked doubtfully at the man from union headquarters, then answered honestly, "I don't know." But the issue never arose. The day after my visit the store management and the union agreed upon a sensible compromise settlement.

In spite of the Father Coughlins, I found on that trip through a strike-bound Middle West, through harried Michigan, Ohio, and

Illinois, that there were a few outstanding business men who, like the strikers themselves, sensed that they are living in a new industrial world in which the labor union is a necessary and living element. Though they frowned on the sit-down strike as lawless and undisciplined which it often is, they were willing at least to accept the labor union, and to work with it.

New Deal officeholders, national and local, conscious of being labor's political debtors, were playing a new *rôle* as arbitrators. Ten years ago Governor Murphy, faced with the sit-down strikes, would have called out the troops. With the hearty cooperation of the Department of Labor, martial law would have been declared to keep the peace and break the strikes. Riot guns would have been used with enthusiasm. Blood would have run in Flint and Detroit. Down in Anderson, Indiana, the authorities took such a vigorous, law abiding, reactionary stand, and three men were shot. With this bloody exception, a hands-off policy was followed by the authorities during the early sit-down strikes, a policy that seems, in the light of history, practically revolutionary. In a genuinely exasperating situation, with employers and employees at sullen stalemate, with plants occupied, all business suspended and public opinion making itself angrily heard, the arbitrators were obliged to exercise unparalleled patience. The automobile strikes were making history.

Eventually, the strikes were settled. The union got recognition, but not sole bargaining rights. Yet with even this concession, the C. I. O. drive shot forward. There was a rush to join the United Automobile Workers. Then, not a month after the settlement of the Chrysler strike, the Supreme Court upheld the Wagner Labor Act, thus giving the C. I. O. drive the hallmark of respectability. The right to collective bargaining became the law of the land. The Justices, who had been so bitterly and unfairly criticized, whom Mr. Roosevelt would have railroaded off the bench, showed in these and other decisions, that they were not insensitive to changes in the economic temper and texture of society. Their response to the new conditions may have been slow in coming — final judicial decisions must not be hasty — but it was, in the end, correct.

With the favorable decision on the Wagner Labor Act, the industrial organization drive gained speed. For a year the country had been waiting for the C. I. O. to attack the steel industry; and when

the automobile strikes were concluded, everyone knew it was steel's turn next. But U. S. Steel employing 225,000 out of 570,000 steel workers anticipated the Wagner Labor Act decision and sidestepped a strike by voluntarily signing with the C. I. O. in March. Jones and Laughlin, the second largest steel company, questioned the union's claim to a majority membership among its workers, and held an election under the Wagner Labor Act. The union won an easy victory. The Company accepted the result in a cooperative spirit, and the C. I. O. union was named sole bargaining agent for all the workers.

Three of the smaller companies, Republic, Inland, and Youngstown Steel and Tube refused to yield. They agreed to match the union's wage and hour scale, but would not sign a union contract. Strikes followed. The Republic Steel Company headed by the intransigent Tom Girdler continued to operate. Youngstown Steel and Inland Tube first closed down its plants and reopened them later under protection of the National Guard. The C. I. O.'s weakness in this situation was its vain effort to keep closed, plants where it had signed up less than a majority of the workers. It tried to do too much too soon.

Ten lives were lost in a clash between pickets and police in South Chicago at the Republic Steel Plant early in the strike. An insufficient and therefore trigger-conscious police force was partly responsible for these fatalities. The moving picture record of this bloody episode did not speak well for the Chicago police. This battle was the third at the Republic steel plant. The President's Mediation Board set up in June failed to settle the strike largely because Tom Girdler refused to sign any contract with the "irresponsible" C. I. O. The strike will in time be settled. Compromise is inevitable.

In the meantime, the C. I. O. drive has slowed down. It probably was moving too rapidly for its own good. Henry Ford refuses to make agreements with the Lewis organization and has the majority of Ford workers on his side, at least for the time being. The first clash took place outside the Ford plant at Dearborn and led to a protracted investigation. In April Henry Ford said, "I will never recognize the U. A. W. or any other union," but sooner or later the power of responsible industrial unionism will win out. The C. I. O. drive is on in textiles and rubber. White collar workers have marched their

unions out of the A. F. of L. to climb on the Lewis bandwagon. This was done by the Newspaper Guild. When it asked for the closed shop it encountered the united resistance of the publishers. A. F. of L. President Green promised his lieutenants at a meeting in Cincinnati an aggressive campaign for new members under the Wagner Labor Act; but Green's form of trade unionism is essentially as superannuated as Ford's anti-unionism. The forces of history are with Lewis.

His chief problem today is to develop competent responsible leadership. If too many unions get out of hand, if contracts are made only to be broken, if easy success makes him and his associates too arrogant, labor gains may be transformed into labor losses. The experience of the steel strike should give him a valuable lesson.

OUTLOOK: The Roosevelt Administration has done and is doing more for organized labor than any of its predecessors. It is as much of a Labor Government as Ramsay MacDonald's was in England. By enforcing compulsory collective bargaining it has given union labor a new and advanced status. All over the country old unions are growing and new unions are forming. There is every indication that we will soon have 10,000,000 labor union members in the United States. Can and will the unions meet these new responsibilities? If their leadership is unequal to the task some succeeding administration may undo what has been done. The general strike in England resulted in laws restricting the right to strike. An abuse of labor union power here will bring about the same results. If labor unions are wise they will not seek to escape legal responsibility. This is sure to come in one form or another so it behooves the unions to help bring it about in that form which is least objectionable to them. Senator Vandenberg's proposed amendments to the Wagner Labor Act provide, as he suggests, a basis for discussion.

Incorporation of labor unions is not the panacea which many persons assume it to be. Far more important is the enforcement of publicity on union membership, management and finances. The relation of labor unions to political campaigns deserves the most careful consideration, particularly the use of union funds for political purposes. It is not impossible to imagine some future La Follette Com-

mittee exposing the racketeers of labor in the same way in which the present Committee has exposed the nefarious practices of some employers. Until 1941 the labor unions of the United States will be operating under a Government that sympathizes with their purposes. If they will use that period not only to grow strong but also to develop that sense of public responsibility which they have sometimes lacked, they can help eliminate some of the worst evils of the capitalist system. The wisely-managed labor union is the best safeguard against unsound radicalism in an industrial society.

10. ROOSEVELT: MAN OF ACTION

FOCAL POINT: *The White House.* The white-porticoed mansion on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D. C., which houses the President of the United States, is generally described as an "imposing" edifice. It represents, at the same time, an architectural character which is as varied and comprehensive and inexplicable as the indefatigable administration under its roof. Constructed 140 years ago of Virginia freestone, the sub-soil rock of that staunchly Democratic state, it has been extensively remodeled and enlarged. The most recent addition of an entire wing still leaves it inadequate to the needs of the administrative organism which performs the most important functions and which has assumed almost all responsibility for federal government. Its personnel has increased to approximately 175 members so that The White House is today more like an administrative power-house than a residence. It is the nerve center of that superabundant vitality which, under the name and leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, has impressed itself broadly and intimately on the lives of 130,000,000 people. If the domed edifice down at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue has become somewhat of an annex to The White House, it is because the present occupant's executive offices are more efficient than those in the legislative Capitol. As the President's acquisitive eye turns from the white dome on the hill, roams fondly past the resplendent memorials to Washington and Lincoln, and finally settles on the Supreme Court, The White House is at once the metronome and tuning fork of this vibrant machine which he has designed to do his bidding. The nucleus of the machine is the five-member secretariat which oils the wheels of legislation and keeps grease in the gears of bureaucracy. Trusted operators of the nation's most strategic switchboard, these five are more important to the President than any twenty-five legislators,

more helpful than fifteen brain-trusters, more friendly than the five liberal justices, more loyal than the ten members of an unusually loyal Cabinet. They are: Marguerite Le Hand, his personal secretary; son James, his personal ambassador; Marvin McIntyre, the regime's executive secretary, who handles contacts; Stephen Early, in charge of press, public relations, and "popular enlightenment"; and finally the ever-sedate veteran Rudolph Forster, in charge of the "machine's" operation, who serves as the little Capitol's office manager.

BACKGROUND: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the thirty-second President of the United States, has more power today than any of the other thirty-one ever had. The reasons are obvious: he is the most aggressive, the most demanding and perhaps the most energetic Chief Executive in the nation's history. He is one of the very few who could even be suspected of wanting a third term. He is preeminently a man of action.

Profoundly convinced that what he seeks to do is for the common good, and his own ready confidence bolstered by the more fanatical of his adherents, he has become more eagerly absorbed in the achieving of his many ends than any recent incumbent of The White House. And yet, with all his grants of power, he is far from satisfied. Wanting, with a most indecent haste to get things done "now," pride and policy lead him pell-mell forward on the road to his self-ordained destiny. He brushes aside such doubts and scruples as have been raised by the opposition forces, he decides quickly, sometimes wrongly, particularly when snap-judgment precedes consultation — and withal, takes his responsibilities more lightly than most of his predecessors. He works with a speed and determination for longer hours on end than most corporation executives could endure, rarely permitting ill-temper or fatigue to mar his zest for labor. His sincere devotion to the welfare of the common man, his urbanity and friendliness, his genuine personal democracy — all these essential characteristics are the very opposite from those we associate with the man of supreme powers, the dictator. Yet, he enjoys the exercise of power and asks for more.

It is this man of action, none can doubt, who was so overwhelm-

ingly reelected to his high executive power in 1936 — to assume for another four years the duties and responsibilities of his office. During his first term he had received as much cooperation from the electorate and their legislative representatives as any president has ever had.

Nor was this vote of confidence rendered grudgingly. It came with a burst of enthusiasm for the man under whose leadership we had achieved economic recovery. His promise of further social progress appeared, to a people that had been sick from anxiety, depression and deprivation, a people determined that many of the older methods must go, to make way for a better balanced program of federal management which would insure the country against the hazards of the previous *laissez-faire* regimes. Perhaps neither the President nor the people paused long enough to interpret this mandate quite thoroughly. If the people were slightly vague as to just what should be done at Washington, here was a man who knew, or thought he knew.

From the very first his self-assurance was convincing, nearly blinding, with the great white light of promise it shed over the vast surrounding gloom. The basis of his tremendous personal popularity still dates from that first flush of optimism with which he swept all the cobwebs out of his way as he passed triumphantly down Pennsylvania Avenue to his inauguration. I know from my own experience that the impression he made upon the throngs that day was enough to hold many of them in the palm of his hand for years to come. At that first inaugural he seemed, veritably, the answer to a hundred million prayers. The few words he uttered on that memorable occasion endeared him to the hearts of liberals the country over, more intimately, than any president but Lincoln had ever achieved. His first inaugural crystallized the force of his personality in the minds of the few thousand who heard and saw him and the many millions who listened by radio or watched the press for some word of hope. The four seconds which it took him to utter the words: "The only thing we need to fear is fear itself," almost sufficed to change American psychology from despair to hope.

There is no mistaking what that expression of his innermost conviction did for the country as a whole. I remember minutely its effect on the people. I remember its effect on me. I was right behind

him in the procession that day in a short wave transmitter car with a microphone in my lap, reporting the ceremonies as they unfolded before and around me. For the first hour my comments had been confined to giving the radio audience a picture of the throng that lined the avenue, the movement of the presidential motorcade, the personal ovation manifest everywhere, but with no editorial comment. I was kept more than busy by a straight reportorial job of transmitting some of the color and sweep of that memorable occasion.

But the impression this inaugural address made on me was instantly evident, I have since learned, to the millions of listeners that day. Hardly conscious of the transition, I soon discovered that my running comment into my portable microphone was largely absorbed with a tribute to this tremendous personality of President Roosevelt, to the breadth of this mind, to the generous sweep of this positive optimistic personality which was to become the most positive factor in American affairs our country had produced since the war. I don't know whether I succeeded in conveying the depth of the impression he made upon me then. I remember clearly, though, as I look back to that day, the contrast between the orator who succeeded in banishing a nation's fear complex with the man who sits complacently on his superimposed throne today.

If he appears to me to be a different man, I would maintain nevertheless that it is only his own experience which has changed him. Walter Lippman agrees with me that the change began in the summer of 1935. He has persevered indefatigably toward further and further democratic objectives. His basic convictions have not changed, in spite of conspicuous successes and equally conspicuous failures. My belief is that he lacks the moderation that belongs to greatness, and the high ethic principles that are a part of mature wisdom. Thus, to achieve his wholly creditable and unselfish aims, he violates the very democratic means to which he pledged himself.

President Roosevelt may become a tragic figure in history. His own ambition may be his own undoing. His greatness lies in his ambition; his value to his political party lies in his enthusiasm; but his enthusiasm has no method, no balance; it provides a vital impulse, but has no sense of discrimination. Imbued with blind devotion he rushes in, where fools would quite wisely fear to tread. It may be, when we come to review his two terms of office some years hence, that

we will find this period in American history as perverse as President Roosevelt is himself. The pity will be that so much time will have been wasted. He has sowed the seeds of progress, and certain of his social advances will have made real headway, but we will find, too, that the same indomitable zeal which pushed these measures forward caused him to waste a great deal of the nation's time and money because of his stubborn refusal to compromise with his extravagant bill of particulars. Such ups and downs of efficiency within the governmental machinery, as he has caused by the violence of his ego, have been extremely costly to business generally and to the nation's internal economy.

The obstacles that have fallen across the path of progress have been irregularities which should have been ironed out between the Executive and Legislative and Judicial bodies. Also, his stubbornness about taking unsolicited advice has been another costly obstacle. He might have had many of the provisions of the NRA in effect and in full force since 1933 if he had gone about it differently. Not until 1937 did he finally admit that NRA had tried to do too much. The same thing has held true of his projected court reforms. In that, too, he tries to do too much. President Roosevelt is fond of sweeping proposals. He is impatient of step by step procedure. He likes the dramatic appeal of the broad stroke. He sought to cure all the ills of industry with NRA — all the ills of agriculture with the AAA — all the weaknesses of administration with one comprehensive proposal. Now, he wants everything wrong with the federal courts straightened out by one new law.

He may become a tragic figure because it is often his finest enthusiasms which work against him; these, and, his love for dramatic gestures, his boyish delight in shrewd political strategy. Nothing gives him more pleasure than to put something over on those who oppose him. But this is not greatness in one who sits in the seat of the mighty.

When these various characteristics balance out against each other, he still comes off with a magnetic personality. He has the most infectious way of saying things, in spite of the fact that it is usually quite coldly calculated. His method is to win allegiance to himself on a personal basis, and having done so, allot himself such prerogatives as seem necessary. He knows a thing or two about the time element in

propaganda, as, for instance, when a certain thought can be most effectively expressed. Sometimes this enthusiasm for the *mot juste* and the wide gesture becomes a boomerang. Can he remember that utterly apt choice of words with which he first (and last) vetoed the bonus bill? "The credit of the United States," he said, "cannot ultimately be safe if we engage in a policy of yielding to each and all of the groups that are able to enforce upon Congress claims for special consideration." These words are worth recalling in these days of WPA strikes when vast Federal subsidies to anything and everything have become a vested interest.

This ability to capitalize on his contacts with the public and his chances to capture the public mind, has, of course, provided him with many of his stepping stones to greater power. By the time his second inaugural had caught up with him he knew it was time to make another intensely personal appeal. He concluded his address on that occasion with two lines from a famous ode:

"For each age is a dream that is dying,
Or one that is coming to birth."

He wants no dying dream. He wants to expedite the new dream's birth. But he might well have quoted the ode's beginning:

"We are the music makers,
And we are the dreamers of dreams."

He dreams dreams. There is no doubt about it. It is a much more accurate appraisal of his mental processes, too, than the oft-repeated but palpably ridiculous charge that he is a "dictator." He certainly has no dictator complex. Those who say so either do not know him or are poor judges of their fellowmen. It is not the amount of power given to men that makes them dictators, but the way they use it once it has been granted. And as we recall them, we must also remember that apart from these "emergency" powers the unamended Constitution itself makes our President the most powerful executive of any democratically-governed country.

Power to print and spend money was the most important royal prerogative in the days of absolute monarchs. The great battles between British kings and their parliaments were fought over the power of the purse. The House of Commons jealously maintained against the House of Lords its sole right to initiate money bills. There is probably no instance on record where the House of Com-

mons ever delegated to King or Premier the right to issue fiat money. Yet the American Congress empowered Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue three billion dollars in freshly printed paper currency at any time he wished. President Roosevelt did not ask for this power. But it was part of his strategy to permit the inflation *bloc* to vote him the right to do certain things he did not at once intend to do.

Gold, which is the measure of all monetary values, is now completely in the President's control. No one not specially licensed may own, acquire, import, export, or transport gold. Up to July 1936 we borrowed over one billion dollars just to pay for the gold we imported from Europe. The President of the United States has more than half of the world's entire stock of gold in his personal control. He can even change the value of that gold in terms of dollars if and when he likes. In April 1937 the mere rumor, that the President of the United States was thinking of changing the value of gold from \$35 an ounce to \$30 or \$25, caused a collapse of prices on stock exchanges throughout the world from which they had not recovered in July. In gold producing South Africa there was almost a panic. Back in 1934 and 1935 inflation rumors deriving from the President's power to print money, sent markets skyrocketing. Now deflation rumors related to his power to devalue gold, have the opposite effect.

Any rumor concerning the intentions of the President of the United States may have monetary implications. Any presidential announcement has immediate financial effects. When he says that the price of copper is too high, it drops. Why? Because he has the power to force the price down. Speculators in copper know that. When he tells them they have pushed the price too high, they unload and copper quotations may drop from eighteen to thirteen cents a pound.

If foreign moneys get too much out of line with ours, the President has another monetary weapon with which to reach across the seas. He controls a secret two billion dollar stabilization fund, with which he can buy or sell dollars, pounds, or francs in the money markets of the world, thereby forcing the value of foreign moneys up or down. To be sure he must compete against the British and French stabilization funds if he carries pressure too far, but since our money power is greater than theirs, they are unlikely to challenge us in the field of currency control. They remember what most Americans have long since forgotten, that the President's emergency powers include

the further devaluation of the old one hundred cent dollar from its present fifty-nine cent status down to fifty cents. This requires no reference to Congress. A presidential order can bring it about at any time.

Nor is the executive's money power confined to gold and greenbacks. He has received the authority to decree the free and unlimited coinage of silver at such ratio to gold as he deems appropriate. For a while our silver purchase policy as exercised by the Treasury under the President's control threatened to bankrupt China for the sake of pleasing a few silver state Senators. Fortunately for the silver countries we became less arbitrary in our silver policy but the President still has the power to demoralize the financial organization of any silver standard country.

Fortunately for the world's financial nerves, we are no longer messing up the money markets by playing about with Professor Warren's gold purchase theories. But lest anyone assume that the President has gone definitely conservative in a monetary way, Secretary Morgenthau reminded the Washington correspondents recently that the treasury is still on the "day-to-day" basis which was announced at the height of the emergency when we first began to play about with money.

The President's right to raise or lower tariffs also has monetary implications. For the first time in American history Congress has abdicated its control over United States tariff policy and placed a large part of it directly in the hands of the President. For the first time the executive of a democratic country has received the right to raise or lower any or all tariffs by fifty percent. The power of the State Department under the direction of the President to negotiate reciprocal trade treaties by using the President's tariff power as a bribe or threat is something new under the American sun. Under the careful guidance of Secretary of State Hull, this power has been wisely used. But it is an authority that could readily be abused. It certainly reduces the power of Congress and enhances that of the executive.

Complete control over the relief setup and the spending of relief moneys have given Franklin D. Roosevelt a type of political and economic power enjoyed by no previous American President. The millions of Americans who receive Federal relief are subject to his

decision on the conditions under which they shall be entitled to sustenance. The hours they must work, the pay they receive, have been dictated by the President of the United States to two million relief workers. He will decide how one and one half billions will be expended during the next fiscal year. It is significant, too, that despite the life-service he has rendered to economy, he fought and defeated the efforts of his own leaders in the Senate to reduce this sum. Already his will and his whim have decided the expenditure of thirteen billion dollars! At this moment millions of pathetically helpless Americans are wondering what an all-powerful American President will decide to do with them or for them. So far as they are concerned he is indeed a dictator albeit one who is beneficent. Can anyone wonder that relief has become muddled with politics? How could it be otherwise when such complete power over relief policies and expenditures is centered in one man whose political assets are handled by so shrewd a politician as James A. Farley.

The effect of a casual Rooseveltian word on security prices received striking illustration in April 1937. Everyone remembers that when President Hoover predicted things were getting better, the stock market nose-dived. Not once did he succeed in stimulating the market in the direction he wanted it to go. Things are different now.

We have a Securities and Stock Exchange Control Act which means control. Margin trading can be stopped over night. Margins are already up to fifty-five percent, and the President's say-so can put every exchange in the country on a cash-and-carry basis. If they don't like it and dare to say so the President can close the exchanges and keep them closed for ninety days. Do you wonder that when the President says civil service employees must not buy stocks on margin, speculators unload and prices fall? The next day at a press conference a newspaper man asks the President whether he intended his warning against margin speculation to apply to everybody. The President nods affirmatively and that nod sets off another wave of liquidation which tumbles prices to a three-months low. This may not be dictatorship. Perhaps Wall Street would call it presidential ticktapership.

So much for a few powers the President picked up quite casually during the emergency. There are many others related to industry and agriculture. They grow out of the vast mass of New Deal legislation

and the innumerable new agencies that have sprung up in Washington since 1933. Agriculture is still dominated from Washington under the soil conservation and other acts. The Supreme Court decisions on the Wagner Act, the Railroad Labor Act and the Minimum Wage Acts give new meaning and power to Federal legislation enlarging executive authority over every kind of business activity. The National Labor Board appointed by and controlled by the President can now supervise and frequently determine the labor policies of American business. Its tremendous new power will be evident before 1937 ends. With new authority over deposits, credits, reserves, and banking practices, the Federal Government through the President and his associates regulates and practically controls every important bank in the country.

As matters stand the President of the United States has so much power over so many things, he hasn't been physically able to exercise more than a small part of it in the short time he has had it. Every now and then someone discovers another piece of executive authority that has been forgotten. He asks for still more, but will he get it?

Congress at last is champing at the bit. The leaders on Capitol Hill are tired of being bossed. And bossed is the word. For four years White House emissaries have told them "the Boss says" or "the Boss wants." And until the President asked for the Supreme Court the invariable response was "Okay, Boss." It was the Court packing proposal, dumped on the desk of an utterly astounded Congress, which broke The White House spell. That is healthy. It means we have a definite change of air on upper Pennsylvania Avenue.

The men up on Capitol Hill have grown a little tired of the constant if subtle dictation from The White House. I have followed Mr. Roosevelt's career rather closely as reporter, editor, editorial writer, Washington correspondent and radio commentator. I have talked with him. I have caught, I think, some of the flavor of his personality and his attitude. I have had the definite impression that since his reelection he is less careful about his contacts with others. He is a little more arrogant. He was a marvelous persuader of Congress during his first administration. He never sent out orders. Often he did not use intermediaries, but would telephone himself and say to a senator, "John, won't you come down to The White House? I'd like to talk things over with you." John, very much flattered, would come

down and the President would take the trouble to explain what he had in mind. And he is a persuasive explainer!

Did he do that with reference to his Supreme Court proposal? Did he do that with reference to his complete government reorganization proposition? Did he do that with his new tax law proposals? He did not.

He had private experts work those things out and then sent the bills up to The Capitol and said: "Now, boys, pass it and don't change it. I want it exactly the way I've sent it up."

Well, the boys got a little tired of that attitude. They are going to change it.

The Supreme Court proposal will be remembered as the one that broke President Roosevelt's control of Congress. It roused resentment on the part of many of his most unselfish supporters and alienated millions of voters who had helped return him to The White House. My own editorial comment on the proposal happened to be almost the first that reached a nationwide radio audience. My listeners were keenly interested in my reaction since they knew I had been sympathetic with a majority of the President's proposals. Here is my immediate extemporized reaction to the President's plan:

"The proposal is disingenuous, because it is not frank and it is not open. It is an attempt to do something indirectly which if done directly would encounter general opposition. The President seeks to accomplish a personal purpose under the guise of a general reform. If the President had said quite frankly: 'The New Deal is being blocked by the conservative members of the Supreme Court. I hereby ask Congress for the right to appoint from three to six new members until the conservatives on the court die or resign,' that would have been a frank and courageous approach to his problem.

"My guess is that both Congress and the country would have liked that directness better. Of course, the one sound way to achieve essential reforms which are in conflict with the Constitution is to amend the Constitution. To create a new court when you don't like the decisions of the old court hardly seems to give the courts what the President in his court message calls 'their essential and constitutional place.'

"My study of the structure of our American Government, from Woodrow Wilson's textbooks and with A. Lawrence Lowell as my

Harvard teacher, has taught me that President Roosevelt's proposal is a direct attack upon our traditional balance of power. Under our governmental system, the Supreme Court is a check upon both the President and the Congress. When a President finds that check effective, and works to get around it, by changing the composition of the Supreme Court, he violates both the spirit and the purpose of the American system of government."

The enthusiastic reactions to this simple statement proved to me how deeply the American people had been stirred by the President's attack on judicial independence.

An amendment to the Constitution was only one of many counter-proposals offered to the President. Every time the answer came back No. He insisted on all or nothing. The public has not been completely informed on the various stages of the controversy, beyond learning that emissaries have been running back and forth between The White House and Congress. Senate opposition soon stiffened. The hearings before the Judiciary Committee did not help the President. The Committee finally voted 10 to 8 against the proposal. The conflict soon became a matter of letting the President have his own way or going without a summer holiday. Congress decided to forego vacation. And with every passing week it became more evident that for the first time in President Roosevelt's administration the country was facing an issue in which public opinion and Congress stood on one side and the President on the other. There was a new flurry of interest when Justice VanDevanter announced his retirement, but the President made it evident that even a Court with six liberals and three conservatives could not be considered safe, since it might declare some of his new laws unconstitutional.

Only during the third week in May of this year was the President's mind more fully revealed. Out from The White House blew a new NRA. The gesture was in many respects a defiance of all those who had endorsed the unanimous Supreme Court decision invalidating the first NRA. Here, as expressed so tangibly and clearly in the concurring opinion of that eminent liberal, Justice Cardozo, the matter of the relationship between the three branches of the federal government had been brought out squarely into the open.

It was not a matter of social legislation being supported and contested respectively by opposing groups of citizens. It was an Execu-

tive proposal which, in effect, took a large part of the Government of the United States and handed it over to a bureaucracy of commissions and commissioners, complete with legislative, judicial and prohibitive authority, to small appointee boards with no responsibility to the electorate, and subject exclusively to the personal pleasure of the Chief Executive.

This was no longer a matter of securing better living conditions for a great mass of people. That was, in all honesty, its sponsor's motive, but such a broad program was not only palpably impossible within the framework of a single statute, but departed from the general plan of government under which we have lived for the past 150 years.

The President, who has not lost sight of his original purpose, has developed a new technique of belligerence. The newest proposal contains the ironic admission that the whole basis of federal regulation of hours, wages and prices was something that could not be reduced to the cold and even terms of federal law, however easy a way it may have appeared in theory. The new plan provides a general forty cent an hour wage and a forty hour week for every important industry and business, regardless of territorial development, geography, prevailing conditions or other variables with only such exceptions as a board of five appointees sees fit to provide. This same commission of supermen is to retain the entire administration of the new code, its regulations, organization and enforcement. The proposal suggests, in other words, that the same regimentation which broke down completely as too big a job for several hundred boards of a score each, might more easily be effected by a single board of five men. It would be almost a miracle if the President could find nine men, whom the United States Senate might be willing to confirm as Supreme Court members, who would declare this proposal valid under the Constitution of the United States.

For the moment, let us return to the person of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His personality manages to surmount each of the controversies, each of the laws, each of the phases through which his Administration has passed. His character has a breadth that encompasses all these. Whether he has a destiny with as broad a scope as he imagines is a moot point; he was called and became the administrative director of 130,000,000 lives. And by the very nature of this country's rise to

its present eminence his overseas sphere of influence plays a considerable rôle in the lives of another 120,000,000 Central and South Americans.

Here is a man who, though in the international as in the national field has exhibited an increasing longing for personal power and leadership, has managed to crystallize international issues to the advantage of America. By means of frank rather than shrewd diplomacy (the credit for which he must divide largely with Secretary Cordell Hull) the President of the United States can point to his country today as having no entanglement in the world's potential crises and as being in the position of the greatest single importance to the world at large.

This brings the picture up to date. What does it hold for the future? It involves two very different factors: our relationship to Europe and our relationship to the other Americas.

In spite of the powerful lobbying of the isolationists, it was inevitable that the United States should take some stand regarding the high seas and the areas of conflict in Europe. It has become more and more the opinion of the nation at large that while we must avoid participation in extra-territorial warfare at all costs, that cost must not be blindness. It is childish to assume the viewpoint that the United States is "not involved." We are involved everywhere in this world, and not always by "vested interests." We are involved because our highly complex and decisively-important international trade keeps American goods in every market of the world. The importance of those open markets to our growers of cotton, hogs, wheat and tobacco, to our producers of copper, iron and oil, to our makers of motorcars and machinery is beyond all question. It behooves our administration, therefore, to establish sound international policies that tell plainly just where we stand. If the State Department had been a little more explicit, and considerably more honest during the World War, America's position might not only have been better understood at home but it would have been a good deal more tenable. Ours is one country that does not need to pretend. It can afford to tell the truth.

President Roosevelt formulated a European policy long before revolution developed into a Little World War in Spain. He recognized Soviet Russia which was sound. He launched a World Economic

Conference and then torpedoed it which was unsound. He was promptly responsive when public opinion, developed by the hearings before Senator Nye's Committee, opposed our acting as a base of supplies for European wars. The first short-term "neutrality" policy prohibited, therefore, the sale of supplies (both articles of combat and necessary raw materials) to "belligerents." This somewhat naive and incomplete act did not consider the responsibility involved in naming one nation or another as belligerent.

The fact was that after a thorough reading of the statute it appeared that it provided more loopholes that might drag America into a war than ways to keep her out. Hopes were high as the tenure of the act expired in the spring of this year — and hopes were dashed when Congress passed another misnamed neutrality statute which again concentrates more power in the hands of the President. He is now the arbiter as to whether the United States shall place its control of raw materials on the side of one or the other of two belligerents. He can determine who is to be permitted to come and buy the raw materials which are indispensable in war.

To leave this grave decision a matter of doubt and dispute is to ignore the nature of modern warfare. We have largely overemphasized the picture-book aspect of war, with bombs bursting in air and heavy artillery being rushed through the mud, just as a light cruiser sails into port to evacuate the women and children in the nick of time. Battleships and machine guns don't win a big war nowadays. International policies, whether as instruments of war or peace, might as well recognize this fact. What counts in modern warfare is the control of credit, access to raw materials, the ability of industry to turn out that vast quantity of material needed to carry on war beyond the first few weeks. The old idea that all you need is a big army able to strike the moment war started is not borne out by what is happening in Spain. We have seen there that under modern war conditions it is the defense that has the advantage, not the offense.

Even a relatively unskilled army with relatively poor equipment has been able to stand off a superior force supplied with excellent war material. Conditions of modern war make defense stronger than offense. That was also one of the lessons of the World War. It was the attacking army that suffered the greatest losses, and sometimes so weakened itself as to invite a successful counter-attack. Remember

what happened on the battlefields of Spain a few weeks ago when the Rebels marched on Madrid. They had a sufficient concentration of power and started off with the Italian division in the lead. They did make some gains. Then the Loyalists saw their opportunity and struck back. They took advantage of the exposed position of the attackers and succeeded in defeating the Italian divisions. With the cooperation of an air force they inflicted the most severe defeat the Rebels had experienced since the beginning of the Revolution.

Defense is stronger than attack. It is the country that can bring to bear raw materials, credit, the country that has access to copper, oil, iron, steel, cotton, wheat, corn, gold, that can wage a successful war. Now, when we give the President of the United States the authority to say who in time of war shall be permitted to come and purchase these from the United States we give him a tremendous responsibility, a responsibility no executive of a democratic country ought to have. In happy contrast with this kind of legislative manœuvring which is more likely to get us into trouble than to keep us out, is the superior strategy employed in our Latin-American diplomacy. Certainly the most heartening radio assignment I have had in the past year was to leave war-torn Spain for Buenos Aires, to cover the peace conference where twenty-two American republics expressed their enduring faith in the principle of collective security. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull did a magnificent job in leading that conference. This is the sort of thing that finds Mr. Roosevelt at his best.

He sold himself to those Latin-American people, and he deserved his popularity with them. They credit him particularly with the Good Neighbor policy which we have practiced for the past four years, and which has laid such a solid foundation for true friendship between the United States and the nations that lie to the South. This feeling of solidarity was expressed in the eight treaties and resolutions adopted at that conference, which the Senate promptly ratified in June 1937.

As the successful exponent of the Hull policy of better trade relations among all nations, the American Secretary of State was already popular in Latin America. He had made a most favorable impression on Latin American diplomats at the Montevideo Conference of 1933. His simple honesty, his sincere modesty, his straightforward approach to the problems in hand enabled him to win the friendship and confidence of practically all the delegates.

The important reciprocity treaties which we have already signed with Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, and others will soon be supplemented. The elimination of arbitrary tariffs, unjust quotas, and unfair currency discriminations resulted in immediate trade increases in both directions. The reduction of excessive prices and the stimulus to exports which have followed the Hull treaties point one important direction which the new fight for peace must take. The Hull policy of reciprocal trade concessions has broken through the lines of national isolation at many points. At Buenos Aires the three Americas joined forces in the new peace offensive. The battle has only begun. Who will say that the war for peace may not yet win important victories when it turns toward distracted Europe?

Against this European background of rearmament, intrigue and civil war, President Roosevelt staged his Pan-American Peace Conference. It was a master stroke of diplomacy since it centered attention on the fight for peace in a world distracted by the thought of war. The mere fact that twenty-one republics of the New World could agree at such a time on any kind of peace program was a valuable object lesson. There are those who see in this object lesson to Europe the prime purpose of the conference. They recall the story current in Washington last year that if President Roosevelt won reelection he would try to bring about a world conference in which the heads of all the leading states would meet together to work out a peace program. Prematurely published, the plan was decried as fantastic. Nevertheless the belief persists that President Roosevelt — whose lively imagination does not shy away from even the boldest enterprise — is still toying with the idea. The success of his Buenos Aires venture has only confirmed his belief that New World unity can and should be the first step in a much more far-reaching program. When the Spanish Civil War ends he will recur to the world conference idea. Success in that wider field may help him to offset the mistakes he has made at home.

OUTLOOK: President Roosevelt has passed the high tide of his popularity. Every President is likely to lose favor as time goes on because every man in high place is bound to make enemies and dis-

point friends. The higher he goes in public favor the farther he falls once the fickle tide of popularity has turned.

It would be ridiculous to say that President Roosevelt has become unpopular. But he is certainly far less popular in 1937 than he was on November third, 1936. His demand in Congress to pack the Supreme Court with six personal appointees is primarily responsible. It shocked Congress and the country and effected a decisive change in their attitude. The compromise proposal to do the Court packing a little at a time has won a few Senate votes but has reconciled no sincere opponent. Insistence on it will injure both the President and his party.

From now on every demand the President makes will be carefully and suspiciously scrutinized. There is growing apprehension concerning his lust for power. There is a widespread belief that he would not be averse to the third term for which Governor Earle of Pennsylvania has already nominated him. My own opinion is that he will use the third term threat for political purposes and then step aside. Measures which Congress might have approved before the Court plan was broached will be defeated solely because they enhance executive at the expense of legislative power. A large part of his 1937 legislative program is jeopardized because of the time spent on the Court plan and the animosities it has engendered.

Franklin D. Roosevelt is too good a strategist not to know when he is beaten. His continued insistence on the Court proposal after he knew it could not pass was in part an attempt to press the Court to make more liberal decisions and who can say that he did not succeed? We have had nothing but liberal decisions since the Court plan was proposed. Partly also the President's insistence is due to his belief in Napoleon's motto: *De l'audace, toujours de l'audace!* Be bold, never say die, and you may turn defeat into victory. The President wanted a liberal court. Now he has it even though he does not choose to admit it.

He will continue to champion far-reaching reforms. But as the pork barrel grows smaller and taxes grow bigger there will be less missionary zeal in both Congress and the country. Even Socialist Premier Blum found it advisable to emphasize "*la pause.*" Nor did it save him from defeat. Even the Holy Crusades of the Middle Ages petered out after the first four years. So the real test of F. D. R. lies ahead. How will he stand defeat? For while he has continued to be *fortiter in re* he seems to have forgotten to be *suaviter in modo!*

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE

WAR OR PEACE?

The imminence of war is still the world's greatest menace and a durable peace is still the world's ultimate goal. We have said little when we declare that peace is a period of pause between two wars. For in saying this we undervalue the fact that both peace and war are made and unmade by the men who lead nations. Little sparks do not necessarily ignite major conflagrations. Wars do not come at regular intervals. Peace can be made months, years or decades after war begins. No precedent has been exact enough to serve as a basis for speculation. Even the most tangible lessons we have learned from the past need deeper understanding to be of any protective value. The judgments of our wisest statesmen are far from reliable, because there is no concert of good will among them. Neither promises, nor agreements, nor declarations of policy have been found sufficiently reliable to withstand the exigencies of passionate outburst or uncontrolled greed.

If these premises provide no foundations on which to plan that cooperative venture which alone can provide a foundation for peace—if, indeed, they seem to destroy even the basis for hope—it does not mean that we cannot circumvent some of the obstacles to peace. Eternal vigilance and basic integrity are still valuable. There is still reason to believe that the broader perspectives of the cultured world citizen can outreach the narrow vision of the local tyrant, whose respect for general welfare goes no further than his own backyard. If we are to resign ourselves to the feeble admission that man's lust is more powerful than his philosophy, it matters little when or where war will come. In such a world the decimation of human beings matters little. It is only if we believe in composite man as a higher type of being that we may find ways and means of triumphing over the mean-ness and small-ness that provoke wars. Only then will it be worth our while to try and achieve common security by international coopera-

tion. Only then will there be any satisfactory response to the stimuli of free trade and cultural intercourse.

Only after we have recognized that war and peace are concepts, arising respectively from sick and healthy minds, can we even measure the likelihood of another major war. The answer will not be found in a tabulation of armaments, or by counting the miles of exposed frontier, or in the speeches of demagogues. We can estimate only two of many contributing factors. One is the temperamental tide in the individuals who lead. This is variable — William James was fond of saying that Napoleon lost a battle because his barber's razor slipped one morning. The other is a country's morale. If it is inordinately high, the delusions of grandeur find expression in aggressive adventure, the pronounced ego seeking speedy and ruthless satisfaction. If it is insufferably low, due to oppression, humiliation or deprivation, its resistance to the shocks of passion and prejudice will be low. Such an embittered type of morale is its own and everybody's enemy, as blind to its own safety as it is to the rights of others. It brought Hitler in Germany.

The only remotely practical consideration of the likelihood of war is a study of the problems besetting those countries where temperament is demonstrably unstable and where morale is out of equilibrium. Such a survey leads us logically to consider the present predicament of the Have-Nots. If war comes tomorrow one of them will provide it.

For the first of the three, let us look at Italy. Mussolini would take first, or any place, on such a list reluctantly, inasmuch as he now claims that Italy no longer belongs in this category. It pleases him to consider his new "colonial empire" as making Italy one of the "satisfied" powers, which seems ridiculous. Before the conquest of Ethiopia, Europe was used to hearing nothing quite as often as Mussolini's dissatisfaction: dissatisfaction with her returns from participation in the war, with her lack of raw materials, with prejudicial tariff barriers, with the immigration laws of other countries, with Italy's northern boundaries, with Nazi aggression in the old Austro-Hungarian region, with England's attitude in the Mediterranean, with the treatment accorded her at council tables, with Geneva, with the declining birthrate, with the Vatican — indeed with almost everything.

Certainly she is hardly satisfied with the annexation of Ethiopia behind her, an African outpost which was costly to capture, which will be difficult to organize, difficult to control and more difficult to exploit. Foreigners are apt not to realize the groundwork that must be laid before a distant colony becomes anything other than a liability to its continental parent. It will be at least fifty years before the Ethiopian "returns" come in.

Furthermore, thanks to the corporate state's hazardous fiscal policies, Italy is only just now beginning to pay the terrific cost of the campaign. The total amount cannot be computed even from the large expenditures for troops' pay, food, transportation, animal upkeep, roadbuilding, arms, ammunition, and lost man-power. It was to some extent the toll exacted by the League members' sanctions which overtaxed the nation's whole economic structure. Any country with a faulty internal economy is at a disadvantage. Such a condition limits the potential gains of conquest. Such a nation can not afford to expand unless immediate success is guaranteed. That is why I believe Mussolini declared himself "satisfied" only because for the moment he has to be and because he felt it necessary to quiet Britain's apprehensions about his further ambitions.

What possibilities exist today for an Italian offensive? None, practically. In spite of all his *bravura*, he has not overcome England's superiority in the Mediterranean, and he is not going to challenge the British Empire to prove the point. What, then, is this first of the Have-Nots going to do? I can simply say that Mussolini, the realist, will not be the first to declare or wage war. Instead, he will continue his present wise tactics of exploiting Hitler's nuisance value while strengthening relations with the smaller countries bordering the Adriatic. There is every indication that he is making progress. The friendly agreement signed with Jugoslavia this year completes the first step in his program. It may end an enmity that gave France a tremendous advantage in that part of Europe. The second step is progressing rapidly: the recent visit of the King and Queen of Italy to Budapest marks the first time a ruling monarch has been seen on Hungarian soil since the dissolution of the Empire. Nor is it true that Mussolini has abandoned Austria to the Nazis. If they seem to have a freer hand it is because they have promised Mussolini not to be too free.

If things appear to be reasonably pacific on the Italian "front," what about Germany? Hitler's internal economy is in as bad, if not a worse condition, than Mussolini's. Not superficially. Germany knows how to put on a brave front. Those who visit Germany all report how well things look. But on account of stringent regulations and rigid censorship no one knows from day to day just what the situation really is. International bankers know that Germany's economic resources have been stretched to the limit by the armament-building program. The entire German army is gradually being mechanized and mobilized, a course which is not only expensive but also exacting on domestic industry. It has meant much more *Ersatz* for all consumers' goods, and the weight of such invisible taxation falls predominantly on the middle classes, which can least afford the burden. This middle class is slowly growing restive under the yoke of restrictions.

Commerce with foreign nations in manufactured goods is definitely gaining; but at what cost to internal economy only Dr. Schacht knows. The artificial subsidies Germany applies to bolster exports were a topic of discussion in every South American country during my 1936 visit. Perhaps the greatest strain on the National Socialist program today is the tension that draws tighter between Nazi demands on Schacht's financial prowess and the limits to which this able financier can go. So we have the parallel with Mussolini's situation: no more than Il Duce can Hitler afford to undertake an aggressive campaign involving the slightest risk of failure or long delay. He will risk a quick stroke such as the brutal reprisal bombardment of Almeria, but not war.

With Franco-Russian and Franco-British relations both much improved, Hitler has long since excluded his Western frontier as a place to achieve territorial gains. That still leaves him the alternative of cajoling the former allied powers into some compromise concession on former German colonies. But this will require better behavior and smarter diplomacy than Germany has recently exhibited. There is, also, the possibility of sudden German mobilization toward one of the weaker powers on the East. And yet, with Poland and Czechoslovakia well armed and bound to France by defensive treaties, Germany must think twice before she invades their territory. Assuming that Hitler will at least wait until 1939 when he will have

finished the extravagant arms program he has undertaken, there is little in the present European picture to suggest a German-made war.

Now that Danzig has been thoroughly Nazified, Germany may wish to reincorporate Danzig. But if this were handled tactfully even Poland could be bribed or persuaded into letting it happen. German Nazi propagandists will continue to bring pressure to bear on the three million German-speaking people in Czechoslovakia. Many of them are already sympathetic under Nazi-leader Henlein's close surveillance. In Austria, Italy may tolerate closer economic relations with Germany but only on condition that there be no effort to extend Germany's political frontiers to the Italian Alps. For all these reasons it is inconceivable that Hitler seeks to engage in premeditated warfare, in the near future.

If these two powerful and ambitious Have-Not powers seem pretty firmly hedged in for the time being, let us glance for a moment at that third super-nationalist power on the other side of the earth. If Japan has had to shed a little of her optimism of the early thirties, when the rest of the world was experiencing a depression she had often known, it is because she has looked forward a little too consistently, and now finds herself looking back longingly. She is just beginning to realize that her opportunities knocked a few years ago, when she was paying too little attention to the new alignments shaping up in the Pacific. It is too late now for her to engage in militant aggression against Russian Siberia and Soviet Mongolia. If Japan ever was a match for Russia, it was before the trans-Siberian Railroad was doubletracked, before Siberia was industrialized and before Vladivostok was fortified and garrisoned as it is today.

At present Japan's own house is far from in order, and she finds herself a little behind schedule everywhere. At least a partial answer to Japan in anything resembling another Russo-Japanese conflict may be found beneath the modern hangars on the government air-field at Vladivostok. There something like 1000 bombing planes wait the order from Moscow to rain incendiary shells on the tinder box beehive cities of Japan. This real danger coupled with the difficulty of successful anti-air defense has entrenched in the already troubled mind of Japan's militarists, the suspicion that any further unprovoked aggression on the mainland might even induce Russo-

Chinese cooperation. Such uncomfortable prospects have restrained the Japanese General Staff but little, however.

Is aggression worth what it will cost? The sober Foreign Office in Tokyo is constantly raising this question with the military hotheads. The military authorities still control the two key posts in every Cabinet which means they can secure direct access to the Emperor and speak for him even after having been voted out by a harassing popular majority. This leaves the oldest of the Have-Nots in a precarious situation.

Foolhardy steps might be taken abroad to secure relief from an unhealthy situation at home. Once Japanese soldiers and sailors are being killed in a foreign war, home opposition disappears until some later time when it might flare forth as revolution against intolerable burdens. Yet it is much more likely that Japan, following the same line of thought as her fellow Have-Nots, will concentrate for a while on making the most out of her puppet state, Manchukuo, and the quiet extension of her political and economic power in North China.

Of course these three dissatisfied powers have enough in common to suggest the possibility that they may act together. Indeed if any one of them considers aggression, the obvious move would be an effort to develop joint action. The three adventurous powers present the greatest possibility of conflict in the prospect of a dual or triple union for the purpose of aggression. This might come either as the result of a carefully mapped policy of sympathetic propaganda (such as that in favor of Rebel Spain) or of some sudden outburst. This is by no means a new or unconsidered menace. Obviously the three are going to stand together on any question that affects all three. What, you might ask, could conceivably affect all three? Communism, real or alleged, is one easy answer. We have only to consider the strength these three could amass together, and we realize how slight an issue it would have to be if the balance of power should ever appear definitely on the side of the Have-Nots. Fascist powers can reach agreement on military action far more easily than democratic powers. Germany and Italy have acted in close military cooperation since the Spanish Revolution began. If such a point were ever reached (and of course England is making it her business to avoid that potential balance of power) it would be logical for all three to strike to-

gether. Only thus could they have the slightest chance of successful acquisition by force.

This prospect of alignment may seem extravagant, but enough friendly overtures have been made among them to make the rest of Europe consider it very seriously. Both Goering and von Neurath have made repeated recent visits to Italy, and Count Ciano has been to Berlin. It has been some time since Hitler's rather unsuccessful trip to Venice, but it looks as though Il Duce might soon repay the visit. Following the attack of a Spanish Government plane on the Deutschland and the reprisal bombardment of Almeria, General von Blomberg of the Reichswehr flew to Rome and agreed with Mussolini on joint military measures to be taken if and when. In another direction, Germany has arrived at an understanding with Japan, ostensibly a working agreement for cooperative action against the spread of Communism, but the almost literal equivalent of an anti-Soviet pact. The notice of the agreement was made public, but the text itself was not filed with the League, since both had retired from the body.

If we can place any confidence in the visible barriers to the declaration of war by any one of the three "irresponsibles," it seems fair to conclude that none of them is in a position to borrow the kind of trouble that warfare would surely bring. This applies, of course, to premeditated campaigns, yet even the most ambitious wars are embarked upon only after the belligerent has evaluated his prospects of success.

The complete pessimist will recall, naturally, that many wars have been less thoroughly calculated; that they originated in the spontaneous "explosion" of political emotions, and only gathered momentum as they went along. I do not pretend to exclude such possibilities today. I say, however, that such outbursts are completely unpredictable, and depend upon a highly complex array of factors. Political emotions are running high, it is true, but we have only to remember that if a general European or world war was going to follow the first, there has been at least one occasion during every one of the last five years when it might have come, and at least five occasions since July 1936. So the required combination must be much more precise. The emotions must be deepseated, the issues longstanding, the individual agitators utterly sure of themselves. We

can find all these elements combined in the major factors: temperament and morale. Beyond these, there is room only for a wholly unpredictable miscalculation — on the part, perhaps, of a dictator, or of a dictator's subordinate. Common sense seems to prevail at this writing, see Hitler's and Mussolini's recent interviews and recent declarations of Japanese foreign policy. But it would take something heavier than common sense to dampen all the loose powder lying in European arsenals.

Is there another side of the picture? Is there anything equally positive that indicates a peaceful prospect for European rehabilitation? Is there a single optimistic note that can be sounded, and perhaps heard, against the clamor of arms and the whirr of propellers? Europe's armies can muster 6,000,000 men, about 15,000 each of airplanes and tanks, and her navies, a couple of thousand fighting ships. All these are ready for war. Can they do anything for peace? Can anything be done for peace? These are the questions all the world is asking. The world wants to know: what is being done for peace?

Theoretically, that is, intellectually and emotionally, the greater part of the 2,000,000,000 people on earth have built up a strong resistance to the idea of war. They regard it as a costly havoc capable of shaking the foundations of civilization. Although millions of them are as yet hopelessly uninformed on the nature of the international enmity, most of them are convinced, within the range of their own feelings, their own imaginations and desires, that some better instrument than war must be devised with which to settle political and economic differences.

But, practically speaking, how much security is this popular determination worth? The two billion inhabitants do not run this world, or any great part of it. The millions of drilled soldiers who are now prepared for war have no voice in the decision as to when it will come or what it will bring. A bare handful of men could inaugurate, within twenty-four hours, the bloodiest warfare mankind has ever known. Who can oppose them? What can restrain them?

So far as I can see, only one alternative is powerful enough. That is the idea of collective security. While each country arms against the other, war is the inevitable end. Only if and when national armaments are pledged to an international peace purpose can there

be any hope of avoiding war. Call it a League, an Association or a Society of Nations, the name matters little. What counts is the determination of peace-minded nations to act collectively against those who deliberately break the peace.

The first step will probably have to be an international economic conference that will carry on where the unhappy London Economic Conference of 1933 left off. Europe cannot be blamed for seeking to inveigle us into accepting responsibility for its convocation. We prevented progress at London — are we ready for collective action now? When Premier Van Zeeland returned to Europe in July after his American visit, he had received little encouragement. The time was not ripe. Yet there is little doubt that the next step must be an economic conference, in which *all* the principal powers would solemnly bind their representatives to stay at the council board until an understanding is reached. An understanding that the common welfare of the world can best be served by cooperative economic enterprise. This might be the beginning of a practical peace movement. Mutual agreement to end the arms race would be the next step and after that the League of Nations could again hold up its head. The barriers are not insurmountable. If I am envisioning an ideal, so much the better. At least I have faith in it. If we are not to become complete pessimists we must have that faith — that which William James called "the will to believe." Without it nothing is possible. With it, something can be done, some progress toward peace can be made.



MODERN AGE BOOKS

It would cost several thousand dollars to publish a single book. When the cost is spread over two or three thousand books, as is usually the case, the cost per book is reduced, but still remains high enough to put it beyond the reach of the average reader.

To overcome this difficulty, Modern Age Books are printed in editions of fifty to a hundred thousand copies, which so reduces the cost per book that it is possible to sell them at a price well adapted to the average pocketbook.

Modern Age Books are being published at regular intervals. They are full-length books, by the best modern authors. They cover the entire field of current literature from popular fiction to serious studies of political, social, and economic problems. In addition to new books, Modern Age is re-issuing a series of unabridged editions of the literary treasures of the present and the past.

For the purpose of convenient identification, all Modern Age Books are issued in three classifications: 1. Blue Seal Books; 2. Gold Seal Books; 3. Red Seal Books. All new books published for sale at 25¢ carry the Blue Seal label; all new books priced above 25¢ carry the Gold Seal label; all re-issues of standard literary works carry the Red Seal label.

All books published in these three classifications at these low prices are bound in sturdy paper covers. For those who wish to have Modern Age Books in a more durable form, a limited number of both Blue and Gold Seal titles are available, attractively bound in cloth.

BLUE SEAL BOOKS

1. BABIES WITHOUT TAILS, *by Walter Duranty*
2. ALL'S FAIR, *by Richard Wormser*
3. MURDER STRIKES THREE, *by David MacDuff*
4. OLD HELL, *by Emmett Gowen*
5. RED FEATHER, *by Marjorie Fischer (Juvenile)*
6. MEALS ON WHEELS, *by Lou Willson and Olive Hoover (Cook Book)*


GOLD SEAL BOOKS

1. THE UNITED STATES: A GRAPHIC HISTORY, *by Louis M. Hacker, Rudolf Modley and George R. Taylor*
2. FROM SPANISH TRENCHES, *compiled by Marcel Acier*
3. KALTENBORN EDITS THE NEWS, *by H. V. Kaltenborn*
4. THE LABOR SPY RACKET, *by Leo Huberman*
5. MEN WHO LEAD LABOR, *by Bruce Minton and John Stuart*

RED SEAL BOOKS

1. TRAVELS IN THE CONGO, *by André Gide*
2. TWELVE AGAINST THE GODS, *by William Bolitho*
3. SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS, *by Dorothy L. Sayers*
4. THE LEAVENWORTH CASE, *by Anna Katharine Green*
5. THEY SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH, *by Morley Callaghan*
6. THE DARING YOUNG MAN ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE, *by William Saroyan*
7. THE HONORABLE PICNIC, *by Thomas Raucaut*
8. MR. WESTON'S GOOD WINE, *by T. F. Powys*
9. A PASSAGE TO INDIA, *by E. M. Forster*
10. BLOOD OF THE CONQUERORS, *by Harvey Fergusson*

Also Published by Modern Age Books



FROM SPANISH TRENCHES

Compiled by Marcel Acier

Next best to being in the midst of stirring events yourself, is a report from someone who is. *From Spanish Trenches* is such a report on Spain. It is a book of vivid letters giving eye-witness accounts of the Civil War from behind Loyalist lines. Probably not since Barbusse's *Under Fire* has so realistic a contemporary record of war appeared. The writers of the letters are of many nationalities — among them Americans, Germans, Spaniards, Dutch, English, Scotch, Irish and Russian. Some of the letters are by American girls serving with the medical units.

The letters naturally reflect several points of view, for each writer is decidedly individual. Some are newspaper correspondents, some are Catholics, Liberals, Communists; others are Irish Republicans, and there are a few who are young men out for adventure. They describe incidents in the heroic defense of Madrid, of the bombing of hospitals and street-cars, and portray also, as Barbusse did, in writing of the World War, the grim humor of the soldiers as well as their heroism and sacrifice.

Marcel Acier, the translator and compiler, is a young American who was born in France. He is a playwright and radio script-writer who is now active in organizing medical aid for the Loyalists.

A Gold Seal Book — 35 cents

MEN WHO LEAD LABOR

by Bruce Minton and John Stuart

Nothing in the years of this turbulent decade has produced a greater stir than the labor developments of 1937. Cleavage of opinion and sympathy have been even sharper than in the presidential election of 1936. To thousands of people John L. Lewis of the C.I.O. is a magnificent patriot fighting for a noble cause — and to other thousands he wears horns and a tail. Opinion divides as sharply on the other leading figures of the labor world — William Green of the A. F. of L., Hutcheson, Heywood Broun of the Newspaper Guild, Bridges of the West Coast.

Minton and Stuart have produced in *Men Who Lead Labor* a series of candid biographies of these men in every day's news — men who are influencing thousands of destinies and the course of our national life. These biographical sketches are vivid and factual, written without fear or favor. In a very real sense this series of brilliant personal histories sketches also the inside story of labor's history during the past decades — a history that includes episodes of corruption and racketeering as well as honest struggle against rotten conditions.

A Gold Seal Book — 35 cents

THE LABOR SPY RACKET

by Leo Huberman

Here are the facts of tyranny in America, a tyranny worse than that which drove George Washington, Jefferson, Tom Paine, John Adams and the other Founding Fathers to revolution. *The Labor Spy Racket* records the testimony produced at the LaFollette investigation, revelations of company police brutality, unlawful arrests,

murders, secret supplies of ammunition and gases to be used against civilians, and other outrages that shocked the country — revelations which made headline news for weeks.

Mr. Huberman, well-known writer on labor subjects, was in Washington during the hearings of the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee, and he has made a notable condensation of the eight bulky official volumes of testimony and evidence. Here it is. You'll find it dramatic reading.

A Gold Seal Book — 35 cents

THE UNITED STATES: A Graphic History

*by Louis M. Hacker, Rudolf Modley,
and George R. Taylor*

Here is history streamlined. All the clutter and windbreaks of footnotes and boring details that slow up the reader have been stripped away. History is presented in its functional form, dealing with the past as it influences our present social, political and business life.

Dr. Hacker's lucid and brilliant text is illustrated with seventy-six interesting pictorial statistics charts. They are a great help in visualizing dramatic and important facts that are usually presented, if at all, in a very dull fashion.

The United States: A Graphic History is a book exciting in context and timely in presentation. It is sound in scholarship and never for a moment dull. It is history that you'll like even if you don't like "history".

A Gold Seal Book — 75 cents

MURDER STRIKES THREE

by David MacDuff

Professor Finley was murdered in his office as the rest of the faculty were gathering for Commencement exercises. Several of his colleagues were embarrassingly absent from the exercises, which they were supposed to attend. Two of them were murdered shortly afterwards. Mallock, the detective, suspected why — but the beautiful girl who held the key to the mystery was good at keeping secrets.

Why did Professor Finley's monstrous son arrive for the first time on the afternoon of his father's murder? Who stole the mummy from Finley's museum? Why? And why were racketeers jittery over the archaeologist's murder?

Tough, fast, terse, this story of a campus murder has no academic flavor to it. It will keep you puzzled to the last page, and you'll hope to see able Detective Mallock at work again, on other mysteries like this one.

A Blue Seal Book — 25 cents





